








Dean Prof. Dr. Patrick Van Kenhove 
(Ghent University) 
 
Prof. Dr. Iris Vermeir 
(Ghent University) 
 
Prof. Dr. Ignace De Beelde 
(Ghent University) 
 
Prof. Dr. Hendrik Slabbinck 
(Ghent University) 
 
Prof. Dr. Tine De Bock 
(KU Leuven) 
 
Prof. Dr. Joëlle Vanhamme 
(EDHEC) 
 






I am forever grateful to my promotors Prof. Dr. Patrick Van Kenhove and Prof. Dr. Iris 
Vermeir for their feedback, trust and support. I also wholeheartedly thank my co-workers 
Elke, Saar, Liesbet and Dieneke for their invaluable friendship, their support and the laughs 
and tears we have shared. I would also like to thank my mother, who is my role model for 
strength and perseverance in the face of adversity, for loving and nurturing me 
unconditionally. I would especially like to thank my partner Thomas for his loving support, 
for always believing in me and for motivating me to push myself, ILY. 
Finally I would like to thank all my colleagues, friends and family for their encouragement 
and support, I am truly fortunate to be surrounded by so many amazing and inspiring people.  
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING ....................................................................... 1 
ENGLISH SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 4 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 8 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 8 
2. Ethical decision making models and frameworks: An overview ...................................... 11 
3. Ethical consumption .......................................................................................................... 20 
4. The interplay between rationality, intuition and emotion ................................................. 23 
5. Dissertation outline ........................................................................................................... 25 
6. References ......................................................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER II: THE VIRTUOUS TORTOISE AND THE VILLAINOUS HARE: 
APPLYING DUAL PROCESS THEORY ON ETHICAL AND UNETHICAL 
JUDGMENT ........................................................................................................................... 37 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 38 
2. Literature review ............................................................................................................... 38 
2.1 Dual-process theory ..................................................................................................... 38 
2.2 Dual-process theory and the judgment of unethical behavior ..................................... 39 
2.3 Dual-process theory and the judgment of ethical behavior ......................................... 41 
2.4 Judgment of unethical versus ethical behavior ............................................................ 42 
2.5 Research objectives ..................................................................................................... 45 
3. Study 1 .............................................................................................................................. 46 
3.1 Participants and procedure ........................................................................................... 46 
3.2 Results and discussion ................................................................................................. 46 
3.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 50 
4. Study 2 .............................................................................................................................. 51 
4.1 Participants and procedure ........................................................................................... 52 
4.2 Results and discussion ................................................................................................. 54 
4.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 56 
5. Study 3 .............................................................................................................................. 56 
5.1 Participants and procedure ........................................................................................... 56 
5.2 Dilemmas ..................................................................................................................... 59 
5.3 Results and discussion ................................................................................................. 60 
6. Study 4 .............................................................................................................................. 64 
6.1 Participants and procedure ........................................................................................... 64 
6.2 Results and discussion ................................................................................................. 65 
6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 66 
7. General discussion ............................................................................................................ 67 
8. Limitations and future research......................................................................................... 70 
9. References ......................................................................................................................... 72 
10. Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 80 
CHAPTER III: ONE SAIL FITS ALL? A PSYCHOGRAPHIC SEGMENTATION OF 
DIGITAL PIRATES .............................................................................................................. 88 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 89 
2. Literature overview and conceptual framework ............................................................... 90 
2.1 Behavioral perspective ................................................................................................ 90 
2.2 Ethical perspective ....................................................................................................... 93 
2.3 Descriptive perspective ................................................................................................ 96 
2.4 Segmentation framework ............................................................................................. 97 
2.5 Piracy-combatting measures ........................................................................................ 98 
2.6 Approach ................................................................................................................... 100 
3. Study 1 ............................................................................................................................ 101 
3.1 Sample characteristics ............................................................................................... 101 
3.2 Research method ........................................................................................................ 101 
3.3 Results ....................................................................................................................... 102 
4. Study 2 ............................................................................................................................ 104 
4.1 Sampling .................................................................................................................... 104 
4.2 Instrument measures .................................................................................................. 104 
4.3 Results and conclusions ............................................................................................. 107 
5. Study 3 ............................................................................................................................ 114 
5.1 Sampling .................................................................................................................... 114 
5.2 Design and instrument measures ............................................................................... 114 
5.3 Results and conclusion .............................................................................................. 116 
6. Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 119 
7. Managerial implications .................................................................................................. 121 
8. Research limitations and future research ........................................................................ 122 
9. References ....................................................................................................................... 124 
10. Appendices .................................................................................................................... 133 
CHAPTER IV: WOULD YOU BE SO KIND TO BUY FAIR? THE IMPACT OF 
INTERPERSONAL FEELINGS ON FAIR-TRADE CONSUMPTION ........................ 141 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 142 
2. Literature review ............................................................................................................. 143 
3. Study 1 ............................................................................................................................ 147 
3.1 Participants and procedure ......................................................................................... 147 
3.2 Results and discussion ............................................................................................... 149 
3.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 151 
4. Study 2 ............................................................................................................................ 152 
4.1 Participants and procedure ......................................................................................... 152 
4.2 Results and discussion ............................................................................................... 154 
4.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 155 
5. General discussion .......................................................................................................... 157 
6. Managerial implications .................................................................................................. 160 
7. Limitations and future research....................................................................................... 161 
8. References ....................................................................................................................... 163 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH .. 169 
1. Recapitulation of findings ............................................................................................... 169 
2. Theoretical and managerial implications ........................................................................ 172 
3. Limitations and suggestions for future research ............................................................. 174 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………... 8 
Table 1. Overview of ethical topics in marketing by Schlegelmilch and Oberseder 
(2010)……………………………………………………………………………………. 10 
Table 2. Consumer ethics scale (Muncy & Vitell, 2005)………………………………… 18 
Table 3. Overview of studies…………………………………………………………….. 28 
CHAPTER II: THE VIRTUOUS TORTOISE AND THE VILLAINOUS HARE: 
APPLYING DUAL PROCESS THEORY ON ETHICAL AND UNETHICAL 
JUDGMENT……………………………………………………………………………. 37 
Table 1. Study 1. Items, means and internal consistency of the scenarios………………. 49 
Table 2. Study 2. Reaction times (in s) by framing……………………………………… 51 
Table 3. Study 2. Items, means and internal consistency of self-reported processing 
styles……………………………………………………………………………………… 53 
Table 4. Study 2. Self-reported thinking styles by condition…………………………….. 55 
Table 5. Study 2. Judgments by framing………………………………………………… 55 
Table 6. Study 4. Eye-tracking metrics…………………………………………………... 67 
CHAPTER III: ONE SAIL FITS ALL? A PSYCHOGRAPHIC 
SEGMENTATION OF DIGITAL PIRATES………………………………………… 88 
Table 1. Study 2: Items, means and internal consistency………………………………... 106 
Table 2. Study 2: Factor loadings deontological and teleological orientation…………… 107 
Table 3. Study 2: Overview of cluster models…………………………………………… 108 
Table 4. Study 2: Overview of segment composition……………………………………. 109 
Table 5. Study 2: Further profiling: General Linear Model……………………………… 110 
Table 6. Study 2: Further profiling: Cross tabulation……………………………………. 110 
Table 7. Study 3: Items, means and internal consistency………………………………... 115 
Table 8. Study 3. Legal strategy…………………………………………………………. 118 
Table 9. Study 3. Educational strategy…………………………………………………... 118 
CHAPTER IV: WOULD YOU BE SO KIND TO BUY FAIR? THE IMPACT OF 
INTERPERSONAL FEELINGS ON FAIR-TRADE CONSUMPTION…………… 141 
Table 1. Study 1: Chi-square tests by condition and by product choice…………………. 151 
Table 2. Study 2: Attribute importances and conjoint utilitiesa overall (a) and compared 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………..... 8 
Figure 1. Four component model of ethical decision making (Rest, 1979)……………….. 11 
Figure 2. An issue-contingent model of ethical decision making in organizations (Jones, 
1991)…………………………………………………………………………….………… 12 
Figure 3. A contingency model of ethical decision making in a marketing organization 
(Ferrell & Gresham, 1985)………………………………………………………………… 13 
Figure 4. Taxonomy of ethical ideologies (Forsyth, 1980)………………………………… 14 
Figure 5. Hunt-Vitell general theory of marketing ethics (1986)…………………………… 16 
Figure 6. Theoretical model of relations among values types (Schwartz, 1994)……………  22 
CHAPTER II: THE VIRTUOUS TORTOISE AND THE VILLAINOUS HARE: 
APPLYING DUAL PROCESS THEORY ON ETHICAL AND UNETHICAL 
JUDGMENT……………………………………………………………………………... 37 
Figure 1. Study 1. Reaction times of scenarios……………………………………………. 50  
Figure 2. Study 3. Reaction times under cognitive load……………………………………. 63 
CHAPTER IV: WOULD YOU BE SO KIND TO BUY FAIR? THE IMPACT OF 
INTERPERSONAL FEELINGS ON FAIR-TRADE CONSUMPTION……………… 141 
Figure 1. Study 1 Mediation analysis………………………………………………………... 150 




LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
CHAPTER II: THE VIRTUOUS TORTOISE AND THE VILLAINOUS HARE: 
APPLYING DUAL PROCESS THEORY ON ETHICAL AND UNETHICAL 
JUDGMENT……………………………………………………………………………. 36 
Appendix A. Overview of existing personal and impersonal moral dilemmas as 
collected and categorized by Greene e.a. (2008)………………………………………... 80 
Appendix B. Structure of moral dilemmas used in studies 3 and 4……………………… 86 
CHAPTER III: ONE SAIL FITS ALL? A PSYCHOGRAPHIC 
SEGMENTATION OF DIGITAL PIRATES………………………………………… 88 
Appendix A. Glossary……………………………………………………………………. 133 
Appendix B. Study 1: Topic guide……………………………………………………...... 134 
Appendix C. Study 2: Ethical dilemma………………………………………………….. 134 








Ethiek gerelateerd aan consumentengedrag behelst een brede waaier aan 
consumentengedragingen, gaande van consumenten die liegen over producten die ze zelf 
hebben beschadigd, namaakproducten aankopen, digitale piraterij tot winkeldiefstal aan de ene 
kant, en aan de andere kant: het aankopen van milieuvriendelijke producten, Fair Trade 
producten en consumenten die eerlijk aangeven dat een rekening verkeerd werd berekend in 
hun voordeel. Ethiek gerelateerd aan consumentengedrag wordt gedefinieerd als “de morele 
regels, principes en standaarden die het gedrag van een individu (of groep) beïnvloeden in de 
keuze, aankoop, het gebruik, de verkoop of het ontdoen van een product of dienst” (Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992, p.298). Moreel geladen consumentengedrag oefent een enorme invloed uit op 
winkeliers en andere bedrijven, in de negatieve zin (vb. winkeldiefstal, namaakgoederen en 
digitale piraterij) maar ook in de positieve zin (vb. de verkoop van Fair Trade of 
milieuvriendelijke producten). De literatuur over ethiek gerelateerd aan consumentengedrag 
omspant twee stromen van onderzoek: onderzoek dat zich toelegt op negatief 
consumentengedrag (i.e. consumenten ethiek) en onderzoek dat zich toelegt op positief 
consumentengedrag (i.e. ethische consumptie). Naar dit positief consumentengedrag zal 
voortaan verwezen worden als “ethisch consumentengedrag” en omvat gedrag dat gericht is 
op het verhogen van andermans welzijn en het goeddoen voor anderen en/of de maatschappij 
in het algemeen. Anderzijds wordt naar negatief consumentengedrag verwezen als “onethisch 
consumentengedrag”. Dit omvat norm-overschrijdend gedrag met kwalijke gevolgen voor 
anderen en/of de maatschappij in het algemeen. Dit werkstuk legt zich toe op beide vormen van 
moreel consumentengedrag en op hoe de beoordeling van dit gedrag kan verschillen.  
De wereld waarin de hedendaagse consument leeft is het voorbije decennium drastisch 
veranderd waardoor nieuwe vormen van ethisch en onethisch consumentengedrag tot uiting zijn 
gekomen. Onethisch consumentengedrag omvatte tot dan toe onethisch gedrag dat zich 
afspeelde binnen de muren van de fysieke winkel zoals winkeldiefstal, het frauduleus gebruik 
van kortingsbonnen of het terugbrengen van beschadigde goederen waarvoor de klant zelf 
verantwoordelijk was, enz. Tegenwoordig heeft de marktplaats zich verplaatst naar het internet 
waardoor nieuwe, unieke uitingen van onethisch consumentengedrag zich hebben ontwikkeld, 
zoals het online kopen van namaakgoederen of digitale piraterij. Daarentegen is ethisch 
consumentengedrag alsmaar belangrijker geworden omwille van een steeds aanhoudende 
globalisatie (met alle problemen van dien) en inspanningen tot het opwekken van een 
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bewustwording onder consumenten door milieu- en humanitaire pressiegroepen. Consumenten 
zijn alsmaar meer bezorgd over de afkomst van hun producten en de omstandigheden 
waaronder ze werden geproduceerd. Ethisch consumentengedrag omvat onder andere het 
aankoopgedrag van ‘ethische producten’. Dit zijn producten die geproduceerd zijn met aandacht 
voor dierenwelzijn, het milieu, menswaardige werkomstandigheden, eerlijke verloning en de 
bestrijding van kinderarbeid.  
Dit werkstuk legt zich toe op de beide kanten van moreel consumentengedrag, het voorziet een 
overzicht van theoretische raamwerken over ethische besluitvorming (Hoofdstuk I), onderzoekt 
hoe morele informatie wordt verwerkt (Hoofdstuk II) en gaat uiteindelijk dieper in op een 
hedendaags onderwerp binnen onethisch consumentengedrag: digitale piraterij (Hoofdstuk III) 
en een hedendaags onderwerp binnen ethisch consumentengedrag: Fair Trade producten 
(Hoofdstuk IV), ten slotte volgen conclusies en aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek 
(Hoofdstuk V).  
Hoofdstuk II “De boosaardige haas en de brave schildpad: Een toepassing van de duale 
processen theorie op ethisch en onethisch gedrag” onderzoekt of er verschillen zijn in de 
verwerking van moreel geladen informatie. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt ethisch en onethisch 
gedrag simultaan en binnen het kader van de duale processen theorie. Vier experimentele 
studies vergelijken reactietijden tussen ethische en onethische situatieschetsen en tonen aan dat 
mensen onethische situaties sneller zullen herkennen en beoordelen dan ethische situaties.  
Hoofdstuk III “Dekt het zeil de lading? Een psychometrische segmentatie van digitale piraten” 
gaat dieper in op hedendaags onethisch consumentengedrag en onderzoekt digitale piraterij. 
Digitale piraterij is immers een uniek raadsel voor de descriptieve ethiek. Sommige mensen 
vinden het onethisch, en anderen dan weer niet. Vooral jongeren staan hier zeer open tegenover. 
Met als gevolg dat onderzoek over digitale piraterij veel tegenstrijdige bevindingen heeft 
voortgebracht met betrekking tot de kenmerken en moraliteit van digitale piraten. In dit 
hoofdstuk poneren wij dat deze tegenstrijdige bevindingen het gevolg zijn van het feit dat 
digitale piraten eigenlijk een heterogene groep zijn en dat de tegenstrijdige literatuur telkens 
een ander type piraat heeft belicht. In dit hoofdstuk beschrijven we vier segmenten van digitale 
piraten die opgebouwd werden op basis van hun verschillen in termen van hun attitude 
tegenover piraterij, schuldgevoelens die ze al of niet ervaren en of ze piraterij al of niet als 
onethisch beschouwen. Deze vier segmenten verschilden vervolgens ook van elkaar in termen 
van hoe vaak ze digitale piraterij beoefenden, subjectieve norm, gepercipieerde zelf-
effectiviteit, gewoonte, gepercipieerde schade en deontologische en teleologische evaluaties. 
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Tot slot is uit dit onderzoek gebleken dat piraterij-bestrijdende campagnes geen vat hadden op 
de meest intensief downloadende piraten.  
In hoofdstuk IV “Zou u zo vriendelijk kunnen zijn om eerlijk te kopen? Over de invloed van 
interpersoonlijke gevoelens op Fair Trade consumptie” onderzoeken we hedendaags ethisch 
consumentengedrag. Dit hoofdstuk tracht een oplossing te bieden voor een belangrijke 
struikelblok binnen onderzoek naar ethisch consumentengedrag: onderzoek wijst namelijk uit 
dat consumenten zeer positief staan tegenover ethische producten maar deze positieve houding 
vertaalt zich niet naar aankoopgedrag. In dit hoofdstuk ligt de nadruk vooral op Fair Trade 
producten en wordt onderzocht of aankoopgedrag van Fair Trade producten kan worden 
beïnvloed door in te spelen op de behoefte naar interpersoonlijke banden. Dit wordt 
bewerkstelligd door het gebruik van een veelgebruikte zelf-affirmatie methode, namelijk de 
‘vriendelijkheids-vragenlijst’. Door het invullen van deze vragenlijst worden allerlei 
interpersoonlijke gevoelens geactiveerd waardoor het belang van Fair Trade als 
productattribuut verhoogd wordt. In twee studies vinden we dat de invloed van de 
vriendelijkheids-vragenlijst verklaard wordt door een verhoogde ervaring van interpersoonlijke 







Ethics in consumer behavior spans a wide variety of consumer behaviors, ranging from 
consumers lying about damaged goods, purchasing counterfeit luxury products, digital piracy 
to downright shoplifting on the one hand, and the purchase of environmentally friendly 
products, Fair Trade goods and consumer honesty when a bill was miscalculated in their favor 
on the other hand. Ethics relating to consumer behavior can be defined as “the moral rules, 
principles and standards that guide the behavior of an individual (or group) in the selection, 
purchase, use, selling, or disposition of a good or service” (Muncy & Vitell, 1992, p.298). 
Morally laden consumer behaviors exert a tremendous impact on retail and businesses, in the 
negative sense (e.g. shoplifting, counterfeit goods and digital piracy) but also in the positive 
sense (e.g. sales of Fair Trade and eco-friendly products). The literature on ethics relating to 
consumer behavior spans two key streams of research: research focusing on negative, unethical 
consumer behavior (i.e. consumer ethics) and research focusing on positive, ethical consumer 
behavior (i.e. ethical consumption). These positive ethical behaviors will be henceforth referred 
to as “ethical behavior” and reflects behavior aimed at enhancing other’s well-being and doing 
good for others and/or society in general. On the other hand, unwanted, negative ethical 
behavior will be referred to as “unethical behavior”. This reflects norm-violating behavior that 
is harmful to others and/or society in general. This dissertation focusses on both types of moral 
behavior and on how judgment of these behaviors differ. 
The world the modern consumer lives in has changed radically in the past decade and new 
manifestations of ethical and unethical consumer behaviors have emerged ever since. Unethical 
consumer behavior has traditionally related to behaviors that take place within the confines of 
the brick and mortar store such as shoplifting, coupon fraud, fraudulent returns, etc. Nowadays, 
the marketplace has shifted to the online environment and new, unique manifestations of 
unethical consumer behaviors have developed, such as the online purchase of counterfeit goods 
and digital piracy. On the other hand, ethical consumer behavior has become more salient due 
to developments in globalization and the efforts of environmental and humanitarian activists. 
More and more consumers are concerned about where their products come from and under 
which conditions they were produced. Ethical consumer behavior relates to purchasing behavior 
of ‘ethical products’, which are products that are inspired by a concern for animal welfare, the 
environment, humane working conditions, fair wages and the absence of child labor. 
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This dissertation focusses on the moral dimensions of consumerism, it provides a literature 
overview of theoretical frameworks relating to ethical decision making (Chapter I), how moral 
information is differentially processed (Chapter II) and finally zooms in on a contemporary 
topic within negative or unethical consumer behavior: digital piracy (Chapter III) and a 
contemporary topic within positive or ethical consumer behavior: Fair Trade products (Chapter 
IV). We conclude with a general discussion and recommendations for future research (Chapter 
V).  
Chapter II “The virtuous tortoise and the villainous hare: Applying dual process theory on 
ethical and unethical behavior” investigates whether differences can be found in how ethical 
and unethical information is processed. This chapter studies judgment of ethical and unethical 
behavior jointly and within the framework of dual process theory. Four experimental studies 
compare the reaction times of ethical versus unethical scenarios and consistently demonstrate 
that people are slow to recognize and judge ethical scenarios compared to unethical scenarios.  
Chapter III “One sail fits all? A psychographic segmentation of digital pirates” zooms in on 
contemporary unethical consumer behavior: digital piracy. Digital piracy is a unique enigma in 
terms of descriptive ethics. Some consider it unethical, whereas other don’t, especially the 
younger generation appears to be very tolerant towards it. As a result of this, the literature on 
digital piracy is struggling with many contradicting findings relating to characteristics and 
morality among digital pirates. In this Chapter, we propose that these contradictory findings 
result from the fact that the population of digital pirates is in fact heterogeneous. We find four 
pirate segments based on differing combinations of attitude toward piracy, ethical evaluation of 
piracy and feelings of guilt: the anti-pirate, conflicted pirate, cavalier pirate, and die-hard pirate. 
These four segments also differ in terms of pirating frequency, subjective norm, pirating self-
efficacy, habit, perceived harm, deontological and teleological evaluations. We also find that 
anti-pirating campaigns are not able to reach the most intensively downloading pirates. 
In Chapter IV “Would you be so kind to buy fair? The impact of interpersonal feelings on Fair-
Trade consumption” we investigate contemporary ethical consumer behavior. We address a 
major issue within research on ethical products: Research shows that consumers report very 
positive attitudes towards ethical products, but these positive attitudes do not translate into 
purchasing behavior. We focus specifically on Fair Trade products and investigate whether 
purchasing behavior can be influenced by tapping into the consumers need for interpersonal 
connections. We do this by the use of a particular self-affirmation tool called the Kindness 
Questionnaire. This activates people’s interpersonal feelings resulting in an increase in salience 
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and importance of the Fair Trade product attribute. In two studies, we find that the effect of the 
Kindness Questionnaire manipulation is indeed mediated by a rise in experienced interpersonal 




CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
Ethics in consumer behavior spans a wide variety of consumer behaviors, ranging from 
consumers lying about damaged goods, purchasing counterfeit luxury products, digital piracy 
to downright shoplifting on the one hand, and the purchase of environmentally friendly 
products, Fair Trade goods and consumer honesty when a bill was miscalculated in their favor 
on the other hand. Ethics relating to consumer behavior can be defined as “the moral rules, 
principles and standards that guide the behavior of an individual (or group) in the selection, 
purchase, use, selling, or disposition of a good or service” (Muncy & Vitell, 1992, p.298). 
Research into ethics relating to consumerism is nested within marketing ethics (i.e. ethical 
behavior and decision-making in marketing, covering topics such as social marketing and 
ethical issues related to sales, product, market research,… See Schlegelmilch and Oberseder 
(2010) for an overview, Table 1) which in turn is nested in the long-standing research history 
of business ethics (i.e. ethical behavior and decision making in broader organizational contexts 
which is related to topics such as employee theft, corporate ethical culture, corporate social 
responsibility and whistle-blowing (Ghillyer, 2010)).  
Morally laden consumer behaviors exert a tremendous impact on retail and businesses, in the 
negative sense (e.g. shoplifting, purchasing counterfeit goods and digital piracy) but also in the 
positive sense (e.g. sales of Fair Trade and eco-friendly products). According to a study released 
by the National Retail Federation, due to shoplifting (38% of shrinkage) and theft by employees 
(34.5% of shrinkage) losses of retailers in the U.S. amounted to a whopping $32 billion problem 
in 2015 (Wahba, 2015). The rise of e-commerce has resulted in a boom for counterfeit products 
according to a SOCTA (Serious and Organized Crime Assessment) report by Europol. In 2015 
80.000 goods with an estimated market value of € 642 million were confiscated by customs 
officials in the EU and 4780 websites were shut down by Europol in 2016 (SOCTA, 2017). In 
spite of the availability of legal streaming alternatives such as Spotify and Netflix, tracking 
figures provided by ICM (Infringement Control Management) reveal that the proportion of 
consumers downloading illegally has remained static at 23% and are infringing more by volume 
(Bales, 2016). On the positive side, sales of Fair Trade products are on steady rise with a world 
average of 15% and an estimated global market value of € 5.5 billion. Although the market 
share is still marginal, more and more emerging economies are starting to participate in the Fair 
Trade business such as Kenya and India (Sarmadi, 2015). On the eco-friendly side, Belgian 
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based company Ecover’s sales of household and toilet cleaning products have increased 4.9% 
and sales of fabric washing products have risen by 2.6% in 2015 (North, 2015).  
These wanted, positive ethical behaviors will be henceforth referred to as “ethical behavior” 
and reflects behavior aimed at enhancing other’s well-being and doing good for others and/or 
society in general. On the other hand, unwanted, negative ethical behavior will be referred to 
as “unethical behavior”. This reflects norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or 
society in general. 
This dissertation focusses on the ethical dimensions of consumerism, it provides a literature 
overview of theoretical frameworks relating to ethical decision making (Chapter I), how moral 
information is differentially processed (Chapter II) and finally zooms in on a contemporary 
topic within negative or unethical consumer behavior: digital piracy (Chapter III) and a 








2. Ethical decision making models and frameworks: An overview 
One of the earliest models for ethical decision making is Rest’s Four-component model (1979) 
and originates from the field of moral psychology, see Figure 1. It represents the different stages 
of an individual’s ethical decision making process. According to the model, an individual must 
first recognize a situation as moral and interpret how it would affect the welfare of others (moral 
sensitivity). Once the individual establishes that he is dealing with a moral situation, he needs 
to pass a moral judgment in which the individual evaluates which course of action is most 
justified according to his moral ideology. In the third stage, the individual must decide what he 
will do. He will have to prioritize moral concerns over personal interest (moral motivation) and 
finally perform the necessary behavior (moral character) while resisting possible distractions 
and obstacles. This model was later adapted by Trevino (1986) into the Interactionists model. 
Based on Kohlberg (1969) findings on moral development, the Interactionists model takes into 




The Four-Component model was later also extended by Jones’ (1991) Issue-contingent model 
which proposes that ethical decisions are determined by the issues that are at stake, see Figure 
2. It introduces the concept of moral intensity and reflects the graveness of the moral situation. 
Moral intensity captures all the characteristics a moral issue can have: the magnitude of 
consequences (the degree of harm that could be inflicted on third parties), social consensus (the 
degree of agreement that the behavior is appropriate), probability of effect (the probability that 
the behavior will actually inflict the predicted harm), temporal immediacy (the amount of time 
that will pass between the behavior and the onset of the consequences. The shorter the time, the 
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greater the immediacy), proximity (how near is the victim to the moral agent? This nearness 
can be either physical, psychological, social or cultural) and concentration of effect (an inverse 




The Multidimensional contingency model (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985) further expanded the 
importance of situational context on ethical decision making, see Figure 3. It takes the general 
social and cultural environment into account, as well as the impact of significant others (i.e. 
differential association and role set configuration), individual factors (i.e. the decision-maker’s 
knowledge, values, attitudes and intentions) and opportunity provided by the wider 
organizational context (i.e. existing professional codes, corporate policy and 
reward/punishment structures). The model also incorporates a feedback loop that runs from the 
evaluation of a certain behavior (which is the outcome of the model) that feeds back to provide 
the individual with information for future decision-making.  
The aforementioned frameworks do not take into account the two fundamental streams of 
thought in moral philosophy. Almost all normative moral theories can be classified as either 
deontological or teleological (Murphy & Laczniak, 1981). Deontological theories focus on the 
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inherent righteousness of the behavior itself and states that there are universal rules that should 
guide moral behavior. The term deontological stems from the Greek words for duty (deon) and 




On the other hand, teleological theories focus on the consequences of the behavior, as opposed 
to the behavior itself. The term teleological derives from the Greek word for end or purpose 
(telos). Teleologists propose that people should determine the consequences of any action in a 
situation and evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of all possible consequences. Moral 
relativism, utilitarianism and consequentialism fall within this doctrine. In sum, deontologists 
rely on absolute rules that designates behavior as either good or bad (for example: “Killing 
someone is bad, no matter who or why.”) whereas teleologists weigh the consequences of a 
certain behavior (for example: “Killing a murderer to prevent him from killing others is 
acceptable.”).  
Forsyth (1980) argued that people can differ in their approach when making ethical decisions 
and that they may have different ethical dispositions relating to idealism and relativism. 
Forsyth’s taxonomy of ethical dispositions (see Figure 4), which is measured by the Ethical 
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disposition questionnaire (1980) departs from the notion that idealism and relativism are two 
uncorrelated constructs. It proposes that people can be classified into four different ethical types 
depending on how they rate on relativism and idealism: situationists (high idealism, high 
relativism), subjectivists (low idealism, high relativism), absolutionists (high idealism, low 
relativism) and exceptionists (low idealism, low relativism). A limitation with this taxonomy is 
that it relies heavily on individual differences and does not incorporate situational factors or 




The Hunt-Vitell general theory of marketing ethics (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) is the most 
influential and complete framework for understanding unethical behavior in the area of 
marketing ethics (Schlegelmilch & Oberseder, 2010), see Figure 5. It takes individual, 
environmental, cultural, normative and moral aspects into account and it integrates the two 
fundamental streams of thought in moral philosophy, deontological and teleological evaluation. 
The Hunt-Vitell model of general marketing ethics is based on the assumption that people are 
neither one nor the other, but that they will often weigh deontological and teleological 
considerations jointly in determining their moral judgment and ultimately their behavior.  
According to the model, moral decisions follow a number of stages. First, the decision-maker 
must recognize that the situation contains moral content, next the decision-maker will 
contemplate about which course of action might be followed in order to resolve the moral 
problem and what consequences could ensue. Each step in this process is shaped by cultural, 
industrial, organizational and personal influences. Teleological evaluations are influenced by 
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the nature of the perceived consequences for all stakeholders: the probability of the 
consequences, an evaluation of the desirability of the consequences and an evaluation of the 
importance of the stakeholders. These constructs are similar to Jones’ (1991) moral intensity, 
but with less emphasis on the characteristics of the stakeholders. All possible courses of actions 
are subjected to deontological and teleological evaluations and both types of evaluations in turn 
influence the decision-maker’s final judgment.  
What sets this theory apart is that is also takes into account that people may not always behave 
in a way that they themselves consider the most morally appropriate way. In other words, a 
decision-maker may perceive a particular course of action as the most moral alternative, but 
nonetheless choose another alternative because it yields positive consequences for the decision-
maker himself, so the model incorporates the possibility that people would engage in unethical 
behavior even if they realize that the behavior is unethical. Intentions are influenced indirectly 
by deontological and teleological evaluations via moral judgment, but the model also provides 
a direct link between teleological evaluations and intentions. Lastly, the model stipulates that 
intentions are likely to lead to behavior depending on situational constricts. There must be an 
opportunity to adopt a certain alternative (Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, & Ferrell, 1979). Finally, the 
actual consequences of the behavior are evaluated and stored into memory for future reference, 
so they feed back into the construct of personal experiences that will influence future moral 
evaluations. 
The abovementioned frameworks focus on how individuals arrive at an ethical judgment. Vitell 
and Muncy’s (1992, 2005) Consumer Ethics Scale was developed to examine how consumers 
actually evaluate certain consumer behaviors as ethical or unethical and has since been a staple 
in ethical consumer research. The CES examines how acceptable or unacceptable people 
consider 31 consumer behaviors differing in terms of active or passive engagement, illegality 
and perceived harm. They devised a categorization of moral consumer behaviors based on 
consumer beliefs. The CES contains four original categories: (1) actively benefiting from illegal 
activities, (2) passively benefiting from illegal activities, (3) actively benefiting from deceptive 
(or questionable, but legal) practices, (4) no harm/no foul activities and three categories that 
were added later on (5) downloading, (6) recycling and (7) doing good (Vitell & Muncy, 2005). 
Table 2 represents the individual items within each category. The authors added the last three 
categories in a successful effort to enhance and update the CES stating that “all four of the 






However, new items that capture the consumers’ desire to do the right thing would offer a 
distinct and valuable contrast to the existing scale items” (p. 268). 
The updated CES reflects two key streams of research within ethics relating to consumer 
behavior: research focusing on negative or unethical consumer behavior (i.e. consumer ethics) 
and research focusing on positive or ethical consumer behavior (i.e. ethical consumption). 
Although research on social marketing and corporate ethical decision making research can be 
traced back well into the 1970s, research into positive, ethical behavior on the consumer side is 
relatively new and has observed an upsurge of interest since the 2000s (Schlegelmilch & 
Oberseder, 2010). Vast societal and global changes have made topics that were mainly 
neglected by regular citizens pressing, pertinent and salient. Globalization has come at a cost 
for workers in developing countries. In the past, unsavory labor conditions and/or unfair wages 
would have remained well hidden for the western consumer, but the ubiquitous rise of the 
internet has created a means for exposing these practices. The unremitting economic growth 
also comes with a price for the environment and consumers are becoming increasingly aware 
of this. In light of these evolutions, research on ethical consumerism has known a steady rise in 
popularity but the development of theory is still in its infancy. As a result, research into ethical 
consumer behavior is relatively scattered and predominantly atheoretical. Few theoretical 
frameworks have been consistently applied and research is often descriptive and rarely 

























3. Ethical consumption 
Research relating to ethical consumption covers a broad load, ranging from purchasing behavior 
that is inspired by a concern for animal welfare (Verbeke & Viaene, 1999), the environment 
(Barbarossa & De Pelsmacker, 2016; Grønhøj, 2006; Matulich, Haytko, & Austin, 1995; Onel & 
Mukherjee, 2015; Sachdeva, Jordan, & Mazar, 2015; Vanclay et al., 2011), humane working 
conditions, fair wages (Brunner, 2014; De Pelsmacker, Driesen, & Rayp, 2005; De Pelsmacker, 
Janssens, & Mielants, 2005; Doran, 2009; White, MacDonnell, & Ellard, 2012) and child labor 
(Auger, Devinney, Louviere, & Burke, 2008). It is not so much a lack of definition than an 
abundance of definitions that poses the largest stumbling block for research into ethical 
consumption. The concept of ethical consumption basically relates to how concerns for certain 
societal or environmental injustices are translated into purchasing behavior, in other words, it 
relates to the acquisition of ethical products. This rather broad delineation has given rise to a 
profusion of labels that have been associated with this concept, such as ‘environmentally 
concerned’ (Kalafatis, Pollard, East, & Tsogas, 1999; Straughan & Roberts, 1999), ‘green 
consumerism’ (Sachdeva et al., 2015) , ‘ethical consumers’ (Carrigan & Attalla, 2001; Carrington, 
Neville, & Whitwell, 2010; Devinney, Auger, & Echkhardt, 2009; Freestone & McGoldrick, 2008; 
Papaoikonomou, Cascon-Pereira, & Ryan, 2016; Papaoikonomou, Ryan, & Valverde, 2011; 
Uusitalo & Oksanen, 2004), ‘socially conscious consumers’ (DeVincenzo & Scammon, 2015), 
‘moral consumption’ (Loureiro et al., 2016), ‘the conscious consumer’(Szmigin, Carrigan, & 
McEachern, 2009) and ‘sustainable consumer behavior’ (Cornelissen, Pandelaere, Warlop, & 
Dewitte, 2008; Lee, Bahl, Black, Duber-Smith, & Vowles, 2016; Milfont & Markowitz, 2016; 
Nguyen & Paswan, 2015; Theotokis & Manganari, 2015) to name a few.  
Value based frameworks are frequently employed in attempting to explain ethical consumption. In 
fact, values are argued to be a more effective means than demographics for the segmentation of 
ethical consumers (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 2005; Doran, 2009). 
Values are found to play an important role in a variety of ethical consumer behaviors such as the 
consumption of genetically modified food (Honkanen & Verplanken, 2004), fashion leadership 
(Goldsmith, Freiden, & Kilsheimer, 1993), fair trade consumption (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 
2005) and eco-friendly attitudes and behavior (Csutora, 2012; Dietz, Kalof, & Stern, 2002; Schultz 
& Zelezny, 1998; Shean & Shei, 1995). Schwarz values theory (Schwartz, 1994) in its entirety or 
elements of it is often used as the basis for research into ethical consumer behavior. Values as 
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defined by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987)( p. 551) “are concepts or beliefs, pertaining to desirable 
end states, which transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, 
and are ordered by relative importance”. Schwartz’s theory is grounded on 57 single values that 
can be categorized into 10 overarching value types: Universalism, Benevolence, Conformity, 
Tradition, Security, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-direction. Schwartz 
(1994) found that 45 of the 57 values in his theory had similar meaning across cultures and could 
be thought to be universal but that some values may be more or less important in different cultures. 
Schwartz’s theory also describes the relationship between the 10 value types based on whether or 
not their motivational goals are compatible. These values and their relationships are represented as 
wedges in a circle and the distance between the wedges represent the nature of their relationships. 
See Figure 6. 
An important issue with research into ethical consumption is the gap that exists between attitude, 
intention and behavior (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; Auger & Devinney, 2007; Brunner, 2014; 
Carrigan & Attalla, 2001; Carrington et al., 2010; De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 2005; Devinney, 
Auger, Eckhardt, & Birtchnell, 2006; Moons & De Pelsmacker, 2012; Szmigin et al., 2009; Vitell, 
2015; White et al., 2012). For example, Csutora (2012) found that ecological footprints of 
individuals with high ethical intentions did not differ significantly from those with low intentions. 
Several explanations for this gap have been suggested. Two main streams of explanations can be 
drawn: some scholars claim that the attitude-behavior gap is a fallacy that has resulted from socially 
desirable answering behavior (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; Auger & Devinney, 2007; Devinney et al., 
2006), whereas others assert that external and internal factors may obstruct the translation from 
attitude into purchasing behavior: at the product level consumers could be dissuaded by the cost 
and not willing to pay the higher price premiums for ethical products or do not find the social 
features important enough (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 2005; Devinney, Auger, & Eckhardt, 
2012; Szmigin et al., 2009; Vitell, 2015), at the consumer level consumers perhaps do not believe 
their ethical purchase would make a difference for those involved (White et al., 2012) or they 





A possible solution for bridging this gap is offered by Devinney et al. (2006). They advocate the 
distinction between what they have coined as the ‘socially responsible consumer’ (CNSR) and the 
‘ethical consumer’. They assert that CNSR differs from ‘ethical consumer behavior’ in that it is 
completely stripped of any moral connotations and propose that these consumers simply also take 
nonfunctional product attributes which benefits others into consideration. For example, an ‘ethical 
consumer’ would purchase a product because it has been produced under conditions that are 
humane and fair wages were disbursed to the laborers (or refrain from purchasing a product because 
its production is morally tainted). A CNSR consumer is not necessarily motivated by moral 
standards but would purchase a Fair Trade product because they attach value to Fair Trade as an 
intangible product attribute. This value could be derived either from the notion that is has been 
produced under fair circumstances, but also because they believe it tastes better and just as well 
because the consumer likes to be seen drinking Fair Trade coffee. Basically, it implies that “ethical 
consumption is concerned about the reason for consumption; socially responsible consumption is 
not” (pg. 228) (Devinney et al., 2012). By enhancing the value of the ethical product attribute (such 
as a Fair Trade label, an eco-label, an animal friendly-label,…) consumers could be motivated to 
purchase ethical products, regardless of the motivation for purchase. According to Devinney et al. 
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(2006) companies play a pivotal role in this value creation and that they should be socially 
proactive as opposed to socially active.  
4. The interplay between rationality, intuition and emotion 
Most formal ethical decision making models assume that consumers weigh options deliberately 
and rationally, but as in regular decision making, moral decision making is the result of a complex 
interplay between ratio, intuition and emotion (Dedeke, 2015; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nvstrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Olatunji & 
Puncochar, 2014). Spearheaded by the Cognitive-developmental work of Kohlberg (1969) and 
Turiel (1983), moral judgment was initially thought to be the result of deliberate, rational and 
conscious reasoning. But this rigorously rational perspective was challenged by the notion of moral 
dumbfounding (Haidt, 2001). In a series of experiments, Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy (2000) 
presented a selection of taboo violations to participants. The scenarios were designed in such a way 
that any possible objection to certain moral transgressions was removed or neutralized. For 
instance, one vignette describes consensual intercourse between adult siblings Julie and Mark, who 
were both using contraceptives. The participants were then asked whether they considered this act 
as appropriate or not. The authors found that participants who deemed these taboo violations 
inappropriate were not able to provide compelling arguments for considering the acts as 
inappropriate, eventually stating “I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong” (p. 814). 
Haidt (2001; 2000) argues that moral dumbfounding provides evidence for the notion that people 
do not engage in moral reasoning and proposes that moral judgment is primarily driven by 
unconscious intuitions. He proposes the Social-intuitionist model, which is grounded on the 
notion that moral judgment is automatic and intuitive and comparable to aesthetic judgments 
(‘good’ vs. ‘bad’). This model does not disregard the existence of reasoning but states that 
reasoning, if needed, is merely employed in the form of a post-hoc rationalization of moral 
intuition. However, criticism has been voiced towards Haidts (2001; 2000) conclusions regarding 
moral dumbfounding and the diminished role of rationality (MacKenzie, 2012). Greene’s work on 
Dual process theory (Greene, 2007, 2011; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2008; Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 2001) provided an answer to the age-old 
discussion between ratio and intuition. It posits that both deliberate reasoning and automatic, 
affective reactions play an important role in the processing of moral information and that the 
manner of processing (deliberately or intuitively) will depend on the nature of the behavior or 
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situation under evaluation. Certain situations will elicit an immediate, affective response and will 
cause moral intuition to dominate a person’s judgment. This effect is known as affective primacy 
(Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Zajonc, 1980) and implies that moral judgment is established 
directly from an automatic and immediate intuition, a moral intuition by which the decision maker 
senses whether something is ‘right or ‘wrong’(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Haidt, 2001). On 
the other hand, if a situation lacks affective primacy and does not elicit strong affective reactions, 
a deliberate, rational and conscious processing style will be adapted by the decision maker. Greene 
(2008; 2001) also finds that deliberate processing can override affective responses, for instance 
when the decision maker experiences strong conflicting emotions (cf. Trolley dilemma, in which a 
person must decide whether he kills one innocent bystander in order to save several others).  
As mentioned previously, moral intuition is described as the sudden occurrence of a moral 
judgment with affective valence (‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘like’ or ‘dislike’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’), without 
having gone through steps of deliberate reasoning, searching, weighing and concluding (Haidt & 
Bjorklund, 2008). When these intuitions become so strong and differentiated, they can be 
conceptualized as moral emotions (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Olatunji & Puncochar, 2014). Haidt 
(2003) classifies moral emotions into self-conscious emotions, which include guilt, shame and 
embarrassment, and other-condemning emotions, encompassing contempt, anger and disgust. But 
also traditionally non-moral emotions can play a role in moral judgment. Haidt and Joseph (2004) 
propose that emotions accompany violations or compliance to innate moral foundations that can 
be found cross-culturally. They identify four moral foundations and related emotions: (1) Suffering 
is characterized by a concern for other people’s suffering, kindness and caring for the vulnerable. 
It triggers compassion as a characteristic emotion. (2) Hierarchy encompasses principles like 
obedience, deference and loyalty and is related to the enforcement of systematic rules for living as 
a society, resulting in domination and protection. Characteristic emotions are resentment vs. respect 
and awe. (3) Reciprocity encompasses principles such as fairness, equality, sharing, trust, 
cooperation and loyalty. Anger and guilt are triggered by violations of these principles. Lastly, (4) 
Purity refers to principles of chastity, cleanliness, physical or spiritual purity and violations trigger 
feelings of disgust.  
Since moral behavior is so varied, they are accompanied by a multitude of emotions. Some 
emotions (e.g. compassion, kindness) may activate people towards certain wanted behaviors such 
as ethical consumption, whereas other emotions (e.g. guilt) could deter people from engaging in 
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unwanted behaviors such as unethical consumer behavior. These wanted, positive ethical behaviors 
are referred to as “ethical behavior” and reflects behavior aimed at enhancing other’s well-being 
and doing good for others and/or society in general. On the other hand, unwanted, negative ethical 
behavior are referred to as “unethical behavior”. This reflects norm-violating behavior that is 
harmful to others and/or society in general. This dissertation focusses on both types of moral 
behavior and on how judgment of these behaviors differ. In what follows, an overview is given of 
the chapters included in this dissertation.  
5. Dissertation outline 
Chapter II focusses on differences in how morally charged information and scenarios are processed 
and investigates whether judgment and decision making with respect to ethical and unethical 
behavior occurs via different processes. Ethical behavior reflects behavior aimed at enhancing 
other’s well-being and doing good for others and/or society in general. On the other hand, unethical 
behavior encompasses norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or society in general. 
This chapter studies judgment of ethical and unethical behavior jointly and within the framework 
of dual process theory. The theory of dual processes is not new within cognitive psychology but 
the application of it on moral judgment has received increasing interest owing to new developments 
in neuroscientific research into morality (Bertsch et al., 2013; Greene, 2007; Killen & Smetana, 
2008; Lamm & Majdandzic, 2015; Schirmann, 2013). In that sense, this Chapter also touches upon 
a contemporary topic within research on moral cognition. Dual process theory presents two ways 
in which information is processed, a slow and deliberate way and a fast and automatic way. Fast 
processing occurs via ‘Type 1 processing’ which refers to a diverse set of autonomous processes 
that are associated with intuition and learned, automated processes. Type 1 processing occurs quite 
automatically and is experienced by the decision-maker as receiving impressions, intentions, 
intuitions and emotions. (Kahneman, 2011). The slow processing type, denoted as ‘Type 2 
processing’ relies heavily on working memory and is associated with deliberate and controlled 
cognitive processes. Decision-makers resort to Type 2 processing for issues that are more difficult, 
detailed and specific. Based on previous research on dual process accounts on unethical judgment 
and altruism (due to a lack of literature on ‘ethical’ behavior) , we propose that unethical judgment 
and decision making is driven by fast processing (Type 1 processing) and that ethical judgment 
and decision making is driven by slow processing (Type 2 processing). Four experimental studies 
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compare the reaction times of ethical versus unethical scenarios and consistently demonstrate that 
people are slow to recognize and judge ethical scenarios compared to unethical scenarios.  
In the following two chapters, we zoom in on contemporary manifestations of moral consumer 
behavior. These chapters were inspired by the new additions to Vitell and Muncy’s (2005) 
Consumer Ethics Scale (CES), which entailed a dimension relating to digital piracy and two 
dimensions about ethical consumer behavior: recycling and doing good.  
Chapter III focusses on digital piracy. Digital piracy is a contemporary manifestation of unethical 
behavior, i.e. norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or society in general. Digital 
piracy within this chapter is defined as downloading media files (music, movies and TV series in 
particular) via torrents from peer-to-peer networks, which is an ingenious way of downloading 
fragments of a file from different people in a network and then piecing the fragments back together 
via specialized software. This method significantly speeds up the downloading process and renders 
downloaders virtually undetectable to authorities. These characteristics make digital piracy into a 
unique enigma in terms of descriptive ethics. Even though it is essentially theft of intellectual 
property, whether digital piracy is unethical is the subject of great debate. Some consider it 
unethical, whereas other don’t. In particular the younger generation harbors no moral qualms 
regarding digital piracy (Freestone & Mitchell, 2004). As a result of this, the literature on digital 
piracy is struggling with many contradicting findings relating to characteristics and morality of 
digital pirates. In this Chapter, we propose that these contradictory findings are not necessarily 
erroneous, but that the assumption they depart from is misguided: they assume that the population 
of digital pirates is homogenous. We propose that this is not the case, that one digital pirate is not 
the other and that a different approach is needed for each type of digital pirate. So the seemingly 
contradicting findings in literature could be the result of a focus on different types of pirates. In 
this chapter four pirate segments were found based on differing combinations of attitude toward 
piracy, moral evaluation of piracy and feelings of guilt: the anti-pirate, conflicted pirate, cavalier 
pirate, and die-hard pirate. These four types can be placed on a continuum of increasing pirating 
frequency, subjective norm, pirating self-efficacy, habit, and decreasing in perceived harm, 
respectively. The segments also differ in deontological and teleological orientations. Then, in an 
experimental mixed design we investigated the effectiveness of two different anti-pirating 
campaign strategies.  
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Chapter IV investigates the last two dimensions of the CES and focusses on ethical consumer 
behavior, i.e. behavior aimed at enhancing other’s well-being and doing good for others and/or 
society in general. The issue with studying ethical consumer behavior is that it covers a very broad 
load, ranging from purchasing behavior that is inspired by a concern for animal welfare, the 
environment, humane working conditions, fair wages and child labor (Auger et al., 2008). Each of 
these ethical product features have distinct characteristics, activates different associations within 
the consumer’s minds and addresses different needs and concerns. There is no one ‘ethical product’ 
that addresses all these needs simultaneously and some could contradict other needs. For instance, 
a Fair Trade product would meet someone’s need to support farmers in underdeveloped countries, 
but would contradict with someone’s need to help the environment since Fair Trade products 
usually are imported from faraway countries. Similar to contemporary unethical behavior, 
contemporary ethical behavior encompasses very complex behavior with a wide range of 
determinants. Each ethical product addresses another need. In this chapter we focus specifically on 
Fair Trade products and investigate whether purchasing behavior can be influenced by tapping into 
the consumers need for interpersonal connections. We do this by the use of a particular self-
affirmation tool called the Kindness Questionnaire. It consists of ten yes/no questions prompting 
people to recall and elaborate on specific situations in which they have been kind to others. This 
activates people’s interpersonal feelings resulting in an increase in salience and importance of the 
Fair Trade product attribute. This way, we address a major issue within research on Fair Trade 
products: the gap between attitude and behavior. Consumers report very positive attitudes towards 
Fair Trade products, but these positive attitudes do not translate into purchasing behavior. In other 
words, people care about Fair Trade, consumers do not. This chapter describes two experimental 
studies, each investigating a different product category often used in Fair Trade research, chocolate 
and coffee in particular. The first study investigates whether the choice of a Fair Trade alternative 
is mediated by interpersonal feelings. The second study takes a range of product features of coffee 
into account and investigates whether the importance of the Fair Trade is driven by an increase in 
the experience of interpersonal feelings caused by the Kindness Questionnaire manipulation, 
compared to the control condition. We find that the effect of the Kindness Questionnaire 
manipulation is indeed mediated by a rise in experienced interpersonal feelings. 
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People often presume that what is ‘unethical’ must be the opposite of what is 
‘ethical’, but this is not always the case. It is unethical if someone steals something 
from a store, but a person who leaves the store without having stolen anything is 
not by definition an ‘ethical’ person. What is ‘ethical’ is not always synonymous to 
‘not unethical’, and vice versa. Neuroscientific literature indeed suggests that 
judgment of ethical behavior differs from the judgment of unethical behavior. This 
paper builds on this proposition and asserts that unethical judgment is driven by 
quick, autonomous and intuitive processes (Type 1 processing) whereas ethical 
judgment is driven by slow, deliberate and controlled processes that rely on working 
memory (Type 2 processing). Four experimental studies compare the reaction times 
of ethical versus unethical scenarios and consistently demonstrate that people are 
slow to recognize and judge ethical scenarios compared to unethical scenarios. 
These findings highlight the need for a unified theoretical framework for moral 






“The distinction between fast and slow thinking has been explored by many psychologists over the 
last twenty-five years. […] I describe mental life by the metaphor of two agents, called System 1 
and System 2, which respectively produce fast and slow thinking.” 
D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (2011). 
People often consider ‘ethical’ as the opposite of ‘unethical’, but this is not always the case. It is 
unethical if someone steals something from a store, but a person who leaves the store without 
having stolen anything is not by definition an ‘ethical’ person. What is ‘ethical’ is not synonymous 
to ‘not unethical’, and vice versa. We propose that ‘ethical behavior’ and ‘unethical behavior’ in 
most cases represent two distinct categories of behaviors. Ethical behavior encompasses behavior 
aimed at enhancing other’s well-being and doing good for others and/or society in general. On the 
other unethical behavior encompasses norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or 
society in general. Building on this rationale, this paper proposes that judging what is ‘ethical’ 
occurs in a different way than judging what is ‘unethical’. We do this by applying dual-process 
theory to moral judgment and propose that ethical judgment relies on what Daniel Kahneman 
(2011) in the quote above denotes as ‘slow thinking’, which entails deliberate and controlled 
processes that rely heavily on working memory. Conversely, we propose that unethical judgment 
relies on ‘fast thinking’, which encompasses quick, autonomous and intuitive processes. Our 
studies consistently show that people are indeed slower to judge ethical scenarios compared to 
unethical scenarios.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 Dual-process theory 
The notion of two distinct types of processing has a longstanding history. The main idea is that 
there are two types of mental processing: an intuitive type of processing on the one hand, and a 
more deliberate, reflective type of processing on the other hand.  
Dual-process accounts have received increasing interest in the field of judgment and decision 
making (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; de Neys, 2006; Evans, 2008, 2012; Kahneman, 2011) and social 
cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj, & Heier, 1996; E. R. Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000) and more recently in the realm of moral cognition (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 
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2006; de Neys, 2006; Greene, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). As a result 
of their diverse origins and domains, various interpretations of these dual-process accounts exist 
and different terminologies have been coined. This uncoordinated proliferation has made the dual-
process theory subject to a fair amount of criticism. Most critiques relate to the incoherent 
fragmentation of dual-processing accounts, the vagueness of definitions and confusion about the 
difference between defining characteristics of the two processes and context-dependent correlates 
(Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  
Most of these criticisms generally target what Evans and Stanovich (2013, p. 226) refer to as the 
“received” or generic form of dual-system theory, an amalgamate of attributes that have been 
gradually added to the feature list. These misconceptions aside, converging evidence from 
experimental, psychometric and neuroscientific methods support the existence of a dual-processing 
account (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). These studies support the distinction between what is 
henceforth referred to as “Type 2 processing”, a type of processing that relies heavily on working 
memory and is associated with deliberate and controlled cognitive processes. Decision-makers tend 
to resort to Type 2 processing for issues that are more difficult, detailed and specific. Conversely, 
“Type 1 processing” refers to a diverse set of autonomous processes that do not rely on working 
memory and are associated with intuition and learned, automated processes. Type 1 processing 
occurs quite automatically and is experienced by the decision-maker as receiving impressions, 
intentions, intuitions and emotions (Kahneman, 2011). According to Evans and Stanovich (2013) 
whether or not there is a reliance on working memory is essentially the defining feature that 
differentiates both systems. The differences between the processes manifest in reaction times: Type 
1 processing is assumed to produce the fastest responses whereas Type 2 processing is assumed 
take up more time due to its reliance on working memory (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 
2011).  
2.2 Dual-process theory and the judgment of unethical behavior 
A series of influential studies relate the application of dual-process theory to morality and provide 
convincing evidence towards the use of fast, automatic and intuitive processes. According to 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) people experience a salient, automatic 
affective response towards moral dilemmas, leading them to judge these dilemmas as inappropriate. 
The authors draw this conclusion based on the observation of increased reaction times for the 
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dilemmas where respondents judged moral violations as appropriate, compared to moral violations 
which respondents judged as inappropriate. This increase in reaction time indicates that 
respondents needed to exert cognitive control in order to override their automatic, intuitive 
response to judge the dilemma as inappropriate. These findings give rise to the notion that an 
autonomous prepotent social-emotional response (against the moral violation) can be overridden 
by a deliberate and controlled process, a phenomenon that bears resemblance to the Stroop-effect 
(Stroop, 1992). They also found increased activity in brain areas associated with emotion and social 
cognition for moral dilemmas.   
Building on these results Greene et al. (2004) further investigate the role of emotional and cognitive 
processes in utilitarian moral judgment. They find that when participants gave a utilitarian response 
(i.e. they judged a personal moral violation as acceptable in order to serve the greater good) 
cognitive control was engaged in order to override the prepotent social-emotional response that 
was elicited by the dilemma. This cognitive intervention resulted in increased reaction times for 
utilitarian responses for moral dilemmas and increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), a region typically associated with cognitive conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001). Basically, when someone has to approve a moral violation in order to serve the 
greater good (i.e. make a utilitarian decision), deliberate processes (Type 2 processing) interfere in 
order to suppress automatic processes, which is why Greene et al. (2004) found higher reaction 
times for utilitarian responses on moral dilemmas.  
However, one does not necessarily need fMRI to study dual process theory; the role of working 
memory on thinking processes can also be investigated by impairing it with a cognitive load. 
Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nvstrom, and Cohen (2008) did exactly that, using a concurrent digit 
task as the cognitive load manipulation. They found that utilitarian moral judgments were driven 
by controlled cognitive processes whereas non-utilitarian (typically deontological) judgments were 
driven by automatic emotional processes. Here the authors focused on difficult moral dilemmas, 
such as the crying baby dilemma (See Appendix A). They found that cognitive load increased the 
reaction times of utilitarian judgments compared to utilitarian judgments without cognitive load. 
No such retardation in reaction times was found in non-utilitarian judgment, suggesting that 
utilitarian judgments were more deliberate (Type 2) than deontological judgments (Type1). This 
finding was later replicated by Conway and Gawronski (2013), who also found that utilitarian 
judgment was interfered by cognitive load, but deontological judgment was not. They also provide 
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further evidence for the intuitive nature of deontological judgment by demonstrating that enhancing 
empathy increased deontological inclinations, while utilitarian tendencies remained unaffected.  
In the same vein, Suter and Hertwig (2011) observe that people tend to make more deontological 
judgments when they are put under time pressure. By limiting the time span and by prompting 
participants to answer swiftly they found that faster responses led to more deontological decisions 
in dilemmas in which an innocent person needed to be harmed in order to save several others. A. 
B. Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008) further demonstrate that people need to exert cognitive effort to 
arrive at utilitarian judgments by alluding to the effect of individual differences in working memory 
capacity. Participants had to judge several dilemmas on how appropriate it would be for them to 
kill one person in order to save several others. The dilemmas varied systematically in the physical 
directness of killing, the personal risk to the decision-maker, the inevitability of the death and the 
intentionality of the act. The authors find that participants with a higher working memory capacity 
found certain types of killing more appropriate and were more consistent, compared to participants 
with lower working memory capacity.  
2.3 Dual-process theory and the judgment of ethical behavior  
While the application of dual process theory in some form or another is well-established within the 
unethical section of moral cognition (Cushman et al., 2006; de Neys, 2006; Greene, 2007; Greene 
et al., 2004) to the best of our knowledge, few studies have addressed the ethical section of moral 
cognition within dual process theory. Kinnunen and Windmann (2013) investigated the differential 
impact of two processing types, intuitive (Type 1 processing) and rational (Type 2 processing) on 
three types of altruistic behaviors. The authors assert that in terms of overt behavior, altruism can 
generally take on three forms: costly sharing (i.e. giving help where one party gives from their 
resources to another without receiving anything in return), altruistic punishment (i.e. costly 
punitive actions against norm violators with the aim of enforcing social norms) and moral courage 
(i.e. the willingness to protest in a situation that conflicts with someone’s moral rules or sense of 
justice). The authors find that a general thinking style that favors intuitive processing (Type 1) was 
associated with altruistic punishment and some form of sharing behavior (donating money to a 
charity), whereas a thinking style that favors deliberate processing (Type 2) was associated with 
moral courage. In the same vein, Corgnet, Espin, and Hernan-Gonzalez (2015) find that individuals 
with a more deliberate processing style (Type 2) are more likely to make choices consistent with 
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mildly altruistic motives in simple monetary decisions. Across two studies, they consistently find 
that behaviors that increase social welfare by increasing others’ payoffs at a low cost for the 
individual may be the result of conscious deliberation rather than automatic processes. 
Unfortunately, the results of the abovementioned studies are only correlational and none have 
recorded reaction times or imposed cognitive load on working memory. However, they do provide 
preliminary evidence that ethical judgment and decision-making could be driven by conscious and 
deliberate Type 2 processing. 
In terms of neuroscientific evidence, Izuma, Saito, and Sadato (2010) find that prosocial behavior 
composes a rational choice based on utilities, in line with social exchange theory which states that 
much alike economic behavior, people’s behavior in social behavior is directed by maximizing the 
ratio of rewards to costs (Homans, 1958). They find that the ventral striatum, an area associated 
with the satisfaction people feel when they get monetary rewards, was activated when people 
donated money to a charity in the presence of another person. They propose that social rewards are 
processed in the same way as monetary rewards and that both are processed as a form of ‘common 
neural currency’. So engaging in ethical behavior, at least in the presence of others, might just as 
well be a deliberate and calculated decision. 
2.4 Judgment of unethical versus ethical behavior  
Few studies investigate both sections of moral cognition jointly. The research on ethical versus 
unethical judgment differs and has been strictly segregated, making direct comparisons difficult. 
Research on unethical judgment and decision-making typically uses moral dilemmas and asks 
people to evaluate the appropriateness of certain actions (Greene et al., 2004), whether and how 
severe they would punish the actors involved (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009; Gino, Shu, & 
Bazerman, 2010; Small & Loewenstein, 2005) and what underlying rules or norms drive judgment 
(Cushman et al., 2006; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Powell, Derbyshire, & Guttentag, 2012; Sunstein, 
2005). On the other hand, the center of gravity in neuroscientific research on ethical judgment and 
decision-making of individuals is mainly situated within the realm of altruism and tends to focus 
on whether, how much and under which circumstances participants would donate to charity 
organizations (Greening et al., 2014; Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Izuma et al., 2010; 
Tankersley, Stowe, & Huettel, 2007) and the role that empathy, perspective taking and theory of 
mind (Farrow et al., 2001; S. Lee, Winterich, & Ross, 2014; Nomi et al., 2008; Seitz, Nickel, & 
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Azari, 2006; Tusche, Boeckler, Kanske, Trautwein, & Singer, 2016) play in prosocial and altruistic 
behavior.  
To the best of our knowledge, few studies focus on how exactly ethical judgment is established 
and literature on underlying rules and norms that drive the judgment of what is considered ‘ethical’ 
is not nearly as extensive as its unethical counterpart. However, literature on altruism does provide 
some insight. It has focused primarily on the norm of self-interest and finds that people consider 
behavior as less altruistic if the actor also benefits from the deed (Lin-Healy & Small, 2012, 2013; 
Newman & Cain, 2014). Moreover, the association between altruism and sacrifice is so strong that 
people think less of those who benefit materially from good deeds, even when benefits were 
unexpected and out of the benefactor’s control (Lin-Healy & Small, 2013). People are especially 
skeptical towards good deeds from companies if the campaign has produced benefits for the 
company (Foreh & Grier, 2003; Yoon, Gurhan-Canli, & Schwarz, 2006). As a result of this 
skepticism “individuals are motivated to convince themselves and others that their generosity is 
pure and that their good deeds are not motivated by selfish desires.” (Barasch et al., 2014)(p. 395). 
These results provide strong evidence for the self-interest norm for what is considered as ethical. 
But how is unethical behavior positioned against ethical behavior? The implicit assumption is that 
ethical and unethical behaviors are each other’s inverse. But this is not always the case: stealing is 
considered unethical, but refraining from stealing something is not necessarily considered as ethical 
behavior. Conversely, donating money to charity is considered as an ethical act, but deciding to not 
donate to a charity does not make someone an unethical person. This distinction is an important 
one to make. In literature authors do not always tend to make this distinction, for instance in their 
study on charitable donation Greening et al. (2014) have operationalized the decision to refrain 
from donating as ‘harmful’. Some authors implicitly draw the line based on the consequences of 
behavior, on whether they be positive or negative (Bostyn & Roets, 2016). In this paper, we draw 
a distinction between unethical and ethical behavior and define them as “norm violating behavior 
which causes harm to others” and “norm exceeding behavior which benefits others at a personal 
cost to the actor” respectively. By “norm exceeding” we refer to the notion that the actor does not 
simple adhere to the norm, but does more than what is expected in terms of the norm. 
In one of the few studies that does compare ethical and unethical behavior -to a certain extent- 
Bostyn and Roets (2016) find an action-omission bias that could only be found in scenarios with 
negative outcomes (i.e. unethical scenarios) because these judgments relied more on causal 
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attributions. They did not find this effect in scenarios with positive outcomes (i.e. ethical scenarios), 
unless participants were explicitly instructed to make causal attributions. Although this study did 
not measure reaction times, their results offer tentative evidence that judgment of ethical versus 
unethical scenarios is driven by different underlying processes.  
Neuroscientific literature offers even stronger evidence that different processes might be involved. 
Morality is not localized in one specific area in the brain but rather constitutes a network of neural 
correlates (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Also, each anatomical brain region houses a number of other, 
non-moral functions. Connecting anatomic regions to psychological functions is not as 
straightforward as one might think but certain areas do reoccur. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays 
an important role in processing unethical as well as ethical information and houses a number of 
higher-order executive functions such as planning behavior, personality, moderating social 
behavior and decision-making (Miller, Freedman, & Wallis, 2002). There is some overlap in the 
anatomical regions involved with typically unethical versus ethical judgment, but the neural 
networks associated with these functions still differ in various other respects. And it is also 
important to note that de PFC is vast and diversified in terms of functional anatomy. For instance, 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), orbitofrontal 
prefrontal cortex (the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC/ACC), anterior insula and 
amygdala are typically involved with judgment and decision-making relating to unethical actions 
(Bertsch et al., 2013; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2004), whereas the posterior superior 
temporal cortex (pSTC), dorsal striatum, anterior insula, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), tempo-
parietal junction, ventral striatum and superior and inferior frontal gyri are associated with altruistic 
behavior, empathy and theory of mind (Farrow et al., 2001). Note that these lists are not exhaustive 
and a myriad of other regions play a role, the point we want to make here is that the neural networks 
associated with ethical versus unethical judgment and decision making are not identical. The neural 
networks of ethical and unethical judgment both include regions that are associated with strictly 





2.5 Research objectives 
The main objective of this paper is to fill the hiatus in the current literature by studying ethical and 
unethical judgment jointly and to integrate them within the dual process framework. Based on the 
literature, we would expect that the evaluation of unethical situations would be driven by intuitive 
and fast Type 1 processing and the evaluation of ethical situations would be driven by deliberate 
and slow Type 2 processing. We can ascertain that unethical judgment is primarily driven by Type 
1 processing, although the emphasis of previous literature was more on how this processing could 
be overridden by Type 2 processes (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2001), which 
is not the focus of our paper. Judgment of unethical behavior usually also has an emotional 
component, emotional regions such as the amygdala and insula in the brain also show increased 
activation (Bertsch et al., 2013). Moreover, evolutionary speaking, it would make sense that 
unethical behavior would be judged more rapidly compared to ethical behavior, the punishment of 
norm violators is hard-wired as we derive pleasure from punishing norm-violators (de Quervain et 
al., 2004) and proven by the notion that people are slow to approve moral violations but quick to 
condemn them (Greene et al., 2004). With respect to ethical judgment, we find promising evidence 
that ethical judgment could be driven by slow and deliberate processing, even though the research 
was limited to certain forms of altruistic behavior .  
In order to learn 1) whether or not ethical and unethical judgments are driven by different processes 
and 2) which processes (Type 1 or Type 2) drive ethical versus unethical judgment, four studies 
were conducted. In the first study, we compare reaction times between the judgment of simple, 
everyday ethical, unethical and neutral, non-moral behaviors. In a second study, we study whether 
a difference can be detected in differently framed moral judgment tasks in order to account for 
possible moral framing effects. In the third study we tax working memory in order to find out 
whether ethical or unethical judgment is impaired by cognitive load. The rationale is that cognitive 
load would retardate reaction times for ethical judgment (Type 2 processing), but not for unethical 
judgment (Type 1 processing). In the fourth and final study, we use eye-tracking technology to 





3. Study 1 
3.1 Participants and procedure 
One hundred forty-one participants were recruited through the crowdsourcing platform Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (AMT). Several studies have confirmed the reliability of recruiting respondents 
via online labor markets for running online experiments (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; 
Rand, 2012) and experiments involving reaction time measurements (Simcox & Fiez, 2014). The 
respondents are US citizens and have an AMT approval rating higher than 95%. The sample 
consisted of 69.3% males and the average age was 35.11 (SD = 11.22). The experiment was 
programmed in Inquisit Web (Millisecond Software™), a software that offers precision 
psychometrics for online research.  
In a within-subjects design respondents were asked to evaluate 24 one-sentence scenarios on moral 
valence. There were 3 types of scenarios: 8 unethical, 8 ethical and 8 neutral scenarios. The 
unethical and ethical scenarios were gathered from the modified Muncy-Vitell Consumer Ethics 
Scale, which has been expanded by Vitell and Muncy (2005) with items representing ethical 
consumer behavior such as the recycling/environmental awareness and doing the right thing/doing 
good dimensions (Vitell & Muncy, 2005). Judgment scores and reaction times were measured. 
The seven-point scale ranged from (1) “Very unethical” to (7) “Very ethical” or from (1) ”Very 
ethical” to (7) “Very unethical”. The order of the presentation was randomized and no effect was 
found of the order of answer options for all types of scenarios: neutral (p =.70), unethical (p = .42) 
and ethical (p = .52) on scenario judgments. The responses were rescaled so all judgments ranged 
from (1) “Very unethical” to (7) “Very ethical”. This order will be used in the following analyses. 
The average number of words is equal over the scenario types (ethical: 12, unethical: 12 and 
neutral: 12). Reliability analyses revealed adequate Cronbach’s Alpha values for all types (α = .73, 
.81 and .86 for ethical, unethical and neutral items resp.), also see Table 1 for descriptive statistics 
of the items.  
3.2 Results and discussion 
Manipulation check. A repeated measures analysis on the judgment scores revealed that all types 
were judged as significantly different from each other (F(2,414) = 597.37, p < .001, η² = .80). The 
unethical scenarios were judged as most unethical (M = 2.36, SD = .76), the ethical as most ethical 
(M = 5.55, SD = .77) and the neutral scenarios as somewhere in between (M = 4.75, SD = .84).  
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Reaction times (in milliseconds). As raw reaction time (RT) data is positively skewed, techniques 
requiring normally distributed data are not suitable for analyzing raw RT data. A nonparametric 
Friedman test for differences among repeated measures revealed a significant difference between 
the raw data of the ethical, unethical and neutral scenarios (χ²(2) = 24.42, p < .001), with a mean 
rank of 2.29 for the ethical scenarios, a mean rank of 1.99 for the unethical scenarios and a mean 
rank of 1.72 for the neutral scenarios. These preliminary results on the raw data already reveal that 
participants required more time to judge the ethical scenarios compared to the unethical scenarios. 
However, as nonparametric tests are limited in scope, the raw data need to be transformed in order 
to allow for the use of parametric testing. A log transform (ln) and an inverted transform (1/T) both 
did not result in a normal distribution of the data. Finally, the raw RT data were trimmed to within 
two standard deviations (Baayen & Milin, 2010; Greene et al., 2008; Whelan, 2008) and yielded 
normally distributed RT data suitable for parametric testing. This a-priori screening allows for a 
systematic removal of outliers and is a widely accepted practice for by-subject and by-item analysis 
(i.e. techniques depending on means being aggregated over subjects and items) (Baayen & Milin, 
2010). It effectively handles extreme values in the right tail of the distribution, which is typical for 
raw RT data. 
An important caveat with this method is the loss of power when the effect is situated in the tail of 
the distribution (Luce, 1986; Ratcliff, 1993), but on the other hand, power is increased if the effect 
is not situated in the tail (Baayen & Milin, 2010). 
RT data were analyzed with a mixed effects model using the maximum likelihood (ML) fitting 
method. Multilevel regression analyses (also known as mixed effects models or random effects 
analysis) are recommended for analyses dealing with repeated measures within individuals. It 
allows for adding a random intercept that takes the variation in the dependent variable caused by 
differences between participants into account. In other words, some people might react slower or 
faster in general and a random intercept can account for these individual differences (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). Prior to using a multilevel model, a researcher must validate whether or not the use 
of a mixed effects model is appropriate. As the within-groups variance differs significantly from 
the between-groups variance (χ²(3)=124.32, p < .001), the application of a mixed effects model is 
appropriate. The model included participant as a random effect and the three types of scenarios 
(ethical, unethical and neutral) as fixed effects.  
48 
 
The main effect of type of scenario was significant (F(2,205) = 14.12, p < .001, AIC = 5588). The 
unethical type (M = 4917.56, SD = 1077.99) differed significantly from the ethical type (M = 
5299.70, SD = 1222.34), p > .001. The neutral type (M = 4779.36, SD = 1190.62) differed 
significantly from the ethical type (p <.001) but not from the unethical type (p = .20). See Figure 
1. These results show that participants need more time to evaluate an ethical scenario compared to 
an unethical scenario. These results show that not all morally laden situations are alike and provide 
preliminary evidence for the hypothesized difference between the judgment of ethical versus 
unethical scenarios. Depending on the moral valence (ethical versus unethical) of a situation, other 
processes are set in motion. 
The evaluation of ethical scenarios appears to be slower and hence more deliberate compared to 
unethical scenarios. It is especially remarkable that such differences already manifest in very short, 
basic and everyday scenarios. This could be due to the possibility that reactions towards the 
violation of implicit and explicit social rules (i.e. unethical behavior) are more learned and 
neurologically hardwired. We also find that non-moral situations are evaluated as quickly as 
unethical scenarios. These neutral scenarios do not require deliberate thought and are easily 
processed. It is for the ethical scenarios that reaction times were slower. This indicates that people 
have more difficulty in recognizing ethical behavior. In other words, bad behavior is more easily 














Ethical scenarios (Vitell & Muncy, 2005)   5.55 .73 
Recycling materials such as cans, bottles, newspapers etc. 5.97 1.17   
Giving a larger than expected tip to a waiter or waitress. 5.08 1.26   
Buying products labelled as ‘environmentally friendly’ even if they 
don’t work as good as competing products. 
4.91 1.38   
Returning to the store and paying for an item that the cashier 
mistakenly did not charge for you. 
6.13 1.24   
Correcting a bill that has been miscalculated in your favor. 5.59 1.67   
Only buying products from companies that have a strong record of 
protecting the environment. 
5.58 1.36   
Buying products made of recycled materials even though its more 
expensive. 
5.58 1.18   
Refraining from buying products from companies that don’t treat 
their employees fairly.  
5.55 1.22   
Unethical scenarios (Vitell & Muncy, 2005)   2.36 .81 
Giving misleading price information to a clerk in a store for an 
unpriced item. 
2.23 1.14   
Lying about a child’s age to get a lower price. 2.33 .96   
Not correcting a waiter or waitress who miscalculates a bill in your 
favor. 
2.55 1.29   
Returning damaged goods to a store when the damage was your own 
fault. 
2.39 1.29   
Getting too much change at the supermarket and not saying anything. 2.65 1.20   
Reporting a lost item as ‘stolen’ to an insurance company in order to 
collect the insurance money. 
2.07 1.30   
Observing someone shoplifting and not saying anything. 2.62 1.09   
Drinking a can of soda in the store without paying for it. 2.01 1.07   
Neutral scenarios   4.75 .86 
Booking a hotel on an online website for a holiday you are planning. 4.93 1.27   
Changing the channel when there is a show on TV you don’t like. 4.71 1.22   
Talking to people about a movie you have recently seen. 4.59 1.13   
Writing down a shopping list before you leave for the supermarket. 4.93 1.24   
Taking the dog out for a walk on a rainy day even though you don’t 
really feel like it. 
4.94 1.29   
Maintaining a personal blog about gardening. 4.65 1.14   
Using your smartphone as an alarm clock for waking up in the 
morning. 
4.89 1.22   
Reading yesterday’s newspaper because you did not receive todays 
newspaper. 
4.39 1.00   




This study has focused on differences between very distinct types of behavior (e.g. lying about a 
child’s age versus using recycled products) so the difference in RT could also be due to varying 
unwanted processes triggered by the short scenarios, for instance, memories could be brought up 
if someone has encountered a similar experience as in one of the scenarios, self-reflection of 
whether they themselves have acted ethically or unethically, or other associations with the topics 
discussed in the scenarios could have been activated. It is not an issue in se if other processes are 
activated, the major issue is that there might be too much variance in the nature of other unwanted 
activity. The next study deals with this issue. The ethical and unethical scenarios have been 
designed to mirror each other in every aspect with the exception of moral valence (ethical versus 
unethical). An important caveat with this kind of research is that a number of moral biases relating 
to the manner in which the scenario is phrased could come into play, namely the identifiable victim 
effect (Small & Loewenstein, 2005), the singularity effect (Kogut & Ritov, 2005), entativity (R. 
W. Smith, Faro, & Burson, 2013) and attribute framing (X. T. Wang, 1996), to name a few. In 
order to account for these possible effects the ethical and unethical scenarios have been framed 
differently while holding the general outcome constant.  
 
Figure 1  

















Reaction times (in milliseconds)
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4. Study 2 
The second study investigates whether a difference can be detected in a morally laden judgment 
task. Five differently framed descriptions of the same scenario were presented to participants for 
either an unethical or an ethical scenario. In the unethical scenario, a robbery is described in which 
a total amount of € 1000 has been stolen. The scenario either states the total amount that has been 
stolen (€ 1000), or the total amount and a small number of thieves (€ 1000 is stolen by 5 thieves), 
or the total amount and a large number of thieves (€ 1000 by 20 thieves), or a small number of 
thieves and the large amount they each steal (5 thieves each steal € 200) or a large number of 
thieves and the small amount they each steal (20 thieves each steal € 50). In the ethical scenario, 
customers of a web shop accidentally receive free clothing due to a bug in the store’s delivery 
software. The scenario describes the total store value of the clothes a number of customers send 
back, which is € 1000. The scenario either states the total store value that has been returned (€ 
1000), or the total amount and a small number of customers (€ 1000 is returned by 5 customers), 
or the total amount and a large number of customers (€ 1000 by 20 customers), or a small number 
of customer and the large amount they each return (5 customers each return € 200) or a large 
number of customers and the small amount they each return (20 customers each return € 50). See 
Table 2 for an overview of the conditions.  
 
Table 2 
Study 2. Reaction times (in s) by framing 











Actors Thieves  Customers   
€ 1000 is stolen/returned 6.17 (2.56) 65 7.81 (3.64) 66 -3.09** 
€ 1000 stolen/returned by 5 actors 5.46(1.94) 69 7.28 (3.40) 64 -3.76*** 
€ 1000 stolen/returned by 20 actors 5.85 (2.36) 65 8.61 (3.88) 62 -4.81*** 
5 actors each steal/return € 200  6.10 (2.34) 64 7.67 (2.66) 64 -3.54** 
20 actors each steal/return € 50 6.07 (2.31) 67 7.73 (3.63) 68 -3.18** 
Total 5.91 (2.31) 330 7.82 (3.47) 324 -8.23*** 
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4.1 Participants and procedure 
Six hundred fifty-four participants were recruited through the university’s online research panel. 
The sample consisted of 62% females and the average age was 30.64 (SD = 14.80). The experiment 
was programmed in Qualtrics, an online survey software.  
In a 5 (framing: €1000, €1000 by 5 actors, €1000 by 20 actors, 5 actors each steal/return € 200, 20 
actors each steal/return € 50) x 2 (unethical versus ethical scenario) between-subjects design 
respondents were asked to evaluate the scenarios on moral valence. The seven-point scale ranged 
from (1) “Very unethical” to (7) “Very ethical” or from (1) ”Very ethical” to (7) “Very unethical”. 
Reaction times were measured in seconds.  
Participants also completed cognitive processing self-assessment scales, such as the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI) (Epstein et al., 1996) and the Situation Specific Thinking 
Scale(SSTS) (Novak & Hoffman, 2009),which consists of two subscales measuring a rational 
thinking style and an experiential thinking style. This scale measures situational influences on 
thinking style and is grounded on the notion of two qualitatively distinct methods of processing 
information (Kahneman, 2003). The REI on the other hand consists of two subscales measuring 
Need For Cognition and Faith in Intuition. The REI is theoretically grounded in an integrative 
theory of personality; the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) (Epstein, 1991) which shares 
broad conceptual similarities with dual-process theory in that it proposes two modes of processing: 
a rational system and an experiential system. The rational system functions mainly at the conscious 
level and is predominantly verbal, intentional, analytic and relatively affect-free. It is measured by 
the Need for Cognition scale, which is a subscale of the REI. Its counterpart, the experiential system 
is assumed to operate at a preconscious, affective, associative and verbal level and is measured by 
the other subscale of the REI: the Faith in Intuition scale. The difference with dual-process theory 
(Evans, 2008) is that Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition are modes of processing that can be 
favored by an individual and are considered more as personality traits and the SSTS implies a 
strong element of control and that an individual can choose which method is more suited, 












Situation Specific Thinking Scale (Novak & Hoffman, 2009)      
Rational SSTS Items   3.88 .91 
I reasoned things out carefully. 3.88  1.44    
I tackled this task systematically. 3.76  1.43    
I figured things out logically. 4.81  1.28    
I approached this task analytically. 3.69  1.48    
I was very focused on the steps involved in doing this task.  3.40  1.40    
I applied precise rules to deduce the answers.  3.21  1.40    
I was very focused on what I was doing to arrive at the 
answers.  
3.92  1.43    
I was very aware of my thinking process.  4.42  1.50    
I arrived at my answer by carefully assessing the information 
in front of me.  
4.21 1.44   
I used clear rules.  3.53  1.44    
Experiential SSTS Items   5.06 .87 
I used my gut feelings. 5.24  1.17    
I went by what felt good to me.  5.63  0.98    
I trusted my hunches.  4.99  1.27    
I relied on my sense of intuition. 5.31  1.09    
I relied on my first impression.  5.25  1.18    
I used my instincts. 5.05  1.25    
I used my heart as a guide for my actions.  5.06  1.26    
I had flashes of insight.  4.67  1.38    
Ideas just popped in my head. 5.18  1.22    
I used free association, where one idea leads to another.  4.27  1.41    
Rational Experiential Inventory (Epstein e.a., 1996)     
Need for Cognition   4.04 .78 
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. (R) 3.08 1.33   




I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities 
rather than something that requires little thought.  
4.90 1.24 
  
 I prefer complex to simple problems. 4.23 1.39   




Faith in Intuition   4.84 .87 
 I trust my initial feelings about people. 4.89 1.19   
 I believe in trusting my hunches. 4.98 1.15   
My initial impressions of people are always right. 4.66 1.23   
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my 
“gut feelings”.  
4.87 1.20 
  
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I 
can’t explain how I know.  
4.82 1.27 
  




4.2 Results and discussion 
Reaction time (in seconds). The RT for all the unethical scenarios were aggregated and the same 
was done for the ethical scenarios. A nonparametric test (Kruskall-Wallis) revealed a significant 
difference between the ethical and unethical scenarios (H(1) = 45.68, p < .001, with a mean rank 
of 304.25 for the unethical scenarios and a mean rank of 408.45 for the ethical scenarios. These 
preliminary results on the raw data already reveal that participants required more time to judge the 
ethical scenarios compared to the unethical scenarios. The raw RT data were trimmed to within 
two standard deviations (Baayen & Milin, 2010; Greene et al., 2008; Whelan, 2008) and yielded 
normally distributed RT data suitable for parametric testing.  
An independent samples t-test on the aggregated data revealed that the evaluation of ethical 
scenarios (M = 7.82, SD = 3.47) took longer than the unethical scenarios (M = 5.91, SD = 2.31). 
These RT were measured in seconds. Of course, since the scenarios differed in framing, 
information is lost when aggregating data. Separate analyses of each scenario were run and each 
yielded longer RT for the evaluation of the analogous ethical scenario, see Table 2 for an overview 
of the results. No differences in RT were found within the 5 ethical (F(4, 319) = 1.23, p = .30) and 
5 unethical scenarios (F(4, 325) = 1.00, p = .41). 
Self-reported processing styles. Several measures of self-reported processing styles and 
preferences were analyzed. With the exception of the rational subscale of the SSTS (t(639) = 2.88, 
p < .01), no differences were found between the ethical and unethical scenarios with respect to the 
experiential subscale of the SSTS (t(639) = -.42, p = .68), Need for Cognition (t(635) = .99, p = 
.33) and Faith in Intuition (t(635) = .16, p = .87, see Table 4. Yet, still differences in RT emerge 
between the evaluation of ethical versus unethical scenarios.  
Though not much can be concluded from null results, this could point to the possibility that people 
may not be consciously aware of these differences. Interestingly, participants in the unethical 
scenarios claimed to rely more on a rational, systematic reasoning to arrive at their judgment yet 
the lower RT does not support this self-reported assertion. These results could possibly suggest that 
people are not aware of the different processes that drive judgment and by extension, decision 
making with respect to ethical versus unethical contexts and behaviors. It also adds to the notion 
that this difference in processing is not the result of differences in personality traits (REI) or 
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situational processing preferences (SSTS), but rather a universal setting that appears to be 
hardwired in the brain.  
Table 4 






SSTS – Rational 4.00 (1.07) 3.76 (1.02) 2.88** 
SSTS – Experiential 5.05 (.88) 5.08 (.77) -.41ns 
REI – Need for Cognition 4.07 (.93) 4.00 (.90) .99ns 
REI – Faith in Intuition 4.85 (1.06) 4.84 (0.89) .16ns 
Significant at ***p<.001,**p<.01,*p<.05 
 
Judgments. Judgment of the moral valence of the scenario (ranging from (1) “Very unethical” to 
(7) “Very ethical”) were recorded. Overall, people judged the unethical scenarios as unethical (M 
= 1.34, SD = .56) and the ethical scenarios as ethical (M = 6.06, SD = 1.00). Within the unethical 
scenarios, more differences within the degree of unethicality were found (F(4, 352) = 5.04, p < .01) 
compared to the ethical scenarios (F(4, 353) = 2.90, p < .05), see Table 5 for an overview of the 
post hoc tests.  
Table 5 
Study 2. Judgments by framing 
  € 1000 € 1000  
5 actors 
€ 1000  
20 actors 
5 actors 
€ 200 each 
20 actors 
€ 50 each 
Total 
 Actors M (SD) 
Thieves Unethical  1.59 (.67) 1.19 (.40) 1.32 (.66) 1.34 (.48) 1.29 (.49) 1.34 (.56) 
Customers Ethical  6.35 (.63) 5.96 (1.20) 5.96 (.80) 5.87 (1.21) 6.18 (.96) 6.06 (1.00) 
 
  Post hoc tests 
Actors M (SD) F-value Multiple comparisons 
Thieves Unethical  5.04** 1>2,1>3,1>5 
Customers Ethical  2.90* 1>4 
All items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1= “Very unethical” to 7 = “Very ethical”) 
Significant at ***p<.001,**p<.01,*p<.05 
 
Our results show that participants were more susceptible to the way the unethical scenarios were 
framed compared to the way the ethical scenarios were framed. McElroy and Seta (2003) find that 
people relying on analytic processing style are less sensitive to framing effects than people 
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engaging in a more heuristic processing style. Although caution is advised when assuming 
causality, our results indicate that participants in the ethical scenarios could have been less sensitive 
to the way the scenario was framed because they were relying more on Type 2 processing, which 
is more analytic in nature, compared to the participants in the unethical scenarios.  
4.3 Conclusion 
In this study we found that participants were slower to evaluate ethical scenarios compared to 
unethical scenarios, regardless of how the scenario was framed. Up until now, the findings have 
only been correlational and an experimental design is needed in order to test whether the differences 
we find are the result of a reliance on working memory for the ethical scenarios (Type 2 processing) 
versus the autonomous processes driving the judgment of unethical scenarios (Type 1 processing). 
Also, Studies 1 and 2 have only dealt with straightforward descriptions of morally laden situations, 
while research on morality has a strong tradition of the use of moral dilemmas. These dilemmas 
are better suited for exposing processing styles as they force participants to make difficult trade-
offs. In Study 3 cognitive load is manipulated in order to tease out differences in processing for 
ethical and unethical dilemmas.  
5. Study 3 
According to Evans and Stanovich (2013) the most essential difference between Type 1 (fast and 
autonomous processing) and Type 2 processing (slow and deliberative processing) is the reliance 
on working memory. Type 2 processing is characterized by its dependence on working memory 
and is expected to be impaired when working memory is taxed by concurrent tasks. On the other 
hand, because Type 1 processing is autonomous and does not rely on working memory, it should 
not be interfered by an engaged working memory. Study 3 seeks to uncover whether controlled 
cognitive processing drives ethical judgment by investigating its reliance on working memory. We 
hypothesize that cognitive load would increase RT for decision making in ethical dilemmas 
compared to decision making without cognitive load. Secondly, we hypothesize that RT for 
decision making in unethical dilemmas would not be hindered by cognitive load.  
5.1 Participants and procedure 
Four hundred eighty-five participants were recruited through the crowdsourcing platform 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). The sample consisted of 62.8% females and the average age 
was 34.68 (SD = 10.45). The experiment was programmed in Inquisit Web (Millisecond 
57 
 
Software™), a software that offers precision psychometrics for online research. In a 2 (cognitive 
load vs. no cognitive load) x 4 (type of dilemma: unethical-personal, unethical-impersonal, ethical-
personal and ethical-impersonal) mixed-subjects design respondents were presented with all 4 
morally charged dilemmas of varying moral valence and gravity. Half of the sample (50.7%) was 
randomly assigned to the cognitive load condition. Reaction times in milliseconds and their 
decision with respect to the dilemma were measured.  
To the best of our knowledge, all classical moral dilemmas used in literature are in fact, unethical 
dilemmas. See Greene et al. (2008) for an overview of existing unethical dilemmas. We find that 
most dilemmas follow the same structure: respondents must choose between taking action or doing 
nothing. Each option (action vs. refraining from action) contains a trade-off that balances the 
personal interference, responsibility and accountability of the decision maker against a possible 
alleviation of the severity of the consequences. In the Trolley or Footbridge dilemma (see Appendix 
A), the archetypical example of a moral dilemma, the decision maker must decide whether he will 
interfere by killing one person (directly or indirectly) in order to save four or five other persons. 
By undertaking action, the decision maker exposes himself to accountability. The decision maker 
is no long a bystander but plays an active role. On the other hand, by refraining from taking action, 
the outcome is more severe and more victims are harmed. The struggle is often one between a 
deontological conviction e.g. “Murdering someone is wrong” and a teleological conviction “One 
must do whatever possible in order to minimize harm for the largest number of people.” 
With respect to traditional unethical dilemmas, Greene et al. (2004) make the distinction between 
moral personal and moral impersonal dilemmas. They consider a moral dilemma as ‘personal’ if it 
meets three criteria and classify dilemmas that fail to meet these criteria as ‘impersonal moral 
dilemmas’. A moral dilemma is considered ‘personal’ if it involves (1) the infliction of serious 
bodily harm (2) to a particular person or a set of persons (3) where the harm does not result from a 
deflection of an existing threat to a third party. They find evidence that personal moral dilemmas 
(which they consider as violations familiar to our primate ancestors) elicit strong prepotent negative 
social-emotional responses whereas impersonal moral dilemmas (which is more related to the 
modern humans problems) are more cognitive in nature and show more similarities with non-moral 
dilemmas. This distinction between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas certainly merits 
attention and is addressed in this study.  
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While unethical dilemmas are widely known and used, no such alternatives exist for ethical 
dilemmas. Most ethical decision making protocols in academic literature comprise a choice 
between whether or not a participant donates to a certain charity and how much is donated. 
However, in the structure mentioned above, this can hardly be considered as a dilemma including 
a trade-off of two equally challenging options. In an unethical dilemma, both possible outcomes 
have a predominantly negative connation, so in that vein both possible outcomes of an ethical 
dilemma should have a predominantly positive connotation (i.e. people are helped in both options). 
In the traditional unethical dilemmas, personal accountability is part of a difficult trade-off. The 
ethical counterpart of this accountability could be represented by notion of self-sacrifice. Literature 
on altruism offers support for this claim as it posits that people consider someone who does a good 
deed but benefits personally from the act as less altruistic. What’s more, in some cases the presence 
of personal or material benefits, even if they were not intended, can even completely backfire for 
the do-gooder, resulting in even more negative evaluations of the intentions of the do-gooder (Lin-
Healy & Small, 2012). Based on these findings, we conclude that the element of self-sacrifice (in 
addition to the perceived intentions of the do-gooder and the magnitude of the consequences) might 
play an important role in the judgment of ethical behavior.  
Analogous to unethical dilemmas, ethical dilemmas should comprise a difficult choice between 
two equally challenging options which encompass a trade-off of personal self-sacrifice against a 
possible optimization of benefits for a third party. Keeping these considerations in mind, we have 
constructed four moral dilemmas: a unethical-personal, unethical-impersonal, ethical-personal and 
ethical-impersonal dilemmas. The nature and degree of harm (financial versus physical) and 
required action (instrumental versus physical) were held constant for the personal and impersonal 
dilemmas. See Appendix B for a scheme of the structure of the dilemmas. Existing moral dilemmas 
were not employed in order to avoid learned responses of participants. If respondents would already 
be familiar with a given dilemma, they could have already formed an opinion prior to the study. 
This would undermine our attempts to investigate processes that drive judgment and decision 
making.  
Respondents had to indicate which course of action they were most likely to undertake, ranging 
from (1) Action to (6) No action. This scale format allowed room for nuance in participants’ 
responses and would preferably result in more contemplation. These scores were then rescaled into 




Unethical and impersonal 
Scholarships 
You are a scholarship admissions officer. You see that a student from a very wealthy family 
has been appointed a very large scholarship, that he not even needs. You also see that 
another, very bright and promising student from a poor background was only appointed 
enough money to last for only one semester. By transferring money from the scholarship of 
the rich student to the scholarship of the poor student, you can help this student through 
college. The chances of getting caught are small, but if you do get caught, you could lose 
your job. What would you be inclined to do? 
Unethical and personal 
 Life boat 
You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on the boat and the ship has to be abandoned. 
There are not enough lifeboats and the lifeboat you are in, Lifeboat 1, is full. You are safe 
in Lifeboat 1. When floating around, you see that a nearby lifeboat, Lifeboat 2, is carrying 
too many people and is sinking fast. There is an injured person in Lifeboat 2 who will not 
survive in any case. If you knock him out with your paddle, the passengers from Lifeboat 2 
will be able to throw that person overboard. That way Lifeboat 2 will stay afloat and the 
remaining passengers will be saved. What would you be inclined to do? 
Ethical and impersonal 
 Game show 
You are participating in a game show in which you have already won a small sum of money 
that will go to a child in need. If you stop here, the child will get a better life for some time, 
but if you continue to the second round you could win a much larger amount for that child 
to have a better life forever. But, if you lose this second round, the child will not be helped 




Ethical and personal  
 Vaccine 
A terribly infectious and lethal disease has emerged and you happen to be immune to the 
virus. Doctors do not really know much about the disease but you are the key to finding the 
cure. If you participate in medical trials the doctors can produce a vaccine that could save 
thousands of people and cure the disease forever. But these medical trials would give you 
permanent scars. Or instead, you could donate blood and save a few people with blood 
transfusions. What would you be inclined to do? 
 
5.3 Results and discussion 
Reaction time (in milliseconds). The raw reaction times (RT) were corrected for the number of 
words in the dilemmas and trimmed to within two standard deviations to correct the positive 
skewness of the raw RT data (Baayen & Milin, 2010; Whelan, 2008). RT data were analyzed with 
a mixed effects model using the maximum likelihood (ML) fitting method. As the within-groups 
variance differs significantly from the between-groups variance (χ²(3)=224, p < .001), the 
application of a mixed effects model is appropriate. The model included participant as a random 
effect and cognitive load, the type of dilemma and the interaction term as fixed effects. 
No significant main effect of cognitive load (F(1,484) = .00, p = .99) was found on RT. A 
significant main effect of type of dilemma (F(3, 934) = 57.58, p < .001) and a significant interaction 
effect of type of dilemma x cognitive load (F(3, 934) = 23.74, p < .001, AIC = 22818) were found. 
Planned post hoc contrasts showed an increase in RT in the personal ethical dilemmas under 
cognitive load (M = 30479.01, SD = 772) compared to no load (M = 26959.54, SD = 825.10), 
t(925) = - 5.76, p < .001), confirming our predictions. Conversely, RT decreased under cognitive 
load for the personal unethical dilemmas (M = 23274.82, SD = 817.46) compared to no load (M = 
28149.91, SD = 780.30), t(950) = 7.77, p < .001, 95% CI [484.76;812.60]. No significant 
differences were found however in the impersonal dilemmas for the unethical (t(922) = - 1.33, p = 
.18) nor ethical impersonal dilemma (t(940) = - .82, p = .42). See Figure 2.  
These results confirm our hypothesis that ethical and unethical decision making is driven by 
different types of processing. The slower RT for ethical decisions under cognitive load provide 
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evidence that working memory plays a role in the judgment and decision making of ethical 
dilemmas. Surprisingly, RT for unethical dilemmas were significantly faster under cognitive load. 
The expectation was that there would be no difference between RT under cognitive load compared 
to no cognitive load. However, this finding does not invalidate our proposition that unethical 
decision making is driven by autonomous processes. People rely more on automated processes and 
heuristics under cognitive load (Barrouillet, Bemardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007; 
Pelham, Sumarta, & Myaskovsky, 1994), in this case working memory load has induced 
participants to respond even faster. We did not find any differences for impersonal ethical and 
unethical dilemmas. This result is not surprising given the previous research of Greene (2004; 
2001) in which he did not find any differences for impersonal unethical dilemmas and concluded 
that impersonal dilemmas are more similar to non-moral dilemmas. These results add to this 
conclusion that might also apply to ethical moral dilemmas.  
Responses. Additional analyses on the participants responses might shed more light on the decision 
making processes. In the ethical impersonal dilemma 52% opted for undertaking action, a binomial 
test indicated that this proportion did not differ significantly from 50% (p = .41), the same goes for 
the unethical impersonal dilemma, in which 47% opted for undertaking action (p = .17). For the 
unethical personal dilemmas, an equal proportion of participants opted for the action and inaction 
option (50%) which did not differ significantly from 50% (p = 1.00). For the ethical dilemma, an 
overwhelming majority opted for the action option (75%), a binomial test indicated that this 
proportion significantly differs from a proportion of 50% (p < .001). Further analyses reveal a 
relationship between the duration of response time and the nature of the response the participant 
gave. We find a significant correlation between the response and response time for all ethical 
dilemmas, but not for the unethical dilemmas. In the impersonal ethical dilemma participants that 
opted for inaction needed more time (M = 2202.21, SD = 770.30) than for action (M = 2027.23, 
SD = 763.14), t(346) = 2.13, p < .05. Conversely, in the ethical personal dilemma participants that 
opted for action needed more than time (M = 2934.32, SD = 1275.96) than for inaction (M = 2326, 
SD = 1152.75), t(351) = -3.68, p < .001. No such differences were found for the impersonal (t(333) 
= .81, p = .42) and personal (t(350) = -1.07,p = .29) unethical dilemmas. This significant relation 
between response and response time for the ethical dilemmas leads us to believe that for the ethical 
dilemmas, people are taking a number of considerations into account and a deliberate reasoning 
process is undertaken. Whereas, for the unethical dilemmas, the participants could have followed 
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a gut feeling that would lead them to either action or inaction, which could explain the indifference 
for response in terms of reaction time.  
An issue with dual process theories is that evidence is usually based on outcome measures (i.e. 
reaction times and responses) as opposed to the activity that takes place during decision making 
(de Neys, 2006; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996). In the next and final study, we exploratively 
























































6. Study 4  
Eye-tracking allows researchers to document various characteristics of reading and information 
search behavior, such as the number and duration of fixations (i.e. moments in which the eye 
remains relatively still), distances and velocities of saccades (i.e. rapid movements of the eyes 
between fixations), gaze duration (i.e. when saccades are included in the duration of a fixation) and 
pupillary diameter. Existing dual process theories do not offer specific predictions as to which other 
information seeking behavior can be expected when doing an eye-tracking study (Horstmann, 
Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009). Pupillary diameter (i.e. the size of the pupil) has been extensively 
researched and has been found to be related to cognitive effort (Barral, 2016). Querino et al (2015) 
provide evidence that the dissociation between dual processes (controlled and automatic) can be 
observed through pupillary dilation. They conducted a Five Digits Task, which is a measure of 
cognitive performance, and found that the pupillary diameter of respondents was smaller in the 
tasks in the control stage (which were designed to elicit automated processes) compared to the tasks 
in the corresponding test stage (which were designed to elicit controlled processes such as 
inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility). Recent findings also demonstrate that pupil diameter 
can also be used as an indirect metric for uncertainty during effortful control processes (Geng, 
Blumenfeld, Tyson, & Minzenberg, 2015). Based on this research, we should expect to find larger 
pupillary diameters for the ethical dilemmas compared to the unethical dilemmas. This study is the 
first to investigate moral dilemmas in an eye-tracking study, for that reason, this study is mainly 
intended as an exploratory study.  
6.1 Participants and procedure 
Eighty-five participants were recruited on campus grounds. Participants were presented with the 
same four morally laden dilemmas as in Study 3 in a random order on a computer screen (using 
stimulus presentation software Experiment Suite 360°™ by SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI)). In 
keeping with the participants native language, the dilemmas were translated into Dutch. Each trial 
was preceded by a blank screen with a fixation cross.  
Eye movements were recorded using the SMI RED250 (SMI) Binocular Remote Eye-tracker with 
a sampling rate of 120Hz and a gaze position accuracy of 0.4°. An infrared sensitive camera 
attached below the monitor records corneal reflection of near-infrared light directed towards the 
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pupil. By use of this method, the X and Y coordinates of the participants gaze point on the monitor 
can be determined.  
6.2 Results and discussion 
Reaction time (in milliseconds). In line with previous findings, the unethical dilemmas (MScholarships 
= 30,940.73, SDScholarships = 14,958.27; MLife boat = 35,562.67, SDLife boat = 13,195.62) show faster 
reaction times than the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 31,816.50, SDGame show = 10,988.19; MVaccine 
= 36,334.07, SDVaccine = 15,088.05), F(3,82) = 4.04, p < .05.  
Fixations. Fixation counts were higher in the unethical (MScholarships = 106.44, SDScholarships = 49.41; 
MLife boat = 130.73, SDLife boat = 52.05) compared to the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 86.39, SDGame 
show = 37.90; MVaccine = 101.01, SDVaccine = 47.50), F(3,82) = 25.98, p < .001. Fixation durations 
tended to take longer in the unethical (MScholarships = 19,792.23, SDScholarships = 11,7942.23; MLife boat 
= 24,574.82, SDLife boat = 11,788.82) compared to the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 15,885.47, 
SDGame show = 7,903.44; MVaccine = 18,844.77, SDVaccine = 10,941.06), F(3,82) = 19.97, p < .001. And 
fixations were more dispersed in the unethical (MScholarships = 8,334.62, SDScholarships = 3,803.16; 
MLife boat = 10,174.99, SDLife boat = 4,087.88) compared to the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 
6,717.13, SDGame show = 3,003.76; MVaccine = 7,837.21, SDVaccine = 3,565.02), F(3,82) = 22.66, p < 
.001 Based on the fixation counts and fixation dispersion, it appears that more information was 
inspected in the unethical dilemmas and that this information was inspected more intensely. The 
longer fixation durations for the unethical dilemmas are somewhat surprising, since this is what 
could be expected for a more deliberate manner of information processing. However, this could 
also signify that participants exhibited a higher involvement.  
Saccades. There were more saccades in the unethical (MScholarships = 108.02, SDScholarships = 51.04; 
MLife boat = 132.46, SDLife boat = 53.29) compared to the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 87.56, SDGame 
show = 38.98; MVaccine = 102.38, SDVaccine = 48.32), F(3,82) = 26.68, p < .001. Saccades were more 
rapid in the unethical (MScholarships = 13,283.24, SDScholarships = 7,845.01; MLife boat = 16,119.71, SDLife 
boat = 7,195.53) compared to the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 10,545.82, SDGame show = 5,130.23; 
MVaccine = 12,580.25, SDVaccine = 6,923.97), F(3,82) = 19.11, p < .001 Finally, the scanpaths were 
longer for the unethical (MScholarships = 27,201.84, SDScholarships = 11,867.71; MLife boat = 33,617.06, 
SDLife boat = 12,460.59) compared to the ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 21,987.81, SDGame show = 
9,402.53; MVaccine = 27,105.69, SDVaccine = 13,366.46), F(3,82) = 27.47, p < .001. A large number 
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of saccades and larger scanpaths in the unethical dilemmas point towards the possibility that 
participants returned to previously read sections to reinspect information. Faster saccade velocity 
could be indicative for a fast and perhaps hasty search strategy. The saccade and scanpath results 
generally point towards a rash and perhaps impulsive search strategy with frequent returns to 
previously inspected words.  
Pupillary diameter (in mm). A repeated measures analysis reveals a significant difference in 
pupillary diameter between the dilemmas (χ²(3,85) = 20.60, p < .001). Significantly larger pupillary 
diameters were found for ethical dilemmas (MGame show = 3.50, SDGame show = 0.49; MVaccine = 3.52, 
SDVaccine = 0.49) compared to unethical dilemmas (MScholarships = 3.46, SDScholarships = 0.52; MLife boat 
= 3.48, SDLife boat = 0.49). Larger pupil sizes for the ethical dilemmas could be suggestive for a 
reliance on working memory and therefore Type 2 processing. Though research has shown that 
pupil dilation is associated with cognitive effort (Barral, 2016; Querino et al., 2015), the measure 
is highly controversial as it could also be an indication of involvement or emotional arousal 
(Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008). For an overview of the descriptive statistics, see Table 
6. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Although these explorative results do not provide conclusive process evidence, we observe more, 
longer and more dispersed fixations, faster, longer and more numerous saccades and smaller pupil 
sizes for the unethical dilemmas compared to the ethical dilemmas. These patterns could be 
indicative for a more immediate, spontaneous information search and processing strategy for the 
unethical dilemmas. However, these patterns could also be interpreted as higher involvement. In 
any case, though no robust conclusions with respect to the direction of the difference can be drawn, 
we can tentatively conclude is that there are at least some differences between ethical and unethical 
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4.04* 1<2, 1<4, 
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19.11*** 1>2, 1>3, 
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27.47*** 1<2, 1>3, 
2>3, 2>4, 3<4 








20.60*** 1<2, 1<3, 
1<4, 2<3, 
2<4, 3<4 
aFriedman test for differences among repeated measures 
bRepeated measures ANOVA 
Significant at ***p<.001,**p<.01,*p<.05 
 
7. General discussion 
Ample research has investigated dual-process accounts, unethical behavior and ethical behavior, 
but to the best of our knowledge, none have attempted to tie this knowledge together by studying 
these topics jointly. The domain of moral cognition is becoming increasingly multidisciplinary and 
the need for a general unified theory on moral judgment and decision making has become more 
important. This paper set out to investigate whether different types of processes drive ethical versus 
unethical judgment and which types of processing is involved. Based on the literature, we proposed 
that unethical behavior is more likely to be driven by Type 1 processing (i.e. a diverse set of 
autonomous processes that do not rely on working memory and are associated with intuition, 
intuition and learned, automated processes and ethical behavior is more likely to be driven by Type 
2 processing (i.e. a type of processing that relies heavily on working memory and is associated with 
cognitive decoupling, hypothetical thinking and thus with deliberate and controlled cognitive 
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processes). Our studies provide evidence for these claims and provide a general framework that 
can help guide future research and hypothesis building.  
In the first study we find that participants needed more time to judge ethical scenarios, even for 
short sentences describing basic, everyday behaviors. These findings show that people are more 
quick to recognize and consequently judge unethical behavior, compared to ethical behavior. This 
is not surprising due to the notion that recognizing unethical behavior is evolutionary speaking 
more advantageous. It is more important to be able to quickly recognize whether your neighbor is 
out to harm you rather than help you. This difficulty in recognizing ethical behavior could also be 
due to the ambiguous meaning and lack of definition of what constitutes ethical behavior. People 
will have less difficulty in defining unethical behavior than they will when defining ethical 
behavior. They may feel it in their gut when something is bad or good. What is experienced as 
‘bad’ shows more overlap with what is ‘unethical’ than what is experienced as ‘good’ overlaps 
with ‘ethical’. What is ethical goes further than just ‘good’, because ‘good’ for a person generally 
entails the things that are beneficial for the person himself, but not necessarily for society. Ethicality 
is a rational, artificial construction created by the modern human, whereas unethicality is 
description of unacceptable behavior that is felt on an ancestral, basal level.  
This asymmetry sometimes extends to the importance that is attached to unethical versus ethical 
deeds. Research shows that consumers are generally intolerant to unethical abuses by retailers and 
consumers (Auger et al., 2008; Fullerton, Kerch, & Dodge, 1996; Steenhaut & Van Kenhove, 2005) 
but appear indifferent toward ethical practices of companies, as ethical efforts of companies are 
not rewarded by the consumers purchasing behavior (Aaker, Vohs, & Mogilner, 2010; Carrington 
et al., 2010; Luchs, Naylor, Irwin, & Raghunathan, 2010; White et al., 2012).  
In the second study we replicate the finding that participants were slower to judge ethical scenarios 
compared to analogous unethical scenarios. Also, participants that were exposed to the ethical 
scenarios were less susceptible to framing effects, which is to be expected from people relying on 
a more analytic processing that is characteristic to Type 2 processing (McElroy & Seta, 2003). We 
also did not find significant correlations between the self-reported scales and participants’ reaction 
times. This could point towards the possibility that these processes manifest at a subconscious level 
outside the participant’s awareness. But it must also be stressed that null-results do not carry 
conclusive implications and more research into the matter is necessary.  
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The third study teases out the differences in Type 1 and Type 2 processing by overtaxing the 
participants working memory during their decision making in four morally laden dilemmas. 
Cognitive load in the form of a digit task hampered decision making in the ethical personal dilemma 
by significantly slowing down reaction times, whereas decision making in the unethical personal 
dilemma was not negatively affected by cognitive load. Moreover, participants reacted even faster 
compared to the no-load condition. No differences were found however in the impersonal unethical 
and ethical dilemmas. This result is in line with previous research (Greene et al., 2004; Greene et 
al., 2001) which did not find any differences for impersonal unethical dilemmas and concluded that 
impersonal dilemmas are more similar to non-moral dilemmas. This could be because the 
impersonal dilemmas do not involve grave, life-threatening matters in which the decision to be 
made is pressing. In that sense impersonal dilemmas are less likely than personal dilemmas to elicit 
strong reactions that expose differences more clearly.  
The final study tracked participants eye movements and pupil diameters while reading and deciding 
upon the four morally laden dilemmas from Study 3. The number of fixations and saccades was 
higher, in the unethical compared to the ethical dilemmas. The fixations were longer and more 
dispersed and saccades were faster for the unethical compared to the ethical dilemmas. Finally, 
pupil diameter was larger for the unethical dilemmas. It appears as if information was inspected 
more superficially, hastily and repeatedly in the unethical dilemmas, which could point towards 
the possibility that a more immediate, spontaneous information search and processing strategy was 
used for the unethical dilemmas. However, the longer fixation durations for the unethical dilemmas 
could be an indication of higher involvement (Behe, Bae, Huddleston, & Sage, 2015; Holmqvist, 
Nÿstrom, Andersson, & van de Weijer, 2011; Kennedy, 2016). Smaller pupil sizes for the ethical 
dilemmas on the other hand could be an indication for a more effortful processing style, but this 
metric is subject to debate as a conclusive measure for cognitive effort (Barral, 2016; Querino et 
al., 2015), because it could also be an indication of emotional arousal or involvement (Bradley et 
al., 2008). At this point it is difficult (if not impossible) to conclusively link these eye tracking 
metrics to Type 1 or Type 2 processing, but what these exploratory results do reveal is that ethical 
and unethical information is inspected and processed differently. The results also show that 
involvement and emotional arousal could possibly play a role but they do not provide a decisive 
verdict how and where they exert influence.  
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Purely rational models of moral reasoning that dismiss the role of emotion (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 
1983) have been amply disproved by neuroscientific studies on the neural correlates of moral 
judgment (Bertsch et al., 2013; Greene, 2011; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Nomi et al., 2008; Seitz et 
al., 2006). There is a general consensus that moral judgment and decision making is the result of a 
complex interplay between emotion and cognitive reasoning, but less consensus exists on how and 
where emotions play a role in moral judgment, both ethical and unethical. Emotions can be used 
as input in a decision or as a means of signaling moral significance or importance. According to 
Horberg, Oveis, and Keltner (2011) emotions help people prioritize decisions in dilemmas that 
involve conflicting moral norms. Others have found a positive link between emotional arousal and 
the probability of making deontological judgments (Szekely & Miu, 2015; Tassy et al., 2011). 
Conversely, the social-intuitionist approach states that moral judgment stems from a moral intuition 
and emotion and that moral reasoning is a post hoc construction that is generated after the judgment 
has been reached (Haidt, 2001). In light of our findings, perhaps emotions enter at different 
moments during ethical and unethical judgment. As ethical judgment relies more on Type 2 
processing, emotions could serve as input along with several other elements of the ethical situation 
that are under consideration. During unethical judgment, emotions could come into play at a much 
earlier stage, at the base of gut feelings that could influence Type 1 processing.  
8. Limitations and future research  
Some limitations should be noted. Firstly, most results are based mainly on reaction times and are 
merely correlational. They do not provide conclusive evidence for causality. Prolonged reaction 
times could also be a reflection of the engagement of other, nonspecific mental processes such as 
visual processing or motor responding, especially when using tasks that impose cognitive load. In 
Study 3 a concurrent digit task was employed, but this could have activated other unwanted 
processes. Future research should replicate results using several types of cognitive load tasks that 
activate different other areas in the brain while imposing cognitive load, some relying on spatial 
memory, such as the dot memory task (Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2014), memorization 
of words, such as the operation span task or Gospan test (de Neys, 2006), the memorization of 
numbers, such as the digit span tasks, or time pressure. Second, in the vein of the findings of Greene 
et al. (2008), in which they found that it is possible that Type 2 processing may take place for 
unethical judgment, it is also possible that Type 1 processing may occur for ethical judgment. For 
instance if there is a strong personal involvement, or for people who bolster strong, outspoken 
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norms and principles regarding ethical behavior or uphold strong values of benevolence or 
universalism (Yoon et al., 2006). Third, this paper did not include the role of emotion, even though 
emotion makes up a vital aspect of moral judgment and decision making. Future research on the 
application of dual-processes should seek to incorporate the role of emotion. Fourth, we did not 
find gender-effects in our studies, but literature suggest that the gender effect on moral judgment 
is contingent on the differential use of double standards depending on the type of (un)ethical 
behavior under scrutiny (Vermeir & Van Kenhove, 2008). Since literature on gender effects on 
ethical judgment are somewhat mixed (Craft, 2013; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), more research 
into in what type of dilemma or context possible gender effects could occur is necessary. Fifth, this 
paper was the first to venture into the use of eye-tracking for investigating moral judgment. There 
are certainly limitations in the use of this methodology with respect to investigating judgment 
processing. Although eye tracking can generate a great deal of data, it is still a ‘black box’ method. 
We know what information is inputted and we can observe the resulting output, but this method 
cannot provide conclusive process evidence, since many alternative explanations exist for e.g. 
fixation duration and pupil dilation. Future research could triangulate eye tracking results with 
reaction time data and fMRI results (high spatial resolution) or EEG results (high temporal 
resolution).  
 Lastly, since to date, no ethical dilemmas have been devised, further research is needed to validate 
the use of ethical dilemmas. The dilemmas used may differ on more than the degree of ethicality 
versus unethicality as they differ considerably in context, e.g. there is a dilemma which takes place 
in a job-related context (Scholarships), survival context (Life boat), recreational context (Game 
show) and medical context (Vaccine). Moreover, people are more likely to be confronted with a 
dilemma similar to the Scholarships dilemma in real-life than with the other dilemmas, which could 
have also influenced response times. On the other hand, we have attempted to keep the level of 
severity (life threatening versus financial repercussions) and the nature of required action (indirect 
versus direct physical contact) constant over the personal versus impersonal and ethical versus 
unethical dilemmas. This issue is also prevalent in the items of Study 1, which also differ 
considerably in context and hence are not directly comparable. Future research could focus on 
keeping the context constant, for instance by negating certain behaviors within the same context 
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Overview of existing personal and impersonal moral dilemmas as collected and categorized by Greene e.a. (2008). 
Impersonal Dilemmas 
1. Standard Trolley (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1986): 
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly 
approaching a fork in the tracks.  On the tracks 
extending to the left is a group of five railway 
workmen.  On the tracks extending to the right is a 
single railway workman. If you do nothing the 
trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of 
the five workmen.  The only way to avoid the deaths 
of these workmen is to hit a switch on your 
dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to 
the right, causing the death of the single workman. 
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to 
avoid the deaths of the five workmen? 
2. Standard Fumes (Thomson, 1986): You are the 
late-night watchman in a hospital.  Due to an 
accident in the building next door, there are deadly 
fumes rising up through the hospital’s ventilation 
system.  In a certain room of the hospital are three 
patients.  In another room there is a single patient.  
If you do nothing the fumes will rise up into the 
room containing the three patients and cause their 
deaths. The only way to avoid the deaths of these 
patients is to hit a certain switch, which will cause 
the fumes to bypass the room containing the three 
patients.  As a result of doing this the fumes will 
enter the room containing the single patient, causing 
his death. 
3. Donation (Unger, 1996): You are at home one 
day when the mail arrives.  You receive a letter from 
a reputable international aid organization.  The 
letter asks you to make a donation of two hundred 
dollars to their organization. The letter explains that 
a two hundred-dollar donation will allow this 
organization to provide needed medical attention to 
some poor people in another part of the world. Is it 
appropriate for you to not make a donation to this 
organization in order to save money? 
4. Vaccine Policy (Baron, 1988): You work for the 
Bureau of Health, a government agency.  You are 
deciding whether or not your agency should 
encourage the use of a certain recently developed 
vaccine.  The vast majority of people who take the 
vaccine develop an immunity to a certain deadly 
disease, but a very small number of people who take 
the vaccine will actually get the disease that the 
vaccine is designed to prevent. All the available 
evidence, which is very strong, suggests that the 
chances of getting the disease due to lack of 
vaccination are much higher than the chances of 
getting the disease by taking the vaccine. Is it 
appropriate for you to direct your agency to 
encourage the use of this vaccine in order to 
promote national health?   
5. Environmental Policy A1: You are a member of 
a government legislature.  The legislature is 
deciding between two different policies concerning 
environmental hazards. Policy A has a 90% chance 
of causing no deaths at all and has a 10% chance of 
causing 1000 deaths.  Policy B has a 92% chance of 
causing no deaths and an 8% chance of causing 
10,000 deaths. Is it appropriate for you to vote for 
Policy A over Policy B?    
6. Environmental Policy A2: You are a member of 
a government legislature.  The legislature is 
deciding between two different policies concerning 
environmental hazards. Policy A has a 90% chance 
of causing no deaths at all and has a 10% chance of 
causing 1000 deaths.  Policy B has an 88% chance 
of causing no deaths and a 12% chance of causing 
10 deaths. Is it appropriate for you to vote for Policy 
B over Policy A? 
7. Sculpture (Baron, 1988): You are visiting the 
sculpture garden of a wealthy art collector.  The 
garden overlooks a valley containing a set of train 
tracks.  A railway workman is working on the 
tracks, and an empty runaway trolley is heading 
down the tracks toward the workman. The only way 
to save the workman’s life is to push one of the art 
collector’s prized sculptures down into the valley so 
that it will roll onto the tracks and block the trolley’s 
passage.  Doing this will destroy the sculpture. Is it 
appropriate for you to destroy the sculpture in order 
to save this workman’s life? 
8. Speedboat (Baron, 1988): While on vacation on 
a remote island, you are fishing from a seaside dock. 
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You observe a group of tourists board a small boat 
and set sail for a nearby island.  Soon after their 
departure you hear over the radio that there is a 
violent storm brewing, a storm that is sure to 
intercept them. The only way that you can ensure 
their safety is to warn them by borrowing a nearby 
speedboat.  The speedboat belongs to a miserly 
tycoon who would not take kindly to your 
borrowing his property. Is it appropriate for you to 
borrow the speedboat in order to warn the tourists 
about the storm? 
9. Guarded Speedboat (Unger, 1996): While on 
vacation on a remote island, you are fishing from a 
seaside dock. You observe a group of tourists board 
a small boat and set sail for a nearby island.  Soon 
after their departure you hear over the radio that 
there is a violent storm brewing, a storm that is sure 
to intercept them. The only way that you can ensure 
their safety is to warn them by borrowing a nearby 
speedboat.  The speedboat belongs to a miserly 
tycoon who has hired a fiercely loyal guard to make 
sure that no one uses his boat without permission.  
To get to the speedboat you will have to lie to the 
guard. Is it appropriate for you to lie to the guard in 
order to borrow the speedboat and warn the tourists 
about the storm? 
10. Five-for-Seven Trolley (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 
1986): You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley 
quickly approaching a fork in the tracks.  On the 
tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway 
workmen.  On the tracks extending to the right is a 
group of seven railway workmen. If you do nothing 
the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the 
deaths of the five workmen.  The only way to save 
these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard 
that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, 
causing the deaths of the seven workmen on the 
other side. Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch 
in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen? 
11. Three-for-Seven Fumes (Thomson, 1986): You 
are the late-night watchman in a hospital.  Due to an 
accident in the building next door, there are deadly 
fumes rising up through the hospital’s ventilation 
system.  In a certain room of the hospital are three 
patients.  In another room there are seven patients.  
If you do nothing the fumes will rise up into the 
room containing the three patients and cause their 
deaths. The only way to save these patients is to hit 
a certain switch, which will cause the fumes to 
bypass the room containing the three people.  As a 
result of doing this the fumes will enter the room 
containing the seven patients, causing their deaths. 
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to 
avoid the deaths of the three patients? 
12. Resume: You have a friend who has been trying 
to find a job lately without much success.  He 
figured that he would be more likely to get hired if 
he had a more impressive resume. He decided to put 
some false information on his resume in order to 
make it more impressive.  By doing this he 
ultimately managed to get hired, beating out several 
candidates who were actually more qualified than 
he. Was it appropriate for your friend to put false 
information on his resume in order to help him find 
employment? 
13. Taxes: You are the owner of a small business 
trying to make ends meet.  It occurs to you that you 
could lower your taxes by pretending that some of 
your personal expenses are business expenses. For 
example, you could pretend that the stereo in your 
bedroom is being used in the lounge at the office, or 
that your dinners out with your wife are dinners 
with clients. Is it appropriate for you to pretend that 
certain personal expenses are business expenses in 
order to lower your taxes? 
14. Environmental Policy B1: You are a member of 
a government legislature.  The legislature is 
deciding between two different policies concerning 
environmental hazards. Policy A has a 90% chance 
of causing no deaths at all and has a 10% chance of 
causing 1000 deaths.  Policy B has a 92% chance of 
causing no deaths and an 8% chance of causing 
10,000 deaths. Is it appropriate for you to vote for 
Policy B over Policy A? 
15. Environmental Policy B2: You are a member of 
a government legislature.  The legislature is 
deciding between two different policies concerning 
environmental hazards. Policy A has a 90% chance 
of causing no deaths at all and has a 10% chance of 
causing 1000 deaths.  Policy B has a 88% chance of 
causing no deaths and a 12% chance of causing 10 
deaths. Is it appropriate for you to vote for Policy A 
over Policy B? 
16. Stock Tip: You are a management consultant 
working on a case for a large corporate client.  You 
have access to confidential information that would 
be very useful to investors.  You have a friend who 
plays the stock market.  You owe this friend a 
sizable sum of money. By providing her with 
certain confidential information you could help her 
make a lot of money, considerably more than you 
owe her.  If you did this, she would insist on 
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canceling your debt.  Releasing information in this 
way is strictly forbidden by federal law. Is it 
appropriate for you to release this information to 
your friend so that she will cancel your debt? 
17. Illegal Lunch: You are a lawyer working on a 
big case.  The judge presiding over the trial happens 
to be someone you knew from law school.  The two 
of you were rather friendly back then, but now, 
decades later, it seems that your old friend barely 
remembers you. You’re quite sure that if you were 
to talk to him over lunch, you could jog his memory 
and he would begin to see you as an old buddy, 
which would be very good for your work on this 
case.  It’s illegal for judges and lawyers working on 
the same case to meet socially. Is it appropriate for 
you to meet with this judge socially in order to help 
you win your case? 
18. Lost Wallet: You are walking down the street 
when you come across a wallet lying on the ground.  
You open the wallet and find that it contains several 
hundred dollars in cash as well the owner’s driver’s 
license. From the credit cards and other items in the 
wallet it’s very clear that the wallet’s owner is 
wealthy.  You, on the other hand, have been hit by 
hard times recently and could really use some extra 
money.  You consider sending the wallet back to the 
owner without the cash, keeping the cash for 
yourself. Is it appropriate for you to keep the money 
you found in the wallet in order to have more money 
for yourself? 
Personal Moral Dilemmas 
1. Transplant (Thomson, 1986): You are a doctor.  
You have five patients, each of whom is about to die 
due to a failing organ of some kind.  You have 
another patient who is healthy. The only way that 
you can save the lives of the first five patients is to 
transplant five of this young man’s organs (against 
his will) into the bodies of the other five patients.  If 
you do this, the young man will die, but the other 
five patients will live. Is it appropriate for you to 
perform this transplant in order to save five of your 
patients? 
2. Footbridge (Thomson, 1986): A runaway trolley 
is heading down the tracks toward five workmen 
who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its 
present course.  You are on a footbridge over the 
tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the 
five workmen.  Next to you on this footbridge is a 
stranger who happens to be very large. The only 
way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push 
this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks 
below where his large body will stop the trolley.  
The stranger will die if you do this, but the five 
workmen will be saved. Is it appropriate for you to 
push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save 
the five workmen? 
3. Country Road (Unger, 1998): You are driving 
along a country road when you hear a plea for help 
coming from some roadside bushes.  You pull over 
and encounter a man whose legs are covered with 
blood.  The man explains that he has had an accident 
while hiking and asks you to take him to a nearby 
hospital. Your initial inclination is to help this man, 
who will probably lose his leg if he does not get to 
the hospital soon.  However, if you give this man a 
lift, his blood will ruin the leather upholstery of your 
car. Is it appropriate for you to leave this man by the 
side of the road in order to preserve your leather 
upholstery? 
4. Architect: You are a young architect visiting one 
of your construction sites with your boss.  Your boss 
is a despicable individual who makes everyone 
around him miserable including you. It occurs to 
you that if you were to push him off of the building 
you are inspecting he would fall to his death and 
everyone would think it was an accident. Is it 
appropriate for you to push your boss off of the 
building in order to get him out of your life?  
5. Hard Times: You are the head of a poor 
household in a developing country.  Your crops 
have failed for the second year in a row, and it 
appears that you have no way to feed your family.  
Your sons, ages eight and ten, are too young to go 
off to the city where there jobs, but your daughter 
could fare better. You know a man from your 
village who lives in the city and who makes 
sexually explicit films featuring small children such 
as your daughter.  He tells you that in one year of 
working in his studio your daughter could earn 
enough money to keep your family fed for several 
growing seasons. Is it appropriate for you to employ 
your daughter in the child pornography industry in 
order to feed your family? 
6. Smother for dollars: You are in hospital lounge 
waiting to visit a sick friend.  A young man sitting 
next to you explains that his father is very ill.  The 
doctors believe that he has a week to live at most.  
He explains further that his father has a substantial 
life insurance policy that expires at midnight. If his 
father dies before midnight, this young man will 
receive a very large sum of money.  He says that the 
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money would mean a great deal to him and that no 
good will come from his father’s living a few more 
days.  He offers you half a million dollars to go up 
to his father’s room and smother his father with a 
pillow. Is it appropriate for you to kill this man’s 
father in order to get money for yourself and this 
young man? 
7. Crying Baby: Enemy soldiers have taken over 
your village.  They have orders to kill all remaining 
civilians.  You and some of your townspeople have 
sought refuge in the cellar of a large house.  Outside 
you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to 
search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to 
cry loudly.  You cover his mouth to block the sound.  
If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying 
will summon the attention of the soldiers who will 
kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the 
cellar.  To save yourself and the others you must 
smother your child to death. Is it appropriate for you 
to smother your child in order to save yourself and 
the other townspeople? 
8. Plane Crash: Your plane has crashed in the 
Himalayas.  The only survivors are yourself, 
another man, and a young boy.  The three of you 
travel for days, battling extreme cold and wind.  
Your only chance at survival is to find your way to 
small a village on the other side of the mountain, 
several days away.  The boy has a broken leg and 
cannot move very quickly. His chances of surviving 
the journey are essentially zero.  Without food, you 
and the other man will probably die as well.  The 
other man suggests that you sacrifice the boy and 
eat his remains over the next few days. Is it 
appropriate to kill this boy so that you and the other 
man may survive your journey to safety? 
9. Hired Rapist: You have been dissatisfied with 
your marriage for several years.  It is your distinct 
impression that your wife no longer appreciates 
you.  You remember how she appreciated you years 
ago when you took care of her after she was 
mugged.  You devise the following plan to regain 
your wife’s affection. You will hire a man to break 
into your house while you are away.  This man will 
tie up your wife and rape her.  You, upon hearing 
the horrible news, will return swiftly to her side, to 
take care of her and comfort her, and she will once 
again appreciate you. Is it appropriate for you to hire 
a man to rape your wife so that she will appreciate 
you as you comfort her? 
10. Grandson: A young boy is visiting his 
grandmother for the weekend.  Usually she gives 
him a gift of a few dollars when he arrives, but this 
time she doesn’t.  He asks her why not and she says 
something about how he doesn’t write her as many 
letters as he used to.  Angered by this, the boy 
decides to play a trick on her. While his 
grandmother is busy cooking he removes a handful 
of pills from the medicine cabinet and puts them in 
his grandmother’s teapot.  Later that night, she 
makes her tea, and the dissolved pills make her sick.  
In the morning she is dead. Was it appropriate for 
this boy to put pills in his grandmother’s teapot in 
order to play a trick on her?    
11. Infanticide: You are a fifteen-year-old girl who 
has become pregnant.  By wearing loose clothing 
and deliberately putting on weight you have 
managed to keep your pregnancy a secret.  One day, 
while at school, your water breaks.  You run to the 
girls locker room and hide for several hours while 
you deliver the baby.  You are sure that you are not 
prepared to care for this baby. You think to yourself 
that it would be such a relief to simply clean up the 
mess you’ve made in the locker room, wrap the 
baby in some towels, throw the baby in the 
dumpster behind the school, and act as if nothing 
had ever happened. Is it appropriate for you to throw 
your baby in the dumpster in order to move on with 
your life? 
12. Lifeboat 2: You are on a cruise ship when there 
is a fi re on board, and the ship has to be abandoned.  
The lifeboats are carrying many more people than 
they were designed to carry.  The lifeboat you’re in 
is sitting dangerously low in the water—a few 
inches lower and it will sink. The seas start to get 
rough, and the boat begins to fill with water.  If 
nothing is done it will sink before the rescue boats 
arrive and everyone on board will die.  However, 
there is an injured person who will not survive in 
any case.  If you throw that person overboard the 
boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers 
will be saved. Is it appropriate for you to throw this 
person overboard in order to save the lives of the 
remaining passengers? 
13. Preventing the Spread 2: You are a waiter.  You 
overhear one of your customers say that he is about 
to go to jail and that in his last forty-eight hours of 
freedom he plans to infect as many people as 
possible with HIV.  You know him well enough to 
know that he is telling the truth and that he has 
access to many potential victims. You happen to 
know that he has a very strong allergy to poppy 
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seeds.  If he eats even one he will go into 
convulsions and have to be hospitalized. for at least 
forty-eight hours. Is it appropriate for you to cause 
this man to have a serious allergy attack in order to 
prevent him from spreading HIV? 
14. Ecologists: You are part of a group of ecologists 
who live in a remote stretch of jungle.  The entire 
group, which includes eight children, has been 
taken hostage by a group of paramilitary terrorists.  
One of the terrorists takes a liking to you.  He 
informs you that his leader intends to kill you and 
the rest of the hostages the following morning. He 
is willing to help you and the children escape, but 
as an act of good faith he wants you to kill one of 
your fellow hostages whom he does not like.  If you 
refuse his offer all the hostages including the 
children and yourself will die.  If you accept his 
offer then the others will die in the morning but you 
and the eight children will escape. Is it appropriate 
for you to kill one of your fellow hostages in order 
to escape from the terrorists and save the lives of the 
eight children? 
15. Bomb 2: You are negotiating with a powerful 
and determined terrorist who is about to set off a 
bomb in a crowded area. Your one advantage is that 
you have his teen-age son in your custody. There is 
only one thing that you can do to stop him from 
detonating his bomb, which will kill thousands of 
people if detonated.  To stop him, you must contact 
him over the satellite hook-up that he has 
established and, in front of the camera, break one of 
his son’s arms and then threaten to break the other 
one if he does not give himself up. Is it appropriate 
for you to break the terrorist’s son’s arm in order to 
prevent the terrorist from killing thousands of 
people with his bomb? 
16. Submarine: You are the captain of a military 
submarine travelling underneath a large iceberg.  
An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most 
of your oxygen supply and has injured one of your 
crew who is quickly losing blood.  The injured crew 
member is going to die from his wounds no matter 
what happens. The remaining oxygen is not 
sufficient for the entire crew to make it to the 
surface.  The only way to save the other crew 
members is to shoot dead the injured crew member 
so that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest 
of the crew to survive. Is it appropriate for you to 
kill the fatally injured crew member in order to save 
the lives of the remaining crew members? 
17. Lawrence of Arabia: You are the leader of a 
small army that consists of warriors from two tribes, 
the hill tribe and the river tribe.  You belong to 
neither tribe.  During the night a hill tribesman got 
into an argument with a river tribesman and 
murdered him.  The river tribe will attack the hill 
tribe unless the murderer is put to death, but the hill 
tribe refuses to kill one of its own warriors. The only 
way for you to avoid a war between the two tribes 
that will costs hundreds of lives is to publicly 
execute the murderer by cutting off is head with 
your sword. Is it appropriate for you to cut off this 
man’s head in order to prevent the two tribes from 
fighting a war that will cost hundreds of lives? 
18. Sophie’s Choice: It is wartime and you and your 
two children, ages eight and five, are living in a 
territory that has been occupied  by the enemy.  At 
the enemy’s headquarters is a doctor who performs 
painful experiments on humans that inevitably lead 
to death. He intends to perform experiments on one 
of your children, but he will allow you to choose 
which of your children will be experimented upon.  
You have twenty-four hours to bring one of your 
children to his laboratory.  If you refuse to bring one 
of your children to his laboratory he will find them 
both and experiment on both of them. Is it 
appropriate for you to bring one of your children to 
the laboratory in order to avoid having them both 
die? 
19. Sacrifice: You, your husband, and your four 
children are crossing a mountain range on your 
return journey to your homeland.  You have 
inadvertently set up camp on a local clan’s sacred 
burial ground. The leader of the clan says that 
according to the local laws, you and your family 
must be put to death.  However, he will let yourself, 
your husband, and your three other children live if 
you yourself will kill your oldest son. Is it 
appropriate for you to kill your oldest son in order 
to save your husband and your other three children? 
20. Vitamins (Unger, 1998): You are the leader of a 
mountaineering expedition that is stranded in the 
wilderness.  Your expedition includes a family of 
six that has a genetically caused vitamin deficiency.  
A few people’s kidneys contain large amounts of 
this vitamin. There is one such person in your party.  
The only way to save the lives of the six members 
of this family is to remove one of this man’s kidneys 
so that the necessary vitamins may be extracted 
from it.  The man will not die if you do this, but his 
health will be compromised.  The man is opposed 
to this plan, but you have the power to do as you see 
85 
 
fi t. Is it appropriate for you to forcibly remove this 
man’s kidney in order to save the lives of the six 
vitamin-deficient people? 
21. Vaccine Test A: viral epidemic has spread 
across the globe killing millions of people.  You 
have developed two substances in your home 
laboratory.  You know that one of them is a vaccine, 
but you don’t know which one.  You also know that 
the other one is deadly. Once you figure out which 
substance is the vaccine you can use it to save 
millions of lives.  You have with you two people 
who are under your care, and the only way to 
identify the vaccine is to inject each of these people 
with one of the two substances.  One person will 
live, the other will die, and you will be able to start 
saving lives with your vaccine. Is it appropriate for 
you to kill one of these people with a deadly 
injection in order to identify a vaccine that will save 
millions of lives? 
22. Euthanasia: You are the leader of a small group 
of soldiers.  You are on your way back from a 
completed mission deep in enemy territory when 
one of your men has stepped in trap that has been 
set by the enemy and is badly injured.  The trap is 
connected to a radio device that by now has alerted 
the enemy to your presence.  They will soon be on 
their way. If the enemy finds your injured man they 
will torture him and kill him.  He begs you not to 
leave him behind, but if you try to take him with you 
your entire group will be captured.  The only way to 
prevent this injured soldier from being tortured is to 
shoot him yourself. Is it appropriate for you to shoot 
this soldier in order to prevent him from being 
tortured by the enemy? 
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This paper focuses on segmenting digital movie and TV series pirates and on 
investigating the effectiveness of piracy-combatting measures i.e., legal and 
educational strategies, in light of these segments. To address these research 
objectives, two online studies were conducted. First, 1277 valid responses were 
gathered with an online survey. Four pirate segments were found based on differing 
combinations of attitude toward piracy, ethical evaluation of piracy and feelings of 
guilt. The anti-pirate, conflicted pirate, cavalier pirate, and die-hard pirate can be 
placed on a continuum of increasing pirating frequency, subjective norm, pirating 
self-efficacy, habit, and decreasing in perceived harm, respectively. The segments 
also differ in deontological and teleological orientations. Second, in an 
experimental mixed design, we find that the educational strategy is more effective 
than the legal strategy in lowering pirating intentions for the conflicted and cavalier 
pirate. However, both strategies fail at lowering intentions of the die-hard pirate, 
although perceived harm and perceived impunity were significantly influenced. 
These findings offer a more profound understanding of pirate segments and how 
they react differently to piracy-combatting measures. As a result, better strategies 




This chapter is based on the published article De Corte, C.E. & Van Kenhove, P. (2015). One 






Piracy, viz., the unauthorized use of intellectual property, is not a recent phenomenon. The 
difference between people taping a movie on TV on VHS and people downloading all of the 
seasons of their favorite TV show onto their hard drive lies in the scale on which this activity 
currently occurs (Johns, 2009). However, due to the damage and loss of revenue, this development 
has been regarded with great discontent by the intellectual property protection industry. According 
to the RIAA (Recording Industry Association America), piracy produces an annual estimated cost 
of 12.5 billion dollar to the American economy (RIAA, 2014; Siwek, 2007) and an estimated 
annual cost of 6.1 billion dollars to the movie industry, according to a study by L.E.K. Consulting 
(LEK, 2006) funded by the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America). However, some 
authors claim that a precise assessment of actual economic loss from piracy is very difficult (Bialik, 
2013; Plumer, 2012; Vany & Walls, 2007). Digital piracy is a form of unethical consumer behavior, 
i.e. norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or society in general. 
We define digital piracy in this study as the illegal procurement of infringed copyrighted digital 
media files by (Bit)Torrent downloading via P2P networks. We focus on the most widespread and 
mainstream form of digital piracy, more specifically that of movies and TV shows. In April 2011, 
the infamous BitTorrent indexing website The Pirate Bay started conducting studies in 
collaboration with the department of sociology of law at Lund University in Sweden and collected 
responses of 75.000 file-sharing users (Svensson et al., 2014). The data are freely available on their 
website, fittingly renamed “The Research Bay”. Recent figures show that 44% of uploads contain 
movies and TV series, followed by 35% adult content and 9% music content; of which the latter 
has been on the decline (Ernesto, 2014). In spite of the availability of legal streaming alternatives 
such as Spotify and Netflix, tracking figures provided by ICM (Infringement Control Management) 
reveal that the proportion of consumers downloading illegally has remained static at 23% and are 
infringing more by volume (Bales, 2016). For definitions and descriptions of torrent downloading 
terminology, see appendix A.  
Digital piracy is an intricate phenomenon, and literature focusing on antecedents or ethical 
components of digital piracy often tends to be contradictory. This paper is unique because it does 
not seek to find a general framework to understand “the pirate” but proposes that digital pirates 
make up a heterogeneous population. It aims to understand contradictory evidence in the piracy 
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literature by investigating the pirating population as a collection of idiosyncratic subgroups. First, 
in depth interviews were organized in order to fully grasp the full range of motivational factors that 
drive consumers towards digital piracy and to gauge their position towards the acceptability and 
ethicality of the matter. By means of an online survey, segmenting digital pirates is the focus of the 
second study. The current paper also contributes to the literature by investigating the effectiveness 
of piracy- combatting measures, i.e., the legal and educational strategy in light of these segments. 
In a mixed experimental design, the third study addresses this research objective. Ultimately, a 
more profound understanding can be established and better strategies can be developed to control 
digital piracy.  
2. Literature overview and conceptual framework 
The current piracy literature can be roughly partitioned into 3 main perspectives on piracy, namely 
a behavioral perspective, an ethical perspective and a descriptive perspective, although these 
perspectives may overlap. Unfortunately, much of the research on piracy tends to be contradictory. 
However, if indeed the population of digital pirates is heterogeneous, then these divergent findings 
may simply be the result of focusing on different pirate segments. Any segmentation should attempt 
to incorporate each of these perspectives, explain differences in pirating behavior and integrate 
these seemingly contradictory findings. The first section in the literature overview is provided to 
focus on finding potential candidate variables for segmentation and later profiling. The last section 
focuses on piracy-combatting measures.  
2.1 Behavioral perspective 
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) is the most frequently used framework for 
understanding various forms of piracy (Al-Rafee & Cronan, 2006; Cronan & Al-Rafee, 2007; Holt 
& Copes, 2010; Kwong & Lee, 2002; Liao et al., 2009; Peace et al., 2003; Robertson et al., 2011; 
Wagner & Sanders, 2001). According to the theory of planned behavior, the occurrence of behavior 
is determined by intention, which in turn is influenced by one’s attitude toward the behavior in 
question, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. Perceived behavioral control pertains 
to one’s beliefs regarding one’s capacity to exert certain behavior (Ajzen, 1991). The application 
of the TPB to piracy has been confirmed for several forms of piracy. Attitude, subjective norms 
and perceived behavior control were found significant predictors of intention to illegally copy 
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software (Peace et al., 2003), purchase pirated goods (Ang et al., 2001), download music (Kwong 
& Lee, 2002; Plowman & Goode, 2009) and use pirated software (Liao et al., 2009). 
Attitude 
Of these constructs, attitude has been found to be most influential in predicting behavior (Beck & 
Ajzen, 1991; Trafimow & Finlay, 1996). A consistent finding in the piracy literature is a positive 
relationship between a positive, accepting attitude toward the act of illegal downloading and past, 
current and future downloading behavior (Chiou et al., 2005; d’Astous, Colbert, & Montpetit, 2005; 
Gopal et al., 2004; Kwong & Lee, 2002; Levin, Dato-on, & Rhee, 2004; Liao et al., 2009; Lysonski 
& Durvasula, 2008; Peace et al., 2003; Plowman & Goode, 2009; Wingrove, Korpas, & Weisz, 
2010). In contrast to this unambiguous finding, less unity is found with respect to the antecedents 
of piracy attitudes. These antecedents range from singer idolization, perceived prosecution risk, 
perceived magnitude of consequences and social consensus (Chiou et al., 2005), to a lack of an 
equitable relationship (Kwong & Lee, 2002). Because several antecedents influence piracy 
attitudes, we expect to find differentiation in people’s attitudes toward piracy. For that reason, we 
propose that attitude would be a suitable variable for segmentation.  
Subjective norms  
Subjective norms are a second important part of the TPB and encompass an individual’s beliefs as 
to whether significant others or peers find such behavior acceptable (Ajzen, 1991; Conner & 
Armitage, 1998). Regarding this construct’s role in the TPB, it would seem apparent that subjective 
norms should be included in a segmentation of digital pirates. However, given the positive 
relationship between attitudes and subjective norms (Al-Rafee & Cronan, 2006; Liao et al., 2009), 
including both constructs in the segmentation could be superfluous. Moreover, it is not advisable 
to include highly correlated variables in a segmentation (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; 
Ketchen & Shook, 1996). In this case, the TPB construct could disproportionally influence the 
segmentation outcome. For this reason, subjective norms are not included as a variable for 
segmentation but as a variable for segment profiling. 
Perceived behavioral control and self-efficacy 
Finally, perceived behavioral control (PBC) refers to the extent to which one believes that his or 
her behavior is under control (Ajzen, 1989). There has been some difficulty in measuring PBC 
owing to the unclear definition of the concept and authors tend to interpret it differently (Kuo & 
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Hsu, 2001; Trafimow, Sheeran, Conner, & Finlay, 2002). Trafimow et al. (2002) found that PBC 
is, in fact, a mixture of two constructs: perceived control (the degree to which the behavior is 
perceived as one that can be performed voluntarily) and perceived facilitation (the difficulty of 
performing the behavior). More importantly, they found perceived facilitation to be a better 
predictor of intentions and behavior than perceived control. 
Kuo and Hsu (2001) argued for the use of self-efficacy as an operationalization of PBC in the 
context of Internet ethics because it goes further than perceived facilitation, also covering skills, 
knowledge, and conviction (Bandura, 1997; Conner & Armitage, 1998). Self-efficacy not only 
reflects one’s skill but also judgments of what one can do with whatever skills he or she possesses 
(Bandura, 1986, p. 391). For this reason, we henceforth opt to focus on the construct of self-
efficacy. 
The confidence and ability to perform the actions needed for digital piracy play a mediating role 
between intention and action. The degree of perceived expertise positively influences the intensity 
of illegal downloading (Chun-Yao, 2003; Hinduja & Higgins, 2011). Since most research has been 
cross-sectional, the causal relationship between pirating behavior and self-efficacy is unclear. 
People could engage in piracy more often because they are able to do so, or they may become 
skilled due to frequent practice (Ajzen, 1991; Conner & Armitage, 1998). Therefore, we will not 
include pirating self-efficacy as a variable for segmentation but as a variable for profiling the 
resulting segments. 
Habitual patterns in digital piracy 
The TPB is based on the premise that behavior is rational and consciously intentional. However, 
advocates of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1991) argue that this may not always be the case. 
In the context at hand, one’s intention to pirate could also be influenced by the formation of 
repeated, habitual behavior within the notion of deficient self-regulation (i.e., the extent to which 
a behavior is outside an individual’s conscious control). Both LaRose and Kim (2007) and Jacobs, 
Heuvelman, Tan, and Peters (2012) observed a positive relationship between deficient self-
regulation (which includes items relating to the degree to which habitual patterns exist) and pirating 
intentions and behavior.  
Other scholars have measured habit strength by employing past piracy behavior (PPB) as a proxy 
(Coyle, Gould, Gupta, & Gupta, 2009; Cronan & Al-Rafee, 2007; Higgins et al., 2005; Levin et 
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al., 2007; Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008; Robertson et al., 2011), finding a significant positive 
relationship between PPB and either intention to pirate or actual pirating behavior. Though the two 
are closely related, we fail to recognize a direct connection between PPB and habit. For this reason, 
we will directly address habitual patterns in digital piracy in our study. To investigate whether and 
how pirates may differ in terms of habitual patterns, we include habit as a profiling variable.  
2.2 Ethical perspective 
In varying degrees in nations worldwide, downloading copyright infringing data is illegal; thus, 
engagement in online piracy can be considered deviant, noncompliant and even criminal consumer 
behavior. In this vein, researchers tend to associate illegal downloading with physical theft, arguing 
that it can be explained by the same motivators that drive traditional shoplifting (Shanahan & 
Hyman, 2010), and relate the willingness to pirate to the willingness to endorse in other morally 
questionable acts (Levin et al., 2004). Consequently, a common underlying assumption is that 
illegal downloaders possess less developed ethical standards (Chaudhry et al., 2011; Cronan & Al-
Rafee, 2007; Gopal & Sanders, 1997; Gopal et al., 2004; Levin et al., 2007; Levin et al., 2004; 
Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008; Robertson et al., 2011; Tan, 2002; Thong & Chee-Sing, 1998). 
 Jambon and Smetana (2012) dispute the operationalization of ethical propensity as a general trait 
that determines how individuals arrive at the evaluation of ethical issues. They argue that 
researchers have employed measures that gauge an individual’s ethical evaluation of acts that are 
unrelated to illegal downloading, such as withholding information about safety hazards, tax evasion 
or drinking a soda in the supermarket without paying for it (Gopal et al., 2004; Levin et al., 2004). 
Moreover, an increasing amount of research does not support the assumption that digital pirates 
display a lack of moral standards (Jambon & Smetana, 2012; Simpson, Banerjee, & Simpson, 
1994). Al-Rafee and Cronan (2006) did not find that moral judgment proved a significant influence 
on attitude toward piracy. Furthermore, Lysonski and Durvasula (2008) found that ethical 
orientation was associated with the intention of stealing a CD from a store, but not with illegal 
downloading. These results indicate that an individual’s specific ethical evaluation of digital piracy 




Ethical evaluation of digital piracy 
The largest challenge possibly lies in the fact that some people simply do not consider piracy an 
ethical transgression (Bonner & O'Higgins, 2010; Coyle et al., 2009; Hinduja & Higgins, 2011; 
Jacobs et al., 2012; Moores & Chang, 2006; Robert, 2004; Shang, Chen, & Chen, 2007) and 
consider it more acceptable than other aberrant behavior (Freestone & Mitchell, 2004). Other 
pirates find themselves in an ambiguous position, while recognizing that it is not acceptable they 
would still recommend it to others (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2009). Therefore, on the one 
hand, they consider it an act of stealing, whereas on the other hand they perceive it as a harmless 
act (Jambon & Smetana, 2012; Levin et al., 2004). There appears to be a disconnection between 
ethical orientation and attitudes toward digital piracy (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2009; Bonner 
& O'Higgins, 2010; Chun-Yao, 2003; Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008). Moreover, despite 
recognizing that pirating is unethical, people may nonetheless engage in the behavior (Simpson et 
al., 1994). In view of these opposing findings, it is likely that a differentiation can be found in 
whether people consider piracy unethical. For that reason we propose to include ethical evaluation 
as a segmentation variable.  
Guilt 
Once an individual recognizes a certain behavior as unethical, self-regulatory mechanisms in the 
form of moral emotions such as guilt or shame may come into play. Guilt and shame may seem 
closely related, but there is a distinct difference between them: shame is focused on the self (e.g., 
“I am a horrible person”), whereas guilt is focused on the behavior in question (e.g., “I did a horrible 
thing”) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). These emotions also differ in how the individual copes with 
them. While guilt leads to attempts to rectify the norm-violating behavior (LaRose & Kim, 2007), 
shame results in emotion-focused coping (Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). Though understudied in 
piracy literature, guilt is generally the focus when self-regulatory emotions are included.  
Cronan and Al-Rafee (2007) found that moral obligation (a three-item construct that included one 
item about guilt) was negatively correlated with the intention to pirate digital goods. They also 
found that 50.7% of their sample experienced feelings of guilt, a similar proportion to that found 
by Hinduja (2003) with regards to softlifting (i.e., pirating software). In contrast, Higgins et al. 
(2005) did not find a significant relationship between guilt and intention to pirate, and X. Wang 
and McClung (2012) reported that anticipated guilt predicted intentions only for frequent 
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downloaders, not for sporadic ones or non-downloaders. Due to these contrasting findings and the 
regulating properties of guilt with regards to unethical behavior (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003, 2004), 
we expect to find a differentiation in the experience of guilt with respect to digital piracy. For that 
reason, we propose to include guilt as a segmentation variable. 
Perceived harm 
Intertwined with any ethical issue is the question of whether and to what extent a third party is 
harmed. Fullerton et al. (1996) found that the ethical evaluation of a situation is positively related 
to the recognition of its social and economic consequences. Similarly, Freestone and Mitchell 
(2004) observed that Generation Y consumers seemed more accepting of digital piracy, precisely 
because of their belief that they were not inflicting direct harm on sellers; they also claimed to be 
themselves victims of prices that were maintained at an artificially high level. Regardless, the 
premise that downloaders consider piracy a harmless activity is well-established in the literature 
(Chaudhry et al., 2011; Hinduja & Higgins, 2011; Jacobs et al., 2012; Jambon & Smetana, 2012; 
Levin et al., 2007; Levin et al., 2004; Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008; Nunes, Hsee, & Weber, 2004). 
Perceived harm is not included as a segmentation variable because of the possible confounding 
relationships between perceived harm and ethical evaluation (Fullerton et al., 1996) and between 
perceived harm and attitude (Freestone & Mitchell, 2004). However, we do expect to find 
differences in perceived harm when profiling the pirate segments. 
Deontological and teleological orientation 
It is interesting to investigate how digital pirates arrive at their ethical judgments. To the best of 
our knowledge, few authors have investigated the role of deontological (i.e., evaluating ethical 
issues based on moral rules) and teleological (i.e., evaluating ethical issues in light of the possible 
consequences of certain actions) orientations in the case of digital piracy.  
Thong and Chee-Sing (1998) confirmed the application of the general theory of marketing ethics 
or Hunt-Vitell model (Hunt & Vitell, 1986, 2006) on the unauthorized use of copied software (i.e., 
softlifting). They concluded that, consistent with this model, IT professionals used both 
deontological and teleological evaluations to arrive at their ethical judgment on an issue. The Hunt-
Vitell model also posits that teleological evaluations may directly affect intentions. It is thus 
possible that an individual may perceive a particular action as the most ethical alternative yet 
nonetheless opt for another alternative that yields more preferred consequences for the individual. 
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Thong and Chee-Sing (1998) did not find a significant direct effect of teleological evaluations on 
moral intention. This finding is unexpected, as the literature shows that people continue to pirate 
even if they consider doing so to be unethical (Simpson et al., 1994).  
In a more recent study, Shang et al. (2007) investigated deontological and teleological evaluations 
of music sharing in a P2P environment but removed teleological evaluations from their analyses 
for methodological reasons. These studies (Shang et al., 2007; Thong & Chee-Sing, 1998) have 
certain limitations in the sense that their measures are scenario-dependent and do not gauge the 
core aspects of deontological and teleological reasoning directly, employing items such as “Based 
on my own values, without considering any possible consequences, I think Alternative 1 is very 
ethical” and “Based on the possible consequences, I think Alternative 1 is very ethical” for 
deontological and teleological evaluations, respectively.  
In light of these methodological issues, we opt to explore whether and how the resulting segments 
differ in terms of a more general deontological and teleological orientation. 
2.3 Descriptive perspective  
Gender 
Little consensus exists among researchers concerning the demographic composition of the digital 
pirate population. Robertson et al. (2011) did not find significant differences in gender with regard 
to the propensity to download illegally. This finding was replicated by Moores and Chang (2006). 
Conversely, Chaudhry et al. (2011) did find differences between men and women; they found that 
men are more inclined to pirate. This too has been replicated by a collection of authors (Al-Rafee 
& Cronan, 2006; Ang et al., 2001; Chiang & Assane, 2002; Coyle et al., 2009; Cronan & Al-Rafee, 
2007; Gopal & Sanders, 1997; Hinduja, 2003; Hinduja & Higgins, 2011).  
Age 
Likewise, results of studies of the age of pirates have been mixed. Freestone and Mitchell (2004) 
found that Generation Y consumers are more permissive toward illegal downloading behavior. In 
their study, they defined consumers born between 1977 and 1993 (age 8 to 24 at the time of the 
study; see Freestone and Mitchell, 2014, p. 123) as Generation Y consumers, due to their 
experience with a changing retail environment, increased purchasing power, access to computers 
and the Internet during the greater part of their lifetime, and their relative homogeneity. Several 
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studies have confirmed the notion that younger consumers are more likely to pirate (Bhattacharjee, 
Gopal, & Sanders, 2003; Bonner & O'Higgins, 2010; Coyle et al., 2009; Gopal & Sanders, 1997; 
Higgins et al., 2005; Hinduja, 2003; Kwong & Lee, 2002; Lau, 2003; Mandel & Süssmuth, 2010; 
Moon, McCluskey, & McCluskey, 2010; Moores & Chang, 2006); however, the actual age 
boundaries differ among studies. Bonner and O'Higgins (2010) also argued that age, not merely 
one’s status as a student (as opposed to being employed), impacts behavior. In light of these 
findings, we wish to investigate what differences, if any, exist between pirate segments with regard 
to gender, age, and employment. 
Pirating frequency 
Pirating frequency is generally the outcome variable of interest. In the literature, this variable is 
conceptualized as either pirating intentions or reported pirating frequency, depending on the study 
design. Digital consumers are usually segmented based on this behavior—e.g., between light, 
heavy, and non-downloaders (Levin et al., 2007; Plowman & Goode, 2009). Because we aim to 
explain differences in pirating frequency rather than building upon these differences, frequency 
will be included as a profiling variable, not a segmentation variable. 
2.4 Segmentation framework 
We propose to explore whether different pirate segments can be outlined based on differing 
combinations of attitude toward piracy, ethical evaluation of piracy, and experienced guilt 
associated with piracy.  
Attitude provides valuable information about a person’s general appraisal of the appropriateness 
of a certain behavior and is indispensable in any framework that aims to understand behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991). Although personal characteristics are included in the revised Hunt-Vitell model 
(Hunt & Vitell, 2006) and few studies of ethical behavior also incorporate attitude (Vitell, Singh, 
& Paolillo, 2007). Some researchers may not consider attitude in their models because they 
presume that attitude is correlated with ethical judgment, and therefore, considering an act 
unethical implies having a negative attitude toward that act. However, the literature suggests that 
attitude is not necessarily contingent on or related to ethical judgment. Several studies covering 
people’s attitudes toward businesses, among other variables, and their ethical judgments regarding 
various questionable consumer actions have suggested a weak or even non-existent relationship 
between consumers’ general attitude toward businesses and their ethical judgment in “no harm, no 
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foul” situations that include illegal downloading (Patwardhan, Keith, & Vitell, 2012; Vitell & 
Muncy, 1992; Vitell et al., 2007)). Hence, there is good reason to include both attitude and ethical 
evaluation as distinct factors.  
Finally, experienced guilt is included as it functions as an inhibitory mechanism that might help to 
further differentiate pirate segments. According to the Hunt-Vitell model (Hunt & Vitell, 2006), 
people may engage in activities that they deem unethical when the outcomes are favorable for them, 
a phenomenon that we believe could be applicable to digital piracy (Simpson et al., 1994). 
Consequentially, guilt can arise whenever behavior is not in accordance with one’s ethical 
judgment. Given the conflicting results in existing literature with respect to guilt and digital piracy, 
we consider it necessary to include experienced guilt in the segmentation.  
To externally validate the resulting segmentation, we must confirm that the segments differ in 
aspects other than the ones used to perform the segmentation (Hair et al., 2010; Ketchen & Shook, 
1996). Therefore, we explore whether the resulting segments also differ in terms of subjective 
norms, self-efficacy, habit, perceived harm, deontological and teleological orientation, gender, age, 
employment, and pirating frequency, thus, resulting in a more robust profiling. As an additional 
form of validation, we explore whether and how current measures taken to combat piracy affect 
the various pirate segments. The next section provides a brief overview of the piracy-combatting 
literature. 
2.5 Piracy-combatting measures 
Digital piracy is very difficult to eradicate due to the decentralized architecture of Bit Torrent 
networks, the fragmentary dissemination of infringed digital media files (see Appendix A), and the 
dynamic nature of the online community. Since high-quality movies or complete television series 
can contain up to several gigabytes, downloading and uploading entire media files from a single 
source is very time-consuming. The Bit Torrent protocol (i.e., torrent downloading) circumvents 
this problem by splitting the media file into separate chunks and disseminating it to members (i.e., 
the computers of downloaders or “peers”) within a network or “swarm.” In the swarm, each peer 
can serve as a distributor of chunks of media that he or she has stored on a computer (thus acting 
as a “seeder”) and can simultaneously download chunks from other peers (thus acting as a 
“leecher”). The downloaded torrent file does not constitute the media file itself; in fact, it contains 
no media content at all but only information about the location of specific chunks of a media file 
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in the swarm (“metadata”). Metaphorically speaking, a torrent file resembles a road map that leads 
the torrent client (the software needed to engage in torrent downloading) to the location of each 
chunk of the media file. Once all the chunks have been downloaded, the torrent client sorts and 
reassembles the chunks into the original media file, which is now ready for the downloader to use. 
See Eger, Hossfeld, Binzenhofer, and Kunzmann (2007) for a detailed overview of the Bit Torrent 
protocol. 
To thwart digital piracy, the entertainment industry has resorted to several strategies, including 
technological innovation (e.g., digital rights management), educational campaigns, legislation, and 
legal digital alternatives. However, there is little evidence that any of these methods have been 
effective in eradicating digital piracy (Gopal et al., 2004; Jeong & Khouja, 2013; T. Orme, 2014; 
Sinha & Mandel, 2008). Here we focus on the legal and educational approaches.  
Legal strategy 
To curb digital piracy, the entertainment industry has resorted to legal enforcement initially aimed 
at file-sharing services (such as Napster, Kazaa and Limewire) and at a later stage at end users 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2008). This approach is consistent with deterrence theory, or the 
premise that a certain, severe, and immediate punishment will reduce criminal behavior (Williams 
& Hawkins, 1986). Meta-analyses have shown that the certainty of punishment, rather than 
severity, has a higher influence on the perceived cost of criminal behavior (Paternoster, 1987; Yu 
& Liska, 1993); this was confirmed in the context of software piracy by manipulating punishment 
certainty in a factorial design (Higgins et al., 2005). These findings inspire us to investigate whether 
the legal strategy has a positive effect on perceived certainty of punishment within all pirate 
segments.  
Some people might not consider piracy a serious crime (Coyle et al., 2009; Freestone & Mitchell, 
2004). Legislation can be confusing and differs from country to country. Additionally, due to 
processes of computer deindividuation (Kwong & Lee, 2002) and the prevalent notion that the 
virtual world exists separately from the physical world, with separate rules and norms (Johnston & 
Johal, 1999), people may tend not to view cybercrime as a matter of much gravity (Morrison, 1994). 
Because a legal strategy works only if respondents realize that what they are doing is in fact illegal, 
we investigate whether the legal strategy has a positive effect on perceived illegality within all 
pirate segments.  
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Ultimately, the goal is to reduce pirating behavior and intentions. Sinha and Mandel (2008) 
demonstrated that this strategy might be successful only for certain segments of consumers and 
might even be counterproductive for other consumers; that is, it could slightly increase the 
likelihood to pirate among individuals with a higher risk tolerance. We investigate whether 
perceived illegality is associated with reduced pirating behavior for the resulting pirate segments. 
In sum, we are interested in whether and how the legal strategy impacts perceived impunity, 
perceived illegality, and downloading intentions for all pirate segments. 
Educational strategy 
The educational strategy takes a softer approach, aiming to influence behavior by increasing 
consumer awareness of the harm that piracy inflicts on the entertainment industry, on other 
stakeholders, and ultimately on consumers themselves (Chiu, Lin, Lee, Nieh, & Chen, 2008). 
Increasing awareness seems critical because most pirates do not believe that any harm is being 
inflicted (Chaudhry et al., 2011; Freestone & Mitchell, 2004; Hinduja & Higgins, 2011; Levin et 
al., 2004; Lysonski & Durvasula, 2008; Nunes et al., 2004), whereas perception of harm is 
negatively related to pirating intentions (Cockrill & Goode, 2012). Moreover, pirates might not 
even consider piracy an important matter to begin with, and a negative relationship between 
perceived importance and attitude exists (Al-Rafee & Cronan, 2006). Therefore, for an educational 
campaign to be effective, it should achieve a notable rise in the perception of inflicted harm and a 
decrease in the perception of triviality. For that reason, we explore whether the educational strategy 
positively influences perceived harm and negatively influences perceived triviality in all pirate 
segments. 
A simulation study conducted by Jeong and Khouja (2013) indicated that the educational strategy 
is more effective when consumers are more resistant to anti-piracy measures. Gopal et al. (2004) 
did not find any effect of deterrent policies (stressing the legal consequences) on music piracy; 
their results suggest that an educational campaign would be more likely to reduce piracy. These 
findings inspire us to investigate whether the educational strategy negatively influences 
downloading intentions among all segments of pirates. 
2.6 Approach 
This paper describes three studies. The first studies explores motivational and moral aspects of 
digital pirates with in-depth interviews. The second study investigates (1) whether digital pirates 
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can be segmented by attitude toward piracy, ethical evaluation of piracy, and feelings of guilt and 
(2) whether this segmentation yields pirate subtypes who also differ in terms of pirating frequency, 
subjective norms, habit, pirating self-efficacy, perceived harm, and teleological and deontological 
orientation. The third study investigates whether and how pirate segments react to current piracy-
combatting strategies. More specifically, we examine (1) whether and how the legal strategy 
influences perceived impunity, perceived illegality, and downloading intentions in the various 
pirate segments and (2) whether and how the educational strategy influences perceived triviality, 
perceived harm, and downloading intentions in various pirate segments. Ultimately, we assess 
which strategy is most effective in lowering downloading intentions. 
3. Study 1 
3.1 Sample characteristics 
A total of 10 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with Belgian respondents ranging 
from the age of 21 to 28. The sample comprises a majority of male participants (80%). However, 
this male preponderance should not pose an issue, since qualitative research focusses on developing 
an understanding of complex issues relating to human behavior rather than attaining 
representativeness and generalizability (Marshall, 1996). A maximum variance sample was opted 
which is designed to maximize diversity within the subjects. Subjects were recruited based upon 
their self-reported downloading frequencies and type of files downloaded, such as music, movies 
and/or TV shows. The sample is comprised of 3 self-reported low, 3 medium and 4 frequency 
downloaders. The data collection phase was concluded at the point of theoretical saturation (Glaser 
& Strauss, 2012).  
 3.2 Research method 
In order to capture the complex nature of digital piracy conventional content analysis was adopted 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). By use of conventional content analysis researchers immerse themselves 
in the data to allow new insights to emerge (Kondracki, Wellman, & Amundson, 2002) by gaining 
direct information from study participants without being influenced by preconceived theoretical 
perspectives (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). A fixed topic guide containing open-ended questions was 
adopted for all participants, subsequent follow-up questions were posed, differing between 
interviews depending on the flow of the conversation. All interviews set off with broad questions 
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and gradually narrowed down to the topic of digital piracy, for the complete topic guide we refer 
to Appendix B.  
3.3 Results  
The qualitative research findings indicate a variety and gradation in attitudinal and ethical 
dispositions towards digital piracy. When it comes to digital piracy, it is not simply a matter of pro 
or con, rather there appears to be a complex interplay of various elements. Firstly, differences in 
ethical evaluations were found among subjects. When posing the question as to whether one 
considers digital piracy as a wrongful and immoral act, a range of diverging reactions were 
recorded. These reactions range from prudent acknowledgments such as 
 “but if you look at it purely technically, it’s still a form of stealing ” and “come to think of it, it’s 
actually quite wrong”. Others evaluate conditionally, yet these conditions vary as well, e.g.: “I 
don’t consider it wrong for TV shows and movies, I do though for music”, “For music not at all, 
movies a bit more” or “No, given that one would still purchase something or go to a concert at 
some point in time. While others do not consider it wrong in the least, e.g.:  
“No. Because we grew up with it, because everybody does it, basically because we take it for 
granted.” and “No, these things should be accessible to everyone, just like knowledge, art and 
culture.” Differences were also found in levels of guilt experienced, yet these differences did not 
seem to be solely contingent on whether they considered digital piracy as wrong. A person 
acknowledging piracy as a moral transgression nonetheless did not report feelings of guilt e.g. : “In 
a way it’s not completely right, but on the other hand, it doesn’t really trouble me, I don’t really 
care”. For other subjects feelings of guilt surfaced which were swiftly followed by some form of 
rationalization, e.g.: “Well, now I feel guilty, but I do pay for Prime and Spotify, so I’m doing my 
best” and “So I bought their CD and for mind soothing reasons deleted the pirated MP3s from my 
computer.” For another person feelings of guilt were surpassed by the benefits of the act, e.g.: 
“Convenience outweighs guilt. It’s (piracy) just too easy to do.” 
Other, yet less salient differences were found in the degree to which subjects considered piracy as 
an unimportant, merely trivial matter, e.g.: “I don’t feel bad about it, it’s something too trivial to 
feel guilty about”. Accordingly, variation in perceptions of the consequences and awareness of the 
consequences of digital piracy was found, e.g.: “I don’t think about the consequences for the artists, 
because it does not make a difference if one person does not buy something” and “No, I’m not 
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going to feel bad about a big faceless corporation.” Similarly to guilt, a subjects attitude towards 
piracy was not necessarily thwarted by the acknowledgment of piracy as immoral, when asked if 
they would continue downloading although they had previously stated that digital piracy was 
wrong , all subjects in question acquiesced. When inquiring for reasons as to why they pirate an 
almost ubiquitous similarity is the fact that they do it because it is free and for practical reasons 
such as not having to leave their house and the speed with which they are able to obtain the media 
files of their choosing, e.g.: “I don’t think people download just for the sake of downloading, they 
do it because they need something, and this is an easy way to get it.”. As a result of a long-term 
bond with digital piracy, some subjects take piracy for granted and consider it a natural thing they 
do, without questioning it, e.g.: “We’re used to it, and if I would win the lottery and become 
extremely rich, I would still continue downloading, it’s just because we grew up with it, it’s all 
we’ve ever known” and “it’s so deeply incorporated in our generation and in the next one”. 
General agreement is also found in the acceptance of the activity by peers, downloading is by no 
means a taboo among their social circles, e.g.: “Piracy is considered as very trivial among my 
friends, it is accepted and maybe even encouraged”. In addition, the subjects did not feel daunted 
by the law, a general impression of impunity was apparent as well as a varying knowledge 
concerning the judicial framework surrounding digital piracy. The interviews also yielded an 
increasingly strident call for a new business model which is more attuned to the needs of this 
generation, e.g.: “I believe the industry should adapt their business model in order to meet the 
consumers’ needs and not the other way around. […] Isn’t that the basic principle of doing 
business? Listening to the consumers’ needs and not taking them to court.” and “The industry needs 
to change, they can’t keep fighting this, people will always find a way to circumvent their bans”.  
At the conclusion of the qualitative phase, it becomes clear that considering the whole fleet as a 
homogeneous mass might not do justice to reality. A noticeable divergence was found in ethical 
evaluation of the act and the same can be stated for experienced guilt. Interestingly, experienced 
guilt was not always contingent on ethical evaluation, in that sense that certain people who do 
consider piracy as an unethical act did not necessarily report feeling guilty. In addition, attitude 
also does not seem to be necessarily contingent upon ethical evaluation, a person can evaluate 




4. Study 2 
4.1 Sampling 
Most studies within the domain of piracy have used convenience samples, usually composed of 
college students. Because a high proportion of college students have been shown to pirate, they 
constitute a representative sample (Chun-Yao, 2003; Madden & Lenhart, 2003). However, a 
younger generation of pirates is arising (Chaudhry et al., 2011; Chiou et al., 2005; Freestone & 
Mitchell, 2004; Shang et al., 2007), and the previous generation remains active in pirating as well; 
because of the significant number of younger pirates, the minimum age for participation was set at 
15 years. The questionnaire was conducted online, consistent with the medium under investigation. 
This mode of inquiry permitted full anonymity in order to minimize social desirability bias 
(Grimm, 2010). The link to this questionnaire was forwarded via university email to all students at 
a university and to an online university research panel; it was also disseminated via online learning 
platforms (such as Smartschool) in collaboration with local high schools and via social networks 
(for example, Facebook and Netlog). This outreach yielded 1,277 valid responses. When the 
questionnaire was administered, the participants’ average age was 23.02 (SD = 6.62), with an 
average birth year of 1991. The age breakdown was as follows: 16.8% of respondents were age 15-
18 (teenagers born between 1996 and 1999), 66.2% were age 19-25 (college-aged, born between 
1989 and 1995), 10.3% were age 26-35 (young adults born between 1979 and 1988), and 6.7% 
were age 36-55 (adults born between 1959 and 1978). Of the sample population, 51.8% was female. 
4.2 Instrument measures 
Table 1 presents the items used, corresponding item means, construct means and internal 
consistency measures. Most constructs were gauged with a single-item measure. Scholars have 
advocated that measures consisting of one item can be practically as effective (Nagy, 2002; Russell 
et al., 2004; Stanton et al., 2002), have acceptable psychometric properties and therefore provide a 
viable alternative to multi-item scales (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007; Drolet & Morrison, 2001; 
Fuchs & Diamantopoulos, 2009). Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) asserted that the use of single-item 
measures is appropriate if the object of the construct (which in this case relates to digital piracy) 
and its related attributes are “concrete singular,” meaning that the object and attributes are 
uniformly and easily imagined in the minds of raters. Conversely, self-efficacy is a multifaceted, 
domain-specific construct and must be tailored to fit the particular purpose (Bandura, 1997, 2006). 
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To assess pirating self-efficacy, a scale was adapted as proposed in Bandura’s (2006) guidelines 
for constructing domain-specific self-efficacy scales. The items were measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (“Completely disagree”) to 7 (“Completely agree”). The scale consisted of 
eight items and was found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s α = .95). 
For deontological and teleological orientation, items were adapted from Tanner, Medin, and Iliev 
(2008). The respondents were first exposed to a hypothetical dilemma (see Appendix C) and then 
had to indicate which of the two proposed courses of action they preferred. After that, they were 
asked a set of deontological and teleological probes with respect to how they arrived at their 
decision. A principal component analysis with varimax rotation yielded a two-factor solution 
(KMO = .77, Bartlett’s test of sphericity: 2 (28) = 892.04, p < .01; see Table 2). Two scales of 
four items each were found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s α = .75 and .84 for deontological and 
teleological orientation, respectively).  
Pirating behavior was operationalized as the frequency of pirating movies, television series and 
music, with nine choices: never (1), once a year (2), once every six months (3), once every three 
months (4), once a month (5), several times per month (6), once a week (7), several times per week 
(8), and daily (9).  
All items used in the survey were formulated in a semantically neutral way to the extent possible. 
For example, the term “torrent downloading” was utilized instead of “illegal downloading” or 
“pirating” to avoid prompting the respondent to respond in a socially desirable manner. However, 
the introduction to the survey indicated (and footnotes throughout the survey reinforced) that this 
study concerned torrent downloading without financial reimbursement of copyright holders. 
Whenever the term “torrent downloading” was used in the survey, this description was displayed 
at the bottom of the page. A pretest confirmed respondents’ understanding that this term implicitly 












Segmentation variables     
Attitude     
I have a positive attitude towards torrent downloading. 4.98 1.53   
Ethical Evaluation     
Torrent downloading is unethical. 3.37 1.45   
Guilt     
I (would) feel guilty when downloading torrents. 2.61 1.52   
     
Profiling variables     
Pirating self-efficacy (adapted scale from Bandura (2006))   4.61 .95 
I usually find the files I need. 5.13 1.62   
I am competent in torrent downloading. 4.24 2.03   
I am capable of avoiding viruses.  4.09 1.99   
I am capable of avoiding files of inferior quality. 4.24 1.99   
I generally understand how torrents work. 4.43 1.97   
I am capable of using downloading software (e.g. Bittorrent, Vuze,…). 4.68 2.05   
I know how to play downloaded files. 5.44 1.70   
When I download torrents, I don’t have to think hard about  
how I have to do it. 
4.60 2.05   
Subjective norm     
The people I find important in my life are accepting of torrent downloading.  5.41 1.28   
Habit     
Torrent downloading is a habit I already have for a long time. 4.33 1.92   
Perceived harm   4.14 .83 
Torrent downloading hurts the music industry. 4.46 1.53   
Torrent downloading hurts the movie industry. 4.37 1.56   
Torrent downloading hurts retailers.  4.69 1.47   
Deontological evaluation (adapted scale from Tanner et al.(2008)     
I chose this option because…   4.31 .75 
…this alternative is consistent with general principles/rules one has to follow. 4.45 1.56   
…I have a moral duty to select this alternative. 4.83 1.44   
…the other alternative is morally wrong. 3.78 1.73   
…some behaviors are definitely right or wrong, irrespective of the 
consequences. 
4.18 1.47   
Teleological evaluation     
I chose this option because…   4.85 .84 
… the positive outcomes outweigh the negative consequences. 4.82 1.46   
…this alternative offers the best possible outcome compared 
   to the outcome of the other alternative. 
4.83 1.41   
…this is the best alternative if you compare the advantages 
   with the disadvantages. 
4.77 1.58   
… this alternative can be justified by its outcomes. 4.98 1.36   
     









I chose this option because…   
… the positive outcomes outweigh the negative consequences. .86  
…this alternative offers the best possible outcome compared 
    to the outcome of the other alternative. 
.83  
…this is the best alternative if you compare the advantages 
    with the disadvantages. 
.83  
… this alternative can be justified by its outcomes. .77  
…this alternative is consistent with general principles/rules 
    one has to follow. 
 .83 
…I have a moral duty to select this alternative.  .80 
…the other alternative is morally wrong.  .75 
…some behaviors are definitely right or wrong, irrespective of 
    the consequences. 
 .63 
Note: Factor loadings < .25 are suppressed 
 
4.3 Results and conclusions 
A latent class cluster model was constructed using the Latent GOLD® Choice 4.5 software. A 
latent class cluster model differs from a traditional ad hoc cluster analysis in that it includes model 
selection criteria, and classification is based on membership probabilities (Vermunt & Magidson, 
2005a). These probabilities are estimated directly from the model parameters and are used to assign 
cases to the class yielding the highest probability. The primary difference between the Latent 
GOLD® algorithm and traditional cluster analysis techniques (such as K-means and hierarchical 
cluster analysis) is that the algorithm assigns cases to clusters based on the estimated membership 
probability, whereas traditional clustering techniques iteratively assign (or reassign) variables to 
clusters based on distances to other cases within a cluster or to cluster centroids. The resulting 
membership classification was exported to IBM SPSS Statistics 22 for further profiling of the 
segments using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square tests. Segment profiling is also 
possible in Latent GOLD® Choice by means of inactive covariates (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005b) 
but lacks the possibility of post hoc testing. For more information, see Vermunt and Magidson 
(2005a, 2005b, 2005c) for the Latent GOLD® technical guide and user manuals. 
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An additional benefit of the Latent GOLD® software is that it also provides fit indices, thus, 
introducing an objective indicator to an otherwise subjective process (Hair et al., 2010; Ketchen & 
Shook, 1996). Based on these fit indices, supplemented with a visual assessment of the composition 
of the resulting clusters, a four-cluster solution emerged as the most optimal segmentation. 
Compared with single-, two-, and three-cluster solutions, the four-cluster model provided the least 
amount of information loss, resulting in the lowest BIC and AIC values (BIC = 9019.29, AIC = 
8880.18). A five-cluster model yielded slightly lower BIC and AIC values, but on closer 
examination the fifth cluster appeared to be a variation of an existing cluster and contained only 
1% of the sample. Additionally, with the five-cluster model, the proportion of cases estimated to 
be misclassified (classification errors) began to rise. See Table 3 for a comparison of the cluster 
models. The results show that these four segments differ significantly from one another regarding 
attitude (Wald chi-square = 404.93, p < .001, R² = 0.27), ethical evaluation (Wald chi-square = 
368.38, p < .001, R² = 0.24), and guilt (Wald chi-square = 237061.40, p < .001, R² = 0.89). To 
validate the robustness of the results, the dataset was randomly split in half, and analyses were 
rerun on the two separate datasets (Hair et al., 2010). Ketchen and Shook (1996) also recommend 
the use of within-method triangulation, which implies that the clustering should be repeated using 
different methods. A two-step cluster analysis combining a nonhierarchical (Ward’s method) with 
a nonhierarchical (K-means) clustering procedure (Hair et al., 2010) was conducted, and it yielded 
a similar pattern as that of the Latent GOLD® results. 
 
Table 3 

















1-Cluster -6982.50 14007.92 13977.00 6 0.000 
2-Cluster -5993.35 12079.68 12012.70 13 0.012 
3-Cluster -4936.12 10015.28 9912.24 20 0.006 
4-Cluster -4413.09 9019.29 8880.18 27 0.005 





By comparing cluster means, we arrived at the identification of four segments, which are labeled 
as follows: the anti-pirate, the conflicted pirate, the cavalier pirate, and the die-hard pirate. Table 4 
offers an overview of the composition of the segments. Further profiling by analysis of variance 
yielded significant differences between the segments regarding subjective norms (F(3,1273) = 
78.11, p <.001, ɳ² = .16), pirating self-efficacy (F(3,491) = 29.33, p <.001, ɳ² = .15), habit (F(3,491) 
= 25.25, p <.001, ɳ² = .13), perceived harm (F(3,1271) = 65.59, p <.001, ɳ² = .13), deontological 
orientation (F(3,290) = 2.89, p < .05, ɳ² = .03), teleological orientation (F(3,290) = 4.69, p < .01, 
ɳ² = .05), and pirating frequency (F(3,1272) = 70.57, p <.001, ɳ² = .14). Chi-square tests were used 
to investigate demographic differences among the segments. Significant differences were found 
regarding gender (χ2(3, N = 1254) = 93.70, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .27), age (χ2(9, N = 1254) = 
45.57, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .11), and employment (χ2(3, N = 1236) = 22.12, p < .001, Cramer’s 
V = .13). See Tables 5 and 6 for an overview of the profiling results.  
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Die Hard Pirate 
 N= 364(28.5%) N=188 (14.7%) N=354 (27.7%) N=371 (29.1%) 
Attitude towards piracy Negative Positive Positive Positive 
Ethical evaluation of piracy Unethical Unethical Unethical Not unethical 
Guilt  Yes Yes No No 
 
Regarding the downloading frequency results in Table 6, it should be noted that there may or may 
not be overlap between the media types. For example, the 42.6% of die-hard pirates who report 
never downloading music are not necessarily asserting that they download nothing at all; they 
might exclusively download movies or only movies and television series. The results can be 
interpreted by examining patterns relative to the expected average of all pirate segments, i.e., the 
expected percentage if no difference existed among pirate segments (see the “Total” column in 
Table 6). For instance, 2.4% of die-hard pirates report downloading music daily, which is a much 


















Post hoc tests 
 F-value Multiple comparisons 
Subjective norm 4.68 (1.34) 5.36 (1.03) 5.63 (1.00) 5.95 (1.22) 5.41 (1.28) 78.11*** 1<2,1<3,1<4,2<4,3<4 
Pirating self-efficacy 3.79 (1.62) 4.52 (1.47) 5.08 (1.28) 5.34 (1.68) 4.61 (1.66) 29.33*** 1<2,1<3,1<4,2<4, 
Habit 3.40 (1.87) 4.42 (1.71) 4.80 (1.55) 5.08 (1.94) 4.33 (1.92) 25.25*** 1<2,1<3,1<4 
Perceived harm 4.70 (0.98) 4.29 (0.90) 4.10 (1.04) 3.55 (1.39) 4.14 (1.20) 65.59*** 1>2, 1>3,1>4,2>4,3>4 
Deontological orientation 4.53 (1.05) 4.38 ( 1.04) 4.01 (1.08) 4.29 (1.41) 4.31 (1.16) 2.89* 1>3 
Teleological orientation 4.51 (1.14) 4.82 (1.07) 4.98 (1.12) 5.16 (1.33) 4.85 (1.19) 4.69** 1<4 
Significant at ***p<.001,**p<.01,*p<.05 
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 Χ2 Cramer V 
Gender        
Male 32.8 35.1 52.7 65.7 48.2 93.70*** .27 
Female 67.2 64.9 47.3 34.3 51.8   
Age         
Teenagers (15-18 years) 15.8 15.1 16.2 18.4 16.6 45.57*** .11 
College students (19-25 years) 57.6 72.4 70.4 67.9 66.3   
Young adults (25-35 years) 13.0 7.0 8.8 10.4 10.2   
Adults (over 35 years) 13.6 5.4 4.6 3.3 6.9   
Employment         
Student 67.4 79.2 80.7 79.8 76.5 22.12*** .13 
Employed 32.6 20.8 19.3 20.2 23.5   




Table 6 (continued)  



















 Χ2 Cramer 
V 
Music download frequency        
Never 58.8 39.4 39.3 31.6 42.6 110.95*** .17 
Once a year 8.2 5.3 8.8 7.0 7.6   
Once every 6 months 6.3 10.1 5.9 5.7 6.6   
Once every 3 months 7.4 13.3 7.6 9.5 8.9   
Once a month 7.1 12.2 9.3 11.6 9.8   
Several times a month 5.5 10.6 15.5 14.1 11.5   
Once a week 3.6 4.8 6.2 8.4 5.9   
Several times a week 3.0 4.3 7.1 9.7 6.3   
Daily 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.4 0.8   
Movie download frequency         
Never 67.0  31.4  29.7  23.2  38.7  240.40*** .25 
Once a year 5.5  2.1  5.9  4.1  4.7    
Once every 6 months 4.4  9.6  4.0  4.6  5.1    
Once every 3 months 4.9  9.6  9.6  8.1  7.8    
Once a month 5.5  13.3  12.1  9.5  9.6    
Several times a month 6.3  19.7  16.1  20.5  15.1    
Once a week 4.1  9.6  11.0  12.7  9.3    
Several times a week 1.9  4.8  10.7  13.8  8.2    
Daily 0.3  0.0  0.8  3.5  1.3    
TV series download 
frequency  
       
Never 72.3 44.1 38.7 32.7 47.3 191.31*** .22 
Once a year 3.8 7.4 5.4 5.1 5.2   
Once every 6 months 4.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 4.7   
Once every 3 months 2.2 7.4 6.5 5.7 5.2   
Once a month 4.1 3.7 6.8 6.8 5.6   
Several times a month 3.3 11.2 13.3 7.8 8.5   
Once a week 4.7 5.9 7.9 7.6 6.6   
Several times a week 4.4 15.4 13.6 22.2 13.7   
Daily 0.8 0.0 2.8 7.6 3.2   





Anti-pirates (28.5%, n = 364) have the least favorable attitude toward piracy (M = 3.86, SD = 1.46, 
95% CI [3.72; 4.00]) compared with the other segments. They consider piracy ethically 
unacceptable (M = 4.29, SD = 1.21, 95% CI [4.16; 4.42]) and experience the largest amount of 
guilt (M = 4.66, SD = .89, 95% CI [4.61; 4.71]) compared to the other segments. They tend to 
pirate least frequently of all segments, ranging from “never” to “once a year”, and report the lowest 
subjective norms (M = 4.68, SD = 1.34, 95% CI [4.55; 4.80]). The anti-pirates also report the lowest 
piracy self-efficacy (M = 3.79, SD = 1.62, 95% CI [3.56; 4.02]), does not really consider their 
piracy a habit (M = 3.40, SD = 1.87, 95% CI [3.13; 3.67]), and believe that digital piracy inflicts 
harm on the industry (M = 4.70, SD = 0.98, 95% CI [4.58; 4.81]). They report the highest 
deontological (M = 4.53, SD = 1.05, 95% CI [4.32 ; 4.73 ]) and the lowest teleological orientation 
(M = 4.51, SD = 1.14, 95% CI [4.29 ; 4.74 ]) of all pirate segments. Anti-pirates are more likely to 
be female, 25 to 55 years old (i.e., young adults or adults), and employed. 
Conflicted pirates (14.7%, n = 188) have a positive attitude toward piracy (M = 4.87, SD = 1.15, 
95% CI [4.68; 5.06]), although they consider piracy ethically unacceptable (M = 3.68, SD = 1.09, 
95% CI [3.49; 3.86]) and experience relatively more guilt when pirating (M = 3.00, SD = .00), 
compared to the other segments, with the exception of the anti-pirate. This juxtaposition typifies 
the conflicted pirate, who tends to pirate more than the anti-pirate (ranging from once every six 
months to several times a month) yet less than the other segments do. Compared with the rest, the 
conflicted pirate reports a moderate subjective norm (M = 5.36, SD = 1.03, 95% CI [5.19; 5.53]) 
and believes that digital piracy harms the industry (M = 4.29, SD = 0.90, 95% CI [4.13; 4.45]). The 
same pattern emerges for pirating self-efficacy (M = 4.52, SD = 1.47, 95% CI [4.19; 4.85]) and 
habit (M =4.42, SD = 1.71, 95% CI [4.04; 4.81]). Similar to anti-pirates, conflicted pirates are more 
likely to be female, 18 to 25 years old (college age), and students. 
Cavalier pirates (27.7%, n = 354) have a positive attitude toward digital piracy (M = 5.27, SD = 
1.25, 95% CI [5.13; 5.41]) and recognize piracy as an unethical activity (M = 3.19, SD = 1.22, 95% 
CI [3.06; 3.32]) but do not experience high levels of guilt over piracy (M = 2.00, SD = .00), unlike 
the two segments described above. This nonchalant and indifferent mindset typifies the cavalier 
pirate. This segment is slightly more likely to pirate than the conflicted pirates, ranging from once 
every three months to several times a week. Cavalier pirates report higher levels of subjective norm 
(M = 5.63, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [5.51; 5.76]), pirating self-efficacy (M = 5.08, SD = 1.28, 95% CI 
[4.80; 5.36]), consider their activity more of a habit (M = 4.80, SD = 1.55, 95% CI [4.47; 5.12]), 
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and perceive it as slightly less harmful (M = 4.10, SD = 1.04, 95% CI [3.98; 4.22]) when compared 
with the previous two segments. Cavalier pirates report the lowest deontological orientation (M = 
4.01 , SD = 1.08, 95% CI [3.76 ; 4.27]) . These pirates are more likely to be men, 18 to 25 years 
old, and students.  
Die-hard pirates (29.1%, n = 371) express the most favorable attitude of all segments (M = 5.87, 
SD = 1.31, 95% CI [5.74; 6.01]) and do not consider it unethical (M = 2.49, SD = 1.43, 95% CI 
[2.36; 2.61]). They also experience the least amount of guilt (M = 1.00, SD = .00), which is 
consistent with their belief that the action is not unethical. Die-hard pirates tend to pirate the most 
of all pirate segments, ranging from once a month to daily. They report the highest subjective norm 
(M = 5.95, SD = 1.22, 95% CI [5.83; 6.07]), the highest pirating self-efficacy (M = 5.34, SD = 
1.68, 95% CI [5.07; 5.61]), and they do not believe that piracy causes much harm to the industry 
(M = 3.55, SD = 1.39, 95% CI [3.43; 3.67]). For the die-hard pirate, pirating is habitual (M = 5.08, 
SD = 1.94, 95% CI [4.77; 5.40]). Die-hard pirates report the highest teleological evaluation (M = 
5.16, SD = 1.33, 95% CI [4.84; 5.48]) and are most likely to be men, between 15 and 18 years old 
(teenagers) or 18 and 25 years old (college age), and students. 
A paired-samples t-test showed no differences between deontological and teleological orientation 
among anti-pirates (t(100) = .101, p = .92, d = .02) or among conflicted pirates (t(50) = -1.96 , p = 
.056, d = -.42). However, teleological orientation scores were higher than those for deontological 
orientation among cavalier pirates (t(72) = -5.44, p < .001, d = -.88) and die-hard pirates (t(68) = -
4.76, p < .001, d = -.64).  
In conclusion, we find four identifiable segments within the pirate population. These segments 
differ from one another in aspects other that those used as segmentation variables, namely 
subjective norms, pirating self-efficacy, habit, perceived harm, deontological and teleological 




5. Study 3 
5.1 Sampling 
In the third study, 303 completed surveys were collected online. As in Study 1, the minimum age 
was set at 15 years (birth date: 1999). When the questionnaire was administered, the average age 
of participants was 22.45 years (SD = 5.98) and the average birth year was 1992. Overall, 16.4% 
were age 15 to 18 (born between 1996 and 1999), 71.1% were age 19 to 25 (born between 1989 
and 1995), 7.7% were age 26 to 35 (born between 1979 and 1988), and 4.7% were age 36 to 55 
(born between 1959 and 1978). The sample was 51% male, and 69.5% were enrolled in school. 
The questionnaire hyperlink was forwarded via university email to students of the entire university; 
it was also distributed via social networks such as Facebook and Netlog, to an online university 
research panel, and via online learning platforms (such as Smartschool) in collaboration with local 
high schools. 
5.2 Design and instrument measures 
In a 2 (between-subjects: legal vs. educational) x 4 (between-subjects: anti-pirate, conflicted pirate, 
cavalier pirate, or die-hard pirate) x 2 (within-subjects: before vs. after the manipulation) mixed 
design, participants were randomly assigned to either the legal or the educational condition and 
their responses were measured before and after the manipulation. Segment membership was 
determined thereafter. To keep the manipulation as realistic as possible, respondents in both 
conditions were exposed to real-life stimuli. In the legal condition, respondents read an article from 
a local newspaper covering the house searches, arrests, and hardware confiscations of website hosts 
and the shutdown of two websites, although a fictitious paragraph was added stating that a number 
of end users also faced administrative fines. For the educational condition, respondents were 
exposed to a brochure from the Belgian Anti-Piracy Federation (BAF) informing consumers about 
intellectual property rights and the detrimental consequences of piracy on the entertainment 
industry. The brochure explicitly referred to piracy as stealing and emphasized that the creative 
sector was losing jobs and revenue for innovation because of piracy. For an overview of the 














Legal condition     
Perceived illegality     
Torrent downloading is illegal. 4.56 1.76 4.71 .85 
Torrent downloading is forbidden by Belgian law.  4.99 1.65   
Torrent downloading is in violation with the law. 4.57 1.72   
Perceived impunity     
The chance of being caught for illegal downloading is very 
small in Belgium. 
5.92 1.39   
Pirating intention     
How likely are you to download your movie/series of choice? 4.79 2.17   
     
Educational condition      
Perceived harm     
Torrent downloading hurts the music industry. 4.45 1.62 4.07 .83 
Torrent downloading hurts the movie industry. 4.37 1.65   
Torrent downloading hurts retailers.  4.67 1.49   
Perceived triviality     
I am not interested in the debate surrounding torrent 
downloading.  
4.03 1.72 4.16 .81 
The debate surround torrent downloading is not interesting 
enough to bother me.  
4.18 1.69   
The whole debate around torrent downloading is  
Exaggerated.  
4.34 1.55   
Pirating intention     
How likely are you to download your movie/series or choice?  4.86 2.19   
     
All items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1= “Completely do not agree” to 7 = “Completely agree”) 
 
In both conditions, pirating intentions were measured before and after the manipulation. The same 
segmentation items as in Study 1 (i.e., attitude, ethical evaluation, and guilt associated with digital 
piracy) were measured first. On the following page, respondents had to select, from a list, a recent 
movie or TV series that they would like to watch and were then asked, “How likely are you to 
download [name of selected movie/series]?” Answers were on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not 
likely at all”) to 7 (“Very likely”). The choice of the movie or TV series was irrelevant to the study 
but was requested in order to enhance the realism of the situation for the respondent. On the next 
page, depending on the condition to which the respondent had been randomly assigned, the 
respondent was presented with items on either perceived illegality and impunity (legal condition) 
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or perceived harm and triviality (educational condition). The items were measured on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (“Completely disagree”) to 7 (“Completely agree”). After a filler task, the 
manipulation was administered and afterwards the participants’ downloading intention was 
measured again, along with items associated with either perceived illegality and perceived 
impunity (legal condition) or perceived harm and triviality (educational condition). See Table 7 for 
an overview of the items for each condition and their corresponding item means, construct means 
and internal consistency measures. 
5.3 Results and conclusion 
Using the LatentGOLD® Choice 4.5 software, a latent class cluster analysis based on attitude, 
ethical evaluation and guilt yielded the same four-cluster solution, thus replicating the findings 
from Study 1. The segment memberships were exported, and repeated measures ANOVA were run 
in IBM SPSS Statistics 22.  
Legal strategy 
A legal strategy was successful in increasing perceptions of the illegality of piracy in all segments 
except for the die-hard pirates. A significant drop in perceived impunity was found in all segments 
except the conflicted pirates. Interestingly, although this strategy was effective in changing 
perceptions of illegality and impunity in most segments, it did not significantly lower pirating 
intentions in any segment. Moreover, it actually resulted in an increase in pirating intentions for 
the cavalier pirates. Perhaps this segment will indeed exhibit higher levels of risk tolerance, as 
Sinha and Mandel (2008) observed in their study. For a detailed overview of these results, see 
Table 8. When comparing the posttest results of all segments, we find that they differ significantly 
in terms of pirating intentions (F(3,145) = 9.44, p <.001, ɳ² = .16), and perceived illegality 
(F(3,142) = 4.96, p <.01, ɳ² = .10). These results indicate that, although changes occurred on the 
within-subjects level, the absolute differences between segments (i.e., anti-pirates having the 
lowest scores, conflicted and cavalier pirates somewhere in the middle and die-hard pirates having 
the highest scores) remained unaffected. Remarkably, the segments do not differ in terms of 
perceived impunity (F(3,142) = 2.27, p = .08, ɳ² = .05), signifying a general perception of impunity 





The educational strategy  
The educating strategy significantly increased perceptions of harm caused by piracy, apart from 
the anti-pirate segment, that already shows high perceptions of harm to begin with, indicative of a 
ceiling effect. The strategy was effective in lowering pirating intentions for the cavalier and 
conflicted pirates, but no significant difference was found for the anti-pirates and the die-hard 
pirates. This result for the anti-pirates can be explained by a floor effect as they already download 
so little. For the die-hard pirates, however, the educational strategy, although successful in 
significantly increasing perceived harm, remained insufficient for generating an effect on pirating 
intentions. For all segments, perceived triviality was not affected by the strategy, indicating that in 
spite of an increased awareness of inflicted harm, piracy remained an issue of little consequence 
for all segments. See Table 9 for an overview of the results. When comparing the posttest results 
between all segments, we find that they differ significantly in terms of pirating intentions (F(3,150) 
= 13.75, p <.001, ɳ² = .22), and perceived harm (F(3,148) = 5.81, p <.01, ɳ² = .11), indicating that 
although changes occurred on the within-subjects level, the absolute differences between segments 
remained unaffected. Not surprisingly, the segments also did not differ in terms of perceived 





Study 3. Legal strategy 
  Perceived illegality Perceived impunity Pirating intention 













All segments 149 4.71 (1.42) 5.18 (1.24) 29.68*** 5.92 (1.16) 5.12 (1.40) 46.11*** 4.79 (2.17) 5.11 (2.42) 11.53** 
Anti-Pirate 26 5.12 (1.09) 5.81 (0.85) 12.14** 5.56 (0.96) 4.64 (1.22) 23.25*** 3.35 (2.04) 3.31 (2.06) .03 
Conflicted  20 5.00 (1.28) 5.40 (1.11) 6.58* 5.50 (1.24) 4.80 (1.20) 4.03 4.75 (1.83) 5.10 (1.97) 3.71 
Cavalier  57 4.72 (1.28) 5.20 (0.90) 14.84*** 5.95 (1.02) 5.20 (1.20) 16.90*** 4.67 (2.23) 5.05 (2.41) 10.01** 
Die-Hard  46  4.36 (1.72) 4.70 (1.63) 3.38 6.27 (1.30) 5.44 (1.70) 11.29** 5.78 (1.81) 6.22 (2.20) 4.11 




Study 3. Educational strategy 
  Perceived harm Perceived triviality Pirating intention 













All segments 154 4.07 (1.24) 4.38 (1.37) 17.69*** 4.16 (1.38) 3.99 (1.28) 5.97* 4.86 (2.19) 4.44 (2.14) 16.69*** 
Anti-Pirate 30 4.72 (1.08) 4.83 (1.44) .25 4.13 (0.91) 3.90 (1.13) 1.30 3.23 (2.16) 2.77 (2.01) 1.83 
Conflicted  28 4.28 (0.86) 4.78 (1.15) 10.03** 4.23 (1.26) 3.86 (1.17) 4.24 4.64 (2.16) 4.18 (2.07) 7.10* 
Cavalier  43 4.20 (1.16) 4.53 (1.15) 9.08** 4.13 (1.32) 4.03 (1.25) 1.12 5.05 (2.06) 4.40 (1.82)  17.50*** 
Die-Hard  53 3.49 (1.34) 3.77 (1.43) 6.02* 4.17 (1.72) 4.07 (1.45) .68 5.74 (1.80) 5.55 (1.84) 1.29 




Four segments of pirates were distinguished based on differing constellations of attitude, ethical 
evaluation of piracy, and guilt: the anti-pirate, conflicted pirate, cavalier pirate and die-hard pirate. 
The segments differ on two important and actionable outcome variables, pirating frequency and 
pirating intentions, thereby further validating the selection of the segmentation variables. They also 
show scaling degrees of pirating self-efficacy, subjective norm, habit, perceived harm, perceived 
triviality and perceived illegality. The segments could therefore be placed on a continuum of 
pirating intensity, not merely in terms of behavioral frequency but also in terms of internalization 
(Scott, 1971). The latter term refers to the process of acceptance of a set of norms and values 
established by people who are influential to the individual. At one end of the continuum resides the 
anti-pirate, who is not very familiar with digital pirating, nor is his or her social environment 
familiar with it. At the other end of the continuum are die-hard pirates who consider piracy a normal 
thing, feel that their peers support it, and feel proficient in doing it.  
The pirate segments also differ in their general deontological and teleological orientation. Cavalier 
pirates report the lowest deontological orientation of all pirate segments. Perhaps they continue 
pirating in spite of considering it unethical because their behavior is not directed by moral 
absolutes. However, anti-pirates reported the lowest teleological orientation. They tend to focus 
less on the repercussions and are guided more by moral absolutes (e.g. “Taking something that 
does not belong to you is wrong”). Compared to the other segments, conflicted pirates hovered in 
between. When comparing their deontological and teleological orientations, the difference is either 
marginally significant or marginally non-significant, depending on the point of view, with a slight 
edge toward teleological orientation. This is presumably because they experience a struggle 
between the two considerations: they consider digital piracy unethical, yet they long to reap its 
benefits. This could explain why conflicted pirates experience more guilt than cavalier pirates. 
Lastly, die-hard pirates report the highest teleological orientation of all pirate segments. Perhaps 
this teleological orientation is so deeply embedded in them that they fail to perceive digital piracy 
as unethical, instead viewing it as a harmless act. This exploratory inquiry into ethical orientations 
reveals thought-provoking differences among the segments but is by no means comprehensive. 
Further application of the Hunt-Vitell model (Hunt & Vitell, 2006), using items specific to digital 
piracy, is needed to identify at what point in the evaluation process deontological and teleological 
considerations take effect, whether and how neutralization techniques are involved (Sykes & 
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Matza, 1957), and which alternatives digital pirates consider. For instance: presenting to choose 
between: “pirating or not watching” versus “pirating or purchasing” might yield different 
teleological evaluations. In any case, this segmentation has revealed general deontological and 
teleological differences among digital pirates that would have gone unnoticed if they were studied 
as a homogeneous mass. 
The need for such segmentation has also been insinuated by previous piracy literature. The fact 
that so many contradictory findings exist is not an artifact of differences in methodology but rather 
of sampling. Opposing findings are not necessarily coincidental or erroneous. For instance, Jacobs 
et al. (2012) did not find a significant effect of pirating self-efficacy on illegal downloading 
behavior, whereas numerous other studies did (Cronan & Al-Rafee, 2007; Kwong & Lee, 2002; 
LaRose & Kim, 2007; Liao et al., 2009; Peace et al., 2003; Shanahan & Hyman, 2010). The 
difference is that Jacobs et al. (2012) sampled from an online forum predominantly populated by 
tech-savvy computer enthusiasts. They also sampled from a population of university students; 
however, university students represented only one-quarter of the sample, and respondents who 
indicated that they have never downloaded movies were excluded. Therefore, Jacobs et al. (2012) 
could in fact have been investigating a sample primarily of die-hard pirates, who are homogeneous 
with respect to self-efficacy. 
More importantly, by establishing these four different segments of digital pirates, we can 
understand better how current piracy-combatting measures influence them differently and why the 
overall success of such measures has been rather limited. We find that the educational strategy is 
more effective than the legal strategy in terms of lowering pirating intentions. Moreover, the legal 
strategy can even be counterproductive for cavalier pirates because it increases pirating intentions. 
Sinha and Mandel (2008) indicated a similar finding, namely that a certain segment of respondents 
reported higher illegal downloading intentions after exposure to a deterrent strategy. This segment 
was characterized by higher levels of optimum stimulation (i.e., higher risk tolerance) and could 
coincide with cavalier pirates.  
Although the legal strategy was successful in significantly influencing perceptions of illegality and 
impunity, it was insufficient to sway die-hard pirates toward lowering their pirating intentions. The 
educational strategy displayed the same weakness, as die-hard pirates reported significantly 
heightened perceptions of harm after the manipulation but their general level of perception of harm 
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remained significantly lower than that of all other segments. This slight increase was also 
insufficient to move die-hard pirates toward lowering their pirating intentions. We have thus 
determined that both strategies fail to change the pirating intentions of the most challenging target 
segment, i.e., die-hard pirates. These people, who do the most frequent pirating, do not recognize 
that much harm is being inflicted and do not view piracy as unethical.  
7. Managerial implications 
Even if a strategy did prove effective, it remains uncertain how durable any attitude change would 
be and whether the return on investment would justify the undertaking. Bhattacharjee, Gopal, 
Lertwachara, and Marsden (2006) tracked the file-sharing activities of 2,056 people before and 
after RIAA-related lawsuits and found that respondents’ sharing behavior decreased significantly 
around the time of RIAA legislative activity but then, after a period of time, returned to its original 
level. To the best of our knowledge, no such longitudinal studies with educational strategies have 
been conducted, but, based on our results, perhaps a different approach would be more suitable—
one focused not on preventing piracy from occurring but on offering better service value than that 
promised by pirating files (Jeong & Khouja, 2013). Such an approach could make it unnecessary 
to awaken pirates’ ethical sensitivity, causing even the die-hard pirates to become more focused on 
legal alternatives.  
Several legal alternatives are already available (Papies, Eggers, & Wlömert, 2010). The classic 
system is that of Electronic Sell-Through (EST), whereby consumers pay a one-time fee per media 
file they download on their hard drive (e.g., at the iTunes store). The downside is that files can 
come with restrictions, and costs of single songs add up. Next, there is the subscription model 
wherein, for a monthly fee, consumers receive unlimited access to an online library for the duration 
of their membership. This model mostly uses streaming (e.g., Spotify, Netflix), a media delivery 
method in which the consumer views or listens to files as they are downloaded but the files are not 
saved to the consumer’s hard drive. Finally, the advertising-based model bears some resemblance 
to the subscription model, but relies on advertising rather than monthly fees as its revenue source 
and can thus offer its services gratis. Papies et al. (2010) found that this model has the potential to 
attract new customers who did not previously download legally. Although this model is very 
attractive because it provides an unlimited and free service, the fact that one does not own the files 
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and the populace’s general aversion toward advertising (Papies et al., 2010) cause such a service 
to remain problematic.  
Could these alternatives convert pirates into law-abiding citizens? Today, the idea of ownership is 
complicated. Consumers used to have a feeling of ownership when they bought a DVD or a CD, 
but with legal digital alternatives, this ownership is temporary and restricted. Piracy offers true 
ownership of files and the freedom do to what consumers want to do, whenever and for as long as 
they wish. Sinha, Machado, and Sellman (2010) stated that the music industry could benefit from 
removing digital rights management (DRM) restrictions because doing so may convert some 
pirates into paying customers. If the entertainment industry wants to change the behavior of a 
significant number of pirates, it must loosen its grip on digital files and offer better value than 
piracy does to consumers.  
8. Research limitations and future research 
A limitation of this study consists in its use of a sample from a single nation (Belgium) where 
piracy is not high on the political agenda and where prosecutions are rare or nonexistent, as 
reflected by the high degree of perceived impunity in our sample. An interesting corollary of this 
situation is that the responses were not biased by fear of prosecution. However, cross-cultural 
research is needed to generalize the existence of the four pirate segments identified here, because 
piracy is a global issue. This study reveals the existence of distinct segments but does not offer 
insights as to which antecedents lead to an individual’s membership in a certain segment. 
Additionally, one cannot exclude the possibility of migration among segments; for example, a 
cavalier pirate could become a conflicted pirate as he or she grows older. Longitudinal research 
would be needed to examine this proposition.  
Furthermore, this study does not consider the impact of financial considerations on piracy. Future 
research could investigate whether differences in total income or discretionary income exist 
between the pirate segments. In addition, the influence on each segment of financial risks related 
to digital piracy or of pricing strategies of legal alternatives could be investigated.  
Study 1 investigated pirating frequency, yet this variable does not clearly reflect the amount of 
media material downloaded. Differences may exist between downloading patterns of the pirate 
segments; for instance, certain pirates may download in batches (i.e., they download full seasons 
of television programs or a number of movies or songs in one session), and others may download 
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sequentially (i.e., they download episodes upon release), whereas others may download according 
to their immediate needs (e.g., they are having friends over, they want to catch up on a show during 
a long flight, or they want to hear a specific song). Moreover, some pirates’ downloading behavior 
might be erratic and could fall under all three of the above-mentioned descriptions at various times. 
Nonetheless, when measuring download volume, one needs to take the dominant downloading 
pattern of each pirate into account, as asking respondents simply to report their recent behavior 
could convey a misleading impression; for example, questioning a prolific batch downloader in 
between batches will yield an underestimation, whereas questioning a sequential downloader at the 
start of a new television season will yield an overestimation.  
Lastly, the ethical perspective should be wholly investigated. The identification of differences in 
general deontological and teleological orientations warrants further investigation of the application 
of the Hunt-Vitell model (Hunt & Vitell, 2006) to digital piracy. Future research could examine 
specific deontological and teleological evaluations relating to digital piracy, pinpointing whether 
and how these evaluations take effect and which alternatives certain pirate segments take into 
consideration. Differences in neutralization techniques (Sykes & Matza, 1957), motives, and 
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Appendix A. Glossary  
Term Definition 
Digital Piracy The illegal procurement of infringed copyrighted digital media files. 
In this study it refers to procuring infringed movies and TV shows by 
use of BitTorrent downloading. 
 
Digital Media Digitized music- and video files in various formats such as .MP3, 
.WAV, .WMA,.MP4, .AVI,… 
 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) network A computer network wherein each connected computer can act as a 
server (i.e. seeder) as well as a client (i.e. leecher) for other computers 




(Bit)torrent is the dominant P2P file-sharing protocol and generally 
operates by splitting content (i.e. files) into several small pieces that 
can each be downloaded by and from different peers. Information 
about the files to be shared (i.e. metadata) and information about the 
tracker are called (Bit)Torrents.  
 
(Bit)Torrent Client A BitTorrent client is any program that implements the bit torrent 
protocol. Every client is capable of requesting and transmitting any 
kind of computer file over the network using the protocol. Examples 
include Vuze Inc. and BitTorrent Inc. 
 
(Bit) Torrent Tracker Trackers contain information about all peers that currently possess 
pieces of a particular file. Trackers coordinate the downloads but do 
not contain any content. Examples include The Pirate Bay, Demonoid 
and Sumotracker. 
 
(Bit) Torrent Index Site Websites that contain an index of torrent files and act as search engines 
through which torrents can be downloaded are called torrent sites. 
Examples include The Pirate Bay, KickassTorrents, Torrentz and 
Mininova (which offers only legally redistributable media). 
 
Streaming Streaming is a media delivery method. During streaming a part of the 
data is buffered so the file can be played. This way the audiovisual 
media can be consumed without downloading the entire file. Examples 





Appendix B. Study 1: Topic Guide  
Topics 
Ice breaker: General music experience 
Do you often listen to music? 
What role does music take in your life? 
What devices do you usually use to listen to music? 
Ice breaker: General movie and TV experience 
Do you often watch movies? 
Do you often watch TV shows? 
What role do movies play in your life?   
What role do TV shows play in your life? 
What devices do you usually use to watch movies? 
What devices do you usually use to watch TV shows? 
Downloading 
Where do you get your music/movies/TV shows from? 
Where do most of your friends get their music/movies/TV shows from? 
Why do you think your friends would download? 
Why do you think people in general would download? 
Why do you download? 
What do you believe are benefits to downloading? 
What do you believe are downsides to downloading?  
What would impede people from downloading? 
Do you think a lot of people do it? Why/Why not? 
What sort of person do you believe the “typical downloader” would be? 
What sort of person do you believe the “typical non-downloader” would be? 
How do you believe the majority of Belgians think about illegal downloading?   
How do you feel when downloading illegally? 
Do you consider the consequences when downloading illegally? 
Would you consider illegal downloading as wrong and immoral? Why/why not? 
Despite the fact you know it’s wrong, why would you continue downloading? 
Would you consider illegal downloading similar to stealing a CD/DVD from a store?  
Why/Why not? 
Would you consider illegal downloading similar to riding a bus without paying?  
Why/why not?  
Before this interview, had you already reflected upon this subject?  
 
Appendix C. Study 2: Ethical dilemma 
“A promising yet very experimental treatment for cancer is being developed, but has severe side-
effects. In order to test the treatment you have to conduct tests that can make the participants very 
sick and could lead to premature death. What do you do?” 
 
A. I test the treatment 




Appendix D. Study 3: Stimuli  
Legal strategy (translated from Dutch) 
  
 
TWO MAJOR WEBSITES SHUT DOWN DUE TO MILLIONS OF ILLEGAL DOWNLOADS: 
USERS PUNISHED 
 
Ghent, March 22nd 2014. –Two Belgian websites were shut down by the investigating judge in Ghent as a result of a 
judicial investigation because these websites were enabling users to download movies, music,… They refer to millions 
of downloads of infringed copyrighted material. Several users of these websites have received fines that amounted to 
thousands of euros. 
 
The Federal police was able to localize those responsible after intensive research and in collaboration with BAF. Nine 




In total, 9 house searches were conducted in Lier, Ranst, Edegem, Hasselt, Aalst, Putte, Westerlo and Lint, and this at 
the residence of the individuals who hosted two websites and of several users.  
As a result, 10 computers, 9 laptops, 45 external hard drives and 10 USB sticks were confiscated. In addition, both 
websites were shut down.  




Those responsible for the website can be sentenced for the violation of the copyright law of June 30th 1994. Penal 
fines can be imposed ranging from 550 to 550,000 euros and/or imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years and the 
destruction of confiscated materials.  
 
Several users were also prosecuted and received fines that could mount up to 8,250 euros.  
  
In addition to this, the BAF can also file a claim for damage restitution. The going rate is 20 euros per infringed item, 






Users of these websites do not always fully realize which violations they make and which risks they take. Users of 
these websites run the risk of getting fines up to thousands of euros! 
The police and the BAF strongly advise users to stay away from these websites and warn users that in the fight 





Educational strategy (English translation below) 
 
What is piracy? 
Piracy entails copying or disseminating copyrighted works, such as movies, music and games, without permission of 
the creators.  
What is copyright? 
The person that produces or creates a movie, game or music is an “author” and is the only one who gets to decide 
how this work is distributed. Due to this right the authors get compensated for the work they put into it. So you 
may never copy or disseminate a movie, song or video game without the authors permission.  
All creators sorely need the compensation for their work so they can start and fund new creations. If everyone 





You are also a victim! 
Who is the victim of piracy? 
Piracy is theft and you are also the victim! 
Every music-, movie- or game lover is affected by illegal copies or downloads. A person that does not pay for a 
movie, game or CD may not realize it, but is stealing from artists and producers and indirectly of all music-, movie- 
or game lovers.  






Protecting creative talent. 
The Belgian movie industry annually loses about 10% of its revenue as a result of piracy. Since 2000 the revenue of 
the music industry has declined with 50% worldwide. Specifically, this means that no new jobs are created in the 
Belgian entertainment industry or even that people lose their jobs.  
In order to protect creative talent and investments, the BAF fights against illegal copying and dissemination of 






-“Oh well… what’s the harm in downloading one CD?”  
-“Oh well… what’s the harm in downloading one game?” 
-“What’s the harm in downloading one movie?” 






CHAPTER IV:  
WOULD YOU BE SO KIND TO BUY FAIR? THE IMPACT OF 





CHAPTER IV:  
WOULD YOU BE SO KIND TO BUY FAIR? THE IMPACT OF 





Consumers claim to have very positive attitudes towards Fair Trade products, but 
these positive attitudes unfortunately do not translate into purchasing behavior. It 
seems that people care about Fair Trade, but consumers do not. In this paper we 
investigate whether the importance consumers attach to the Fair Trade-attribute of 
a product can be increased by activating the experience of interpersonal feelings 
such as love, connectedness, pride, generosity, joy, benevolence, compassion and 
empathy. The results of two experimental studies demonstrate that it is possible to 
enhance the importance of the Fair Trade product attribute by activating the 
experience of interpersonal feelings using Reed and Aspinwall’s (1998) Kindness 
Questionnaire in two different product categories, namely chocolate and coffee. 
These results suggest that consumers can be nudged towards choosing a Fair Trade 
product and thus a potential solution is proposed for bridging the attitude-behavior 




Consumption of Fair Trade goods is a form of ethical consumer behavior or ethical consumerism, 
which reflects behavior aimed at enhancing other’s well-being and doing good for others and/or 
society in general. In this paper we investigate whether the importance consumers attach to the Fair 
Trade attribute of a product can be increased by activating the experience of interpersonal feelings. 
This way consumers can be nudged towards choosing a Fair Trade alternative and thus a potential 
solution is proposed for bridging the attitude-behavior gap that is especially prominent in research 
on Fair Trade purchase behavior. Consumers boast very positive attitudes towards Fair Trade 
products, but curiously these positive attitudes do not translate into positive sales figures. It seems 
that people care about Fair Trade, but unfortunately, consumers do not.  
Consumers in developed countries are becoming increasingly aware and concerned about where 
their products come from and under which circumstances they were produced. People appear to 
care deeply about the social aspects of the products they consume (Auger, Burke, Devinney, & 
Louviere, 2003; Auger & Devinney, 2007; Auger et al., 2008; Rice, 2001) and Fair Trade products 
offer a way of soothing the consumers’ conscience.  
Fair-trade products are products produced and sold under Fair Trade standards which ensure better 
terms of trade for local farmers and achieve sustainable development of producers in disadvantaged 
circumstances (Fair Trade International, 2016). Generally speaking, Fair Trade is an alternative to 
free-market trade in which the payment of fair wages and prices, worker circumstances, the 
development of sustainable businesses and ultimately the establishment of political and social 
justice is promoted (De Pelsmacker, Janssens, et al., 2005; Littrell & Dickson, 1999).  
Coffee, bananas, flowers and cocoa still make up the most important product categories for Fair 
Trade (Sarmadi, 2015). The Fair Trade product portfolio has increased steadily, amounting to up 
to 30,000 product references in 125 countries across the world, ranging from coffee and tea to wine 
and cosmetics (Smithers, 2014). Although market share is rather marginal, Fair Trade products are 
definitely on the rise, with a world average (of participating countries) of 15% (Sarmadi, 2015). 
The United States of America, which is a relatively new market since Fair Trade was not introduced 
until 2012 is one of the strongest growing markets with a growth rate of 501% and brand new 
markets such as India and Kenya are exhibiting rapidly growing sales of Fair Trade products. 
Germany and UK are currently boasting the largest Fair Trade retail sales worldwide with a sales 
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increase of 12% and 23% respectively, an impressive increase of markets that are already the 
largest in terms of Fair Trade products worldwide (Sarmadi, 2015; Smithers, 2014).  
In light of these optimistic figures local farmers in underdeveloped countries, retailers and Fair 
Trade activists should be able to rest securely on their laurels. But can they? Bearing in mind that 
market share is still marginal, the Fair Trade market is still considered a niche market that has yet 
to reach the general populace (Devinney et al., 2009). The main challenge lies in the apparent gap 
that exists between consumer attitude and actual purchasing behavior. Consumers positive attitudes 
towards socially responsible products (Auger et al., 2003; Auger & Devinney, 2007; Auger et al., 
2008; Rice, 2001) do not translate into actual purchasing behavior (Aaker et al., 2010; Carrington 
et al., 2010; Luchs et al., 2010; White et al., 2012).  
2. Literature review 
Several explanations for this gap have been suggested. Auger and Devinney (2007) posit that the 
alleged attitude-behavior gap behavior is merely an artifact of methodology because conventional 
surveys elicit social desirable responses and consequently cause an overestimation of intentions. 
Several authors recommend the use of research methods that force respondents to reveal their true 
preferences, attitudes and intentions such as contingent valuation methods, conjoint analyses, 
choice experiments or natural field experiments (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; Auger & Devinney, 
2007; Devinney et al., 2006). Perhaps social desirability could indeed inflate stated preferences and 
attitudes, but this does not discount the notion that people could still have a positive attitude towards 
Fair Trade products overall. Many obstacles could obstruct the translation from attitude into actual 
behavior: the price trade-off could be too strong (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 2005; Devinney 
et al., 2012; Szmigin et al., 2009; Vitell, 2015), people do not believe justice restoration can be 
achieved (White et al., 2012), people could be using neutralization techniques (Brunner, 2014) or 
they could simply not believe the ethical claims (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 2005). 
Regardless of what could be driving this gap, the fact of the matter remains: people care about Fair 
Trade, but consumers don’t. Yet herein lies a vast pool of potential consumers for companies. 
Devinney et al. (2006) propose a proactive model of consumer social responsibility in which the 
initiative does not come from the consumer itself, but from companies bolstering a market by 
awaking latent needs of socially conscious consumers. Corporations should take the lead and act 
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socially proactive as opposed to socially active. A crucial step in this endeavor is investigating how 
to bridge the gap between attitude to behavior and capitalize on it.  
The problem is that current literature does not offer an action-oriented answer to this question. 
Research on Fair Trade consumption is relatively new and most literature to date is –though 
necessary- descriptive and diagnostic in nature and mainly investigates drivers of Fair Trade 
consumption by exploring demographic characteristics (Auger et al., 2003; Bellows, Alcaraz, & 
Hallman, 2010) or values (Auger et al., 2008; De Pelsmacker, Driesen, et al., 2005; De Pelsmacker, 
Janssens, et al., 2005; Doran, 2009). This paper focusses on what could trigger consumers to opt 
for a Fair Trade option in a naturalistic experimental setting, while taking into account the trade-
offs that people are willing to make. 
In concreto we investigate whether completing Reed & Aspinwalls (1998) Kindness Questionnaire 
compared to completing a control questionnaire would nudge participants into choosing a Fair 
Trade alternative as opposed to a regular product. 
The Kindness Questionnaire (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998) is rooted in self-affirmation theory and is 
a typical tool used in manipulating self-affirmation. According to Steele (1988) people have a 
desire to view themselves as being moral, competent, adaptive and in control of the outcome of 
their lives. Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) refers to processes that are attuned to the 
preservation of a person’s self-worth. Whenever a person’s self-worth is threatened, people will 
tend to engage in a general affirmation of their self-worth. Threats to a person’s self-worth may 
take on many forms, people may behave in a way that is inconsistent with their attitudes which in 
turn threatens their perception of their own self-worth (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), receiving 
negative self-relevant information (Dillard, McCaul, & Magnan, 2005; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; 
Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000) but may also include negative judgments by others or a failure 
to perform according to personal standards (Duclos, Bettman, Bloom, & Zauberman, 2012), though 
the list is not exhaustive. 
Studies in health literature find that people who have the opportunity to self-affirm prior to 
receiving negative self-relevant health information (e.g. confronting coffee-drinkers with negative 
information about the effects of consuming coffee) react less defensively towards the information 
given, compared to a control (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et al., 2000). Self-affirmation can 
be manipulated in a number of ways, for instance by first threathening the self and consequently 
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offering an opportunity to affirm the self in one of the conditions. Usually the self-affirming 
procedure entails a reflective writing component, for instance by writing about values participants 
find important (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008) or by thinking about a time they felt like 
an honest person and writing about it (Dillard et al., 2005). But the most popular tool for self-
affirmation is Reed and Aspinwall’s (1988) Kindness Questionnaire.  
It consists of ten yes/no questions prompting people to recall and elaborate in writing on specific 
situations in which they have been kind to others such as “Have you ever forgiven another person 
when they have hurt you?”. The Kindness Questionnaire has been shown to increase receptiveness 
to threatening information, increase motivation and change behavior (Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & 
Napper, 2008; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). Self-affirmation is assumed to enhance self-esteem, but 
evidence on this mechanism is mixed (McQueen & Klein, 2006). For instance, in a study on 
communicating harmful effects of smoking, Dillard et al. (2005) did not find that allowing 
respondents to self-affirm reduced defensiveness. In addition, Armitage and Rowe (2011) find that 
the Kindness Questionnaire did not affect self-esteem or global self-feelings. The authors conclude 
that self-affirmation probably operates not by reinforcing the self, but rather by distracting the self 
away from the threat by focusing it on positive interpersonal feelings.  
However, in contrast to the effect on self-esteem and self-concept, the evidence of the effects on 
positive interpersonal feelings is more robust (Armitage et al., 2008; Armitage & Rowe, 2011; 
Epton & Harris, 2008; McQueen & Klein, 2006). Positive interpersonal feelings entail feelings 
such as love, compassion, empathy, connectedness etc. and are feelings that are outwardly directed 
toward another social entity. Crocker et al. (2008) also refer to them as ‘other-directed feelings’ 
and contrast them to ‘self-directed feelings’ such as pride and superiority. They measured 18 
feelings and found that self-affirmation had a greater impact on other-directed feelings such as 
love, than on self-directed positive feelings. Using a subset of these 18 feelings, Armitage and 
Rowe (2011) also found an increase in interpersonal feelings. 
In this paper the authors focus specifically on the Kindness Questionnaire manipulation. The mere 
notion that this manipulation would increase the experience of positive interpersonal feelings 
should theoretically speaking suffice to nudge participants into selecting a Fair Trade product, 
regardless of any threat to the person’s self-image because ample literature has shown that positive 
feelings and positive interpersonal feelings foster a range of prosocial behaviors (Aknin, Dunn, & 
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Norton, 2012; Bankard, 2015; Baron, 1997; Cavanaugh, Bettman, & Luce, 2015; Kelley & 
Hoffmann, 1997; Telle & Pfister, 2016).  
Based on these findings, we hypothesize that the Kindness Questionnaire manipulation would 
nudge people into opting for the Fair Trade alternative (Study 1) as opposed to a regular product 
and attaching more importance to the Fair Trade product attribute (Study 2) due to an increase in 
the salience of interpersonal feelings.  
Our paper contributes in three ways, first it offers an action-oriented approach for retailers and Fair 
Trade stakeholders to nudge consumers towards Fair Trade products. Second, to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is one of the few that applies the Kindness Questionnaire on product choice 
(see Townsend and Sood (2012) for an application of self-affirmation theory –without the use of 
the Kindness Questionnaire- on aesthetic product choice) or prosocial behavior. Most literature on 
self-affirmation and by extension the Kindness Questionnaire focusses on health behavior (Crocker 
et al., 2008; Dillard et al., 2005), with the exception of Duclos et al. (2012). Lastly, our studies 
refrain from the use of traditional surveys in order to curb the effects of social desirability, as 
recommended by Andorfer and Liebe (2012). 
This paper describes two studies, each investigating a different product category often used in Fair 
Trade research, chocolate and coffee in particular. The first study investigates whether (1) 
respondents in the Kindness Questionnaire condition have a higher likelihood of choosing the Fair 
Trade alternative in a real-life store simulation and (2) whether this choice is mediated by 
interpersonal feelings. Respondents could choose between a brand name regular milk chocolate 
bar (Cote d’Or) and a brand name Fair Trade milk chocolate bar (Oxfam) of comparable size (47 
and 50 grams, resp.) and general appearance (both chocolate bars had red packaging). The second 
study takes a range of product features of coffee into account and investigates whether the 
importance of the Fair Trade is driven by an increase in the experience of interpersonal feelings 
caused by the Kindness Questionnaire manipulation, compared to the control condition. We find 
that the effect of the Kindness Questionnaire manipulation is indeed mediated by a rise in 




3. Study 1 
3.1 Participants and procedure 
One-hundred ninety-six undergraduate students at a Western European University participated in 
the study. The average age was 22.56 years (SD = 4.84) and the sample consisted of 59 % female 
participants.  
The participants were invited to the lab and were randomly assigned to either the Kindness 
Questionnaire condition (N=99) or the control condition (N=97). After completing the 
questionnaire the participants reported their experienced levels of interpersonal feelings, among 
other unrelated filler tasks. Next, the participants were instructed to partake in what they believed 
was a taste test, but was actually the choice segment of the experiment. The participant was told 
that he or she was participating in a milk chocolate taste test and that they had the freedom to 
choose between two brands, without explicitly attracting attention to the fact that one of the brands 
was a Fair Trade product. They could choose between a regular brand (Cote d’Or) and a Fair Trade 
brand (Oxfam). Both bars were of similar size (47grams and 50 grams respectively) and similar in 
general appearance as both had red colored packaging. No explicit control questions were asked as 
to whether or not the participant noticed that one of the brands was Fair Trade. On the one hand 
because the Fair Trade brand (Oxfam) is relatively well-known as a Fair Trade brand and on the 
other hand because we did not want to reveal the true purpose of the study. The participants 
returned to their seats with the selected chocolate bar and completed a survey about the chocolate 
bar they had selected. The respondents were allowed to keep the rest of the chocolate bar in case 
they had not finished it during the alleged taste test, received payment for their participation and 
thanked at the end of the survey.  
Materials 
Kindness Questionnaire condition 
Participants assigned to this condition were instructed to complete a Kindness Questionnaire. The 
Kindness Questionnaire was a Dutch translation of the one used by Reed and Aspinwall (1998) in 
which participants were prompted to elaborate on their past acts of kindness. Ten questions 
prompted participants to recall specific acts of kindness they had engaged in in the distant or present 
past. The Kindness Questionnaire consists of the following ten “yes or no” questions: ‘Have you 
ever forgiven another person when they have hurt you?’, ‘Have you ever been considerate of 
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another person's feelings?’, ‘Have you ever been concerned with the happiness of another person?’, 
‘Have you ever put another person's interests before your own?’, ‘Have you ever been generous 
and selfless to another person?’, ‘Have you ever attended to the needs of another person?’, ‘Have 
you ever tried not to hurt the feelings of another person?’, ‘Have you ever felt satisfied when you 
have helped another person?’, ‘Have you ever gone out of your way to help a friend even at the 
expense of your own happiness?’ and ‘Have you ever found ways to help another person who was 
less fortunate than yourself?’. When the participant answered ‘yes’ to a question, they were asked 
to describe one (or several) specific act(s) of kindness related to the question.  
Control condition 
The control condition was also a Dutch translation of the control questionnaire that was utilized by 
Reed and Aspinwall (1998). Participants in the control condition also had to complete a ten item 
questionnaire, similar to the Kindness Questionnaire condition. The difference lies in the content 
of the questions. Here the participants were probed for their opinions of ten neutral statements that 
were completely unrelated to acts of kindness. The control questionnaire consisted of the following 
ten statements: ‘I think the color blue looks great on most people.’, ‘I think that chocolate is the 
best flavor for ice cream.’, ‘I think that winter is the most satisfying season of the year.’, ‘I think 
that the most aromatic trees in the world are pine trees.’, ‘I think that cooking is an important skill 
to possess.’, ‘I think that houseplants help to brighten the home.’, ‘I think that sewing is an 
important skill to possess.’, ‘I think that the beach is a great place to go on holiday.’, ‘I think that 
the underground is the best form of public transportation.’, and ‘I think that fruit makes the best 
dessert.’. Consistent with the Kindness Questionnaire group, when the participants answered ‘yes’ 
to a statement, they were asked to elaborate on as to why they would hold that particular opinion.  
Measures  
Interpersonal feelings were measured using items based on previous research (Armitage & Rowe, 
2011; Crocker et al., 2008) and encompassed love, connectedness, pride, generosity, joy, 
benevolence, compassion and empathy. Participants were asked to rate the degree to which they 
experienced these feelings at the present moment on a scale ranging from (1) Not at all to (5) 
Extremely. Exploratory factor analysis revealed that the interpersonal feelings measures loaded on 




In addition to an open ended question ‘Why did you choose this product?’ other quantifiable 
questions were asked in order to gain insight into the motives driving their decision. Two general 
questions about taste preference and brand familiarity were formulated. In order to further mask 
the true objective of the study several health-related questions were posed.  
3.2 Results and discussion 
An independent samples T-Test revealed that participants in the Kindness Questionnaire (KQ) 
condition did indeed report higher levels of experienced interpersonal feelings (M=3.82, SD=.52) 
than the control condition (M=3.63, SD=.69), t(194) = 2.23, p < .05.  
We found that the effect of the Kindness Questionnaire on product choice was mediated by 
interpersonal feelings. As Figure 1 illustrates, the regression coefficient between condition and 
interpersonal feelings was statistically significant (B=.19, SE=.09, p < .05), and marginally 
significant between interpersonal feelings and product choice (B=.46, SE=.25, p = .06). We tested 
the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. Unstandardized indirect 
effects were computed for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval 
was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The 
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .09 (Boot SE=.07), and the 95% confidence 
interval ranged from .00 to .29. The indirect effect was statistically significant.  
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine whether participants who were 
exposed to the KQ have a higher tendency of selecting the Fair Trade option. Unfortunately, the 
relation between these variables proved statistically insignificant, χ2 (1, N = 196) = 1.35, p = .25. 
Although slightly more participants selected the Fair Trade option (49.5%) compared to the 
participants in the control condition (41.2%). The lack of significance could be explained by the 
overpowering influence of brand familiarity on an effect that is already expected to be small to 
begin with. Analyses on the motive items reveal that a large number of the participants that selected 
the regular brand option (Cote d’Or) were driven by familiarity motives (52.3%) compared to the 





To clarify, Table 1 (section “By product choice”) reflects the motives for choice split up by the 
product they have chosen. In other words, of the participants that chose the regular product, 52.3% 
did so because they were motivated by brand familiarity. Conversely, of the participants that chose 
the Fair Trade product, 3.4% were motivated by brand familiarity. A strong preference for the taste 
of the well-known regular chocolate brand (Cote d’Or) probably also imposed an subduing effect 
on the manipulation as a large number of the participants that selected the regular brand option 
(Cote d’Or) were driven by flavor motives (56.1%) compared to the number of participants that 
selected the Fair Trade option (16.9%), χ2 (1, N = 196) = 31.63, p < .000, which in part could be 
also be explained by the brand’s overwhelming ubiquity. Though it is interesting to note that still 
a relatively large proportion of the sample opted for the Fair Trade option (45.4%). No differences 
between the conditions was found with respect to motives of taste (χ2 (1, N = 196) = .72, p = .40) 
or brand familiarity (χ2 (1, N = 196) = 1.40, p = .24). See Table 1 for an overview of these Chi 
Square tests. In addition, there was no correlation between product choice and any of the health-
related questions (“Do you smoke?”, χ2 (1,N=196) = .01, p = .93; “How is your health in general?”, 
χ2 (1,N=196) = .15, p = .70, “How often do you eat candy?”, χ2 (1,N=196) = .59, p = .87 and “How 





Study 1: Chi-square tests by condition and by product choice 










Χ² Cramer V p-value 
Product choice       
     Regular 50.5 58.8 54.6 1.35 .08 .25 
     Fair Trade 49.5 41.2 45.4    
     Total 100 100 100    
       
Brand familiarity       
     Yes 26.3 34.0 30.1 1.40 .09 .24 
     No 73.7 66.0 69.9    
     Total 100 100 100    
       
Taste preference       
     Yes 35.4 41.2 38.3 .72 .06 .40 
     No 64.6 58.8 61.7    
     Total 100 100 100    
       
       










Χ² Cramer V p-value 
Brand familiarity       
     Yes 52.3 3.4 30.1 55.37 .53 *** 
     No 47.7 96.6 69.9    
    Total 100 100 100    
       
Taste preference       
     Yes 56.1 16.9 38.3 31.64 .40 *** 
     No 43.9 83.1 61.7    
     Total 100 100 100    
       
Significant at ***p<.01,**p<.05, *p<.10 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
We find that the inclination of respondents in the KQ condition towards the Fair Trade option is 
mediated by a rise in interpersonal feelings. The smaller size of the effect could be due to the 
imposing influence of brand familiarity on product choice. Cote d’Or is a strikingly popular brand 
among Belgian users. The following study should neutralize the effect of brand familiarity whilst 
keeping it in the product equation. Also, Study 1 does not control for idealistic dispositions, it could 
well be that certain participants would have selected the Fair Trade option due to personal beliefs 
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unrelated to the manipulation or that one condition could contain a larger concentration of idealistic 
participants by chance. De Pelsmacker, Janssens, et al. (2005) found that consumers high in 
idealism tend to have a stronger inclination towards Fair Trade products. 
4. Study 2 
4.1 Participants and procedure  
One-hundred seventeen coffee-consuming undergraduate students of a Western European 
University participated in the study. The average age was 22.41 years (SD = 5.47) and the sample 
consisted 53 % female participants.  
Participants were screened based on their coffee-consumption and invited to the lab. People who 
did not drink coffee were not included in the analysis. They were randomly assigned to either the 
Kindness Questionnaire condition (N=60) or the control condition (N=57). After completing the 
questionnaire in a computer room the participants were probed for their experienced levels of a 
range of interpersonal feelings. After completing these tasks the participants completed an adaptive 
conjoint analysis survey about coffee.  
Adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) is a computerized survey design in which a relatively large 
number of product attributes are presented in combinations that are customized based on the 
respondents previous answers. In order to avoid information overload and extended and tiresome 
survey questioning ACA focuses only on the attributes that are most relevant to the respondent. 
This survey design enables researchers to determine indirectly what product attributes are 
considered important by presenting trade-offs of these attributes to respondents. Contrary to a 
traditional survey, in which respondents can claim that they find every attribute as important, 
respondents are now forced to choose what they truly find important and which attribute takes 
precedence in a trade-off. The researcher introduces several product or service attributes (for 
example: color, weight, design,…) and declares the number of levels each attribute has (for 
example, the 3 levels for the attribute color are blue, yellow and green). Based on a customized 
presentation of combinations the importance of these attributes is indirectly derived. The ACA 
survey consists of several sections which each have a specific purpose. First, the preference level 
for each attribute is directly gauged (known as the ‘ACA rating’), second the relative importance 
of each attribute is measured (known as the ‘ACA importance’), third come the paired-comparison 
trade-off questions which elicit the conjoint trade-offs and lastly the computer composes a series 
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of ‘calibrating concepts’, in other words, it composes products with attribute combinations ranging 
from the most ideal product to the most undesirable product and prompts the respondent to report 
either their purchase likelihood. (Sawtooth, September 2007). 
The attributes and their appropriate levels were partly inspired by the attributes De Pelsmacker, 
Driesen, et al. (2005) used and were based on an exploratory group discussion they conducted with 
coffee consumers, and partly on a short pilot study. We distinguish two types of attributes: product 
versus ethical attributes. The following product attributes and associated levels were used in the 
ACA survey:  
 Brand: manufacturer brand or private label  
 Blending: arabica or robusta 
 Strength: strong, regular or decaf 
 Type: coffee pads or grounded coffee 
 Price: €2, €3 or €4 
 Point of purchase: supermarket or organic specialist store 
As well as the following ethical attributes:  
  Fair Trade label: present or absent 
 Organic certification (“Bio-label”): present or absent  
The authors have opted to include organic certification in the ACA survey to not attract too much 
attention to the Fair Trade attribute. Since research has shown that consumers rating high on 
idealism tend to have a stronger tendency for purchasing Fair Trade products (De Pelsmacker, 
Janssens, et al. ,2005) the participants completed a questionnaire which measured idealism in order 
to control for these idiosyncratic ethical dispositions. Upon completion, participants received 
payment for their participation and thanked at the end of the survey.  
Measures  
Interpersonal feelings: The same items as in the first study were used. Participants were asked to 
rate the degree to which they experienced these feelings at the present moment on a scale ranging 
from (1) Not at all to (5) Extremely. Exploratory factor analysis revealed that the interpersonal 
feelings measures loaded on a single factor explaining 52.5 % of the variance in the data, resulting 
in a scale with α= .87.  
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Idealism: Idealism was measured with items from the ethical position questionnaire (Forsyth, 
1980). The Ethics Position Questionnaire was designed to measure individual differences in moral 
thought. Examples of items of the idealism scale are “People should make certain that their actions 
never intentionally harm another even to a small degree.” and “The existence of potential harm to 
others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.”. Items were measured on a seven-
point scale ranging from (1) Completely disagree to (7) Completely agree. The coefficient alpha 
for the idealism scale was .89.  
4.2 Results and discussion 
Attribute importance and conjoint utilities: An adaptive conjoint analysis was implemented using 
the Sawtooth adaptive conjoint analysis software, the data was imported into IBM SPSS Statistics 
23. The most important attribute overall is coffee strength (18.3%), followed by point of purchase 
(15.1%), type (13.9%), brand (11.6%), presence of Fair Trade label (11.6%), price (10.9%), organic 
certification (9.3%) and blending as least important attribute (9.2%). Table 2 presents an overview 
of overall attribute importances and conjoint utilities (See B. Orme (2010) for more information on 
the interpretation of adaptive conjoint analysis). Again, a significant difference in IPF is found 
between the KQ condition (M=3.89, SD=.50) and the control condition (M=3.67, SD=.69), 
t(115)=2.02, p < .05. Interestingly, when comparing attribute importances between the conditions 
we see a marginally significant difference in the importance of the Fair Trade label between the 
KQ condition (M=9.97, SD=7.75) and the control condition (M=7.65, SD=6.14), t(115)=1.79, p = 
.07. But we do not find a difference in importance in the other ethical attribute, namely the presence 
of an organic certification (t(115)=1.35, p = .89). For an overview of all pairwise comparisons we 
refer to Table 2. This suggests that the increase in IPF exclusively impacts the ethical value that 
has a strong humane, social aspect (i.e. the Fair Trade label) as opposed to the other ethical value 
that has a more global, environmental overtone. One could even go so far to state that is has some 
self-oriented benefits, as organic food is often believed to be healthier (Yusoff, Ibrahim, Shafie, & 
Rennie, 2012).  
Again, we found that the effect of the Kindness Questionnaire on product choice was mediated by 
interpersonal feelings, even when controlling for idealism. As Figure 2 illustrates, the regression 
coefficient between condition and interpersonal feelings was statistically significant (B=.23, 
SE=.06, p < .05), as was the regression coefficient between interpersonal feelings and product 
155 
 
choice (B=2.45, SE=1.04, p < .05) and the regression coefficient between the covariate idealism 




We tested the significance of this indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures. Unstandardized 
indirect effects were computed for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence 
interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The 
bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was .56 (Boot SE=.36), and the 95% confidence 
interval ranged from .04 to 1.51.  
4.3 Conclusion 
We can thus conclude that participants who received the kindness manipulation attached more 
importance to the Fair Trade attribute and this effect can be explained by an increase in 
interpersonal feelings. As could be expected, idealistic participants attached more importance to 
the Fair Trade attribute, yet including this covariate in the model did not eliminate the effect of the 




Study 2: Attribute importances and conjoint utilitiesa overall (a) and compared between the kindness and control condition (b). 

















Strength 18.27 %  20.41 %  24.65 %  2.99 *** 
     Strong   .03  .05  .18   
     Regular  .33  .49  .38   
     Decaf  -.45  -.63  -.69   
Type 13.93 %  15.49 %  16.00 %  .31 .76 
     Coffee pads  -.11  -.18  -.36   
     Grounded coffee  .05  .12  .27   
Price 15.14 %  14.57 %  13.67 %  .72 .47 
     €2  .31  .30  .23   
     €3  .09  .13  .09   
     €4  -.49  -.53  -.44   
Brand 10.86 %  10.52 %  10.06 %  .34 .73 
     Private label  -.27  -.36  -.26   
     Manufacturer brand  .20  .30  .18   
Point of purchase 11.59 %  11.35 %  9.83 %  1.08 .28 
     Supermarket  .20  .30  .09   
     Organic specialist store  -.26  -.36  -.17   
Blend 9.25 %  10.18 %  10.76 %  .40 .69 
     Arabica  .02  .04  -.08   
     Robusta  -.09  -.03  .00   
Fair Trade label 11.64 %  9.97 %  7.65 %  1.79 * 
     Present  .24  .23  .20   
     Absent  -.30  -.29  -.28   
Organic certificate 9.33 %  7.51 %  7.36 %  .14 .89 
     Present  .14  .02  .18   
     Absent  -.21  -.08  -.26   
Significant at ***p<.01,**p<.05, *p<.10 
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5. General discussion 
Our results demonstrate that it is possible to nudge consumers into choosing a Fair Trade 
alternative by increasing the experience of interpersonal feelings through Reed and Aspinwall’s 
(1998) Kindness Questionnaire. We could find this effect in two different product categories, 
namely chocolate and coffee. In the first study we find that participants choice for a Fair Trade 
milk chocolate brand versus a well-known regular brand was driven by an increase of 
interpersonal feelings. We find that participants in the Kindness Questionnaire condition were 
slightly more inclined than participants in the control condition to choose the Fair Trade 
product. The effect of choice of a product was not large because the regular milk chocolate 
brand was too popular amongst our sample. However it should be noted that in reality, brand 
familiarity is always a force to be reckoned with. In the conjoint analysis survey in study 2 the 
product attribute private label brand versus manufacturer brand was included in the model, but 
no specific brands were mentioned hence mitigating the influence of brand names. In the second 
study we found that participants in the Kindness Questionnaire condition attached more 
importance to the Fair Trade attribute than did the participants in the control condition.  
The Kindness Questionnaire is traditionally used in research on self-affirmation theory, a theory 
that states that people wish to view themselves as moral, competent, adaptive and in control of 
the outcome of their lives. According to self-affirmation theory, whenever that view is 
threatened, people will engage in actions that help reastablish that view (Steele, 1988). However 
this paper does not focus on self-affirmation theory. In part because the empirical evidence of 
self-affirmation is not convincing (see McQueen and Klein (2006) for a review). What is more, 
specific to the Kindness Questionnaire Dillard et al. (2005) found no effect on self-esteem or 
global self-feelings. But they did find an increase in interpersonal feelings, which is what we 
have specifically focused on in this paper. 
A second issue with studying self-affirmation theory is that the theory states that self-
affirmation can be flexible. So when someone’s self-image is threatened, this person can also 
self-affirm in a domain unrelated to the domain under threat. Imagine that someone receives a 
negative evaluation at work and work is important to that person’s self-integrity. This person 
could then think about how satisfying his or her family life is and by considering his or her 
personal life as more important than their job, this person can reaffirm and restore their self-
integrity. This possibility complicates research on self-affirmation theory, since there is no way 
of knowing whether the theory is disconfirmed or whether the respondent self-affirms outside 
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the bounds of the experiment. Lastly, in the setup of our studies, the use of the self-affirmation 
theory is in fact inconsequential because the respondents self-integrity is never threatened. This 
is because Kindness Questionnaire consolidates respondents’ self-integrity, as opposed to 
threatening it. This is in fact its main purpose: researchers use the Kindness Questionnaire to 
restore respondents’ self-integrity after threatening it.  
Our studies have confirmed that the Kindness Questionnaire leads to an increase in the 
experience of interpersonal feelings, thus replicating previous research (Armitage et al., 2008; 
Armitage & Rowe, 2011; Epton & Harris, 2008; McQueen & Klein, 2006). This boost in 
interpersonal feelings in turn nudges respondents towards choosing a Fair Trade product. 
Several explanations can be offered for this effect. For one, by completing the Kindness 
Questionnaire people could be induced into a mindset in which they transcend self-directed 
concerns and focus more on others. In their paper on the influence of writing about self-
important values on defensiveness towards self-threatening information Crocker et al. (2008) 
posit that values affirmation reduces defensiveness via self-transcendence and not via self-
integrity, which is contrary to what self-affirmation theory would predict. Similar to the 
findings of this study, they find that writing about values respondents considered important 
induced more positive other-directed emotions (such as love and compassion), than positive 
self-directed emotions (such as pride). The effect of the Kindness Questionnaire on the 
importance of the Fair Trade label, but not the organic certification in Study 2 also demonstrates 
this focus on others rather than on the self. Fair Trade has a much stronger social and 
humanitarian component than does an organic certification, which is more focused on the self 
as consumers believe it to be more healthy and beneficial (Yusoff et al., 2012).  
A second explanation could be that respondents felt good when experiencing a rise in 
interpersonal feelings and wished to continue feeding this ‘warm and fuzzy feeling’. Aknin et 
al. (2012) propose the existence of a positive feedback loop between prosocial behavior and 
happiness. They find that recalling a past prosocial behavior (their paper focusses on prosocial 
spending specifically) increases happiness levels, which in turn increase the likelihood of 
engaging in prosocial behavior and so on. The respondents in this study could have been feeling 
good about themselves when remembering the kind acts they have performed for others and 




Lastly, attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980) could also explain why the Kindness 
Questionnaire would lead to an inclination to opt for the Fair Trade option. Grounded in 
persuasion literature, attribution theory deals with how people arrive at causal explanations of 
events. R. L. Miller, Brickman, and Bolen (1975) find that a persuasion communication 
designed to manipulate the attribution a person makes about themselves can result in enduring 
behavioral and motivational changes. A practice that is also referred to as ‘labelling’ (E. M. 
Moore, Bearden, & Teel, 1985). In their study on the modification of children’s littering 
behavior, R. L. Miller et al. (1975) randomly assigned three fifth-grade classrooms to three 
conditions: a persuasion condition, an attribution condition and a control condition. In the 
persuasion condition, they hung up a poster in the class stating “Don’t be a litterbug.” With 
“Don’t litter” and “Be neat” bordering it. In the attribution condition, a poster was also hung 
but it stated “We are Andersens’s Litter-Conscious Class”. At the end of an eight day period, 
the authors found that not only was the attribution condition more effective, the effects also 
lasted longer than in the persuasion condition. The authors conclude that the children in the 
attribution class had internalized the message the most and were least likely to litter on follow-
up tests, even when they did not know they were being monitored. Attribution could explain 
what was happening in our studies. By completing the Kindness Questionnaire, respondents 
were subtly internalizing the message: ‘You are a kind person’ and behaved accordingly. The 
rise in interpersonal feelings could have reinforced this attribution of kindness.  
It is worth noting that our effect sizes are on the small side. This is an unfortunate yet inevitable 
outcome that coincides with the subject matter. The consumer purchase process is dazzlingly 
complex and a myriad of factors have to be taken into account. More importantly, at this point, 
for only a handful of idealistic consumers Fair Trade might be a unique selling proposition but 
for the mainstream consumer Fair Trade is no more than a product attribute competing with 
other product attributes that are much more powerful, such as price and functionality (Devinney 
et al., 2009). Consumers are not easily distracted from habitual purchases and the comfort of 
brand familiarity, especially when it comes to permanently switching to Fair Trade products. It 
will require a slow and gradual process issued and governed by corporations. The “ethical 
consumer” as such is a myth and the socially responsible consumer is to be created not 
discovered (Devinney et al., 2009; Devinney, Auger, & Eckhardt, 2010). This paper 
demonstrates that there is hope yet, it is possible to nudge the consumer towards choosing Fair 
Trade in a positive way by reminding them of how kindhearted they are and not by guilt tripping 
them into a choice they will not wholeheartedly embrace. This positive approach has proven 
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much more effective in persuading people towards making better decisions because they do not 
feel they are being coaxed into doing something. They let their guard down and react less 
defensively, therefore allowing for more long-lasting behavioral change (Cornelissen et al., 
2008; R. L. Miller et al., 1975). 
Though this paper does not explicitly investigate specific drivers of the attitude-behavior gap, 
the results can be used as a means for bridging or even circumventing this gap. We find that it 
is possible to nudge people into opting for a Fair Trade option by reminding them of how kind 
they are and by making interpersonal feelings salient. Persuading people into buying Fair Trade 
products by inducing warm and positive affect is not new in Fair Trade marketing. The 
marketing strategy of the Fairtrade Foundation is basically intent on raising awareness about 
how Fair Trade can improve the lives of local farmers (it mostly boils down to ‘making the 
world a better place for all humanity’) and the bulk of their promotional and packaging material 
features smiling farmers (see Marketing Society (2013) for an overview of The Fairtrade 
Foundations marketing strategy and objectives). Research shows that smiling models in 
advertising produce more consumer joy (Berg, Soderlund, & Lindstrom, 2015). The difference 
is that the positive affect these campaigns instill is abstract, broad-based and ‘far from home’, 
whereas this paper shows that people need to feel close, concrete, specific and self-relevant 
positive affect oriented at others. The Kindness Questionnaire does just that: it reminds them 
of specific moments in which they were kind to others and may even relive those feelings.  
6. Managerial implications 
Although the Kindness Questionnaire has proven effective, completing it is time consuming 
and it is cumbersome to apply in a real life supermarket environment. The boost in interpersonal 
feelings is likely to be fleeting and short-lasting so any use of it should be implemented at the 
point of purchase and/or at the level of product packaging. Drawing on attribution theory, texts 
such as “You are a kind person” or more specific statements inspired on the items of the 
Kindness Questionnaire such as “Your friends can rely on you” or “You are generous towards 
friends and family” could be printed on the product packaging or on a poster near the Fair Trade 
product assortment. It is important to keep the tone of the message positive. Posing questions 
outside the context of the Kindness Questionnaire could backfire and result in defensive 
reactions. Reading “Have you ever put another person's interests before your own?” on a Fair 
Trade product could sound judgmental and coercing to consumers.  
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In the long run, interventions like the Kindness Questionnaire could abet the increase of the 
value that is attached to a Fair Trade label. According to Devinney’s (2012) notion of ‘socially 
responsible consumption’ (CNSR) consumers need not necessarily be driven by ethical motives 
but that the consumer could take into account “non-functional components of the consumption 
activity where benefits to others are taken into consideration, either directly or indirectly” (pg 
228). This much broader view on the consumption of ethical products does not require that 
consumer is driven by ethical motives, but merely by the appreciated value of the Fair Trade 
product attribute in itself. To illustrate, a socially responsible consumer could purchase a Fair 
Trade product because he strongly believes that minimum labor standards are imperative, but 
he could just as well purchase a Fair Trade product simply because he likes being seen with a 
Fair Trade product, or because he prefers the flavor or quality. In that sense, CNSR is not 
concerned with whether the reasons for consumption are ethical or not, but focusses on the 
value that is attached to the ethical product attribute.  
7. Limitations and future research  
 Fair Trade products exist for over more than 60 years but researching this topic still remains 
challenging due to social desirability. This study has attempted to circumvent this issue by 
concealing the true research objective. In Study 1 by telling participants they were participating 
in a taste test. Participants only had the choice between two options, so it is imaginable that 
some participants saw through this false pretense and behaved in a way they thought were 
expected to behave. Second, in the open-ended questions some participants declared that they 
had chosen the Fair Trade option because they did not know the brand and just wanted to try 
something new. Then again, this could also have been an a posteriori rationalization of a choice 
they had made as a result of the manipulation. Future research should grant participants a budget 
and allow for real price trade-offs and offer a larger number of regular and Fair Trade brands. 
Study 2 employed an adaptive conjoint analysis survey design as recommended by Andorfer 
and Liebe (2012). However this technique is also not completely immune to socially desirable 
responses, respondents could attribute a higher importance to certain attributes they believe 
they are expected to attached a higher importance to, such as Fair Trade, or child labor-free 
practices. But the trade-off section of the survey is able to tease out what the respondent really 
finds important, this makes socially desirable responding less straightforward compared to 
traditional surveys.  
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The effect sizes tend to be on the small side. This could in fact be a reflection of the small role 
Fair Trade currently plays for consumers. Larger sample sizes could improve statistical 
significance, but would not change the size of the effects. Still, it is indeed advisable that future 
researchers use much larger sample sizes when studying the role Fair Trade plays in a 
consumers purchasing behavior. It is also not clear what truly drives the behavior: is it merely 
the rise in interpersonal feelings, attribution/labelling or a combination of both? Future research 
should focus on disentangling these possible mechanisms. This paper has also focused on 
consumers as a whole, but several studies have shown that there exist different segments of 
consumers, some with a larger propensity of purchasing Fair Trade (De Pelsmacker, Janssens, 
et al., 2005; Doran, 2009). There could be variety in the effectiveness of the Kindness 
Questionnaire depending on the type of consumer. Lastly, coffee and chocolate are one of the 
most typical Fair Trade product categories, but in order to generalize to all Fair Trade goods, 
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This dissertation investigates and compares contemporary topics in ethical and unethical 
consumer behavior. We take a broad comparative perspective and study the different cognitive 
processes that drive ethical and unethical judgment and then zoom in on contemporary topics 
in ethical and unethical consumer behavior. This final chapter is structured as follows. First, a 
recapitulation of the main findings of Chapters II to IV is provided, followed by an overview 
of specific and general theoretical and managerial contributions and the final section concludes 
with suggestions for future research.  
1. Recapitulation of findings 
In the second chapter we study judgment of decision-making of ethical and unethical behavior 
jointly by integrating them in a dual process framework. This chapter investigates whether 
different types of processes drive ethical versus unethical judgment and which types of 
processing are involved. Ethical behavior encompasses behavior aimed at enhancing other’s 
well-being and doing good for others and/or society in general. On the other unethical behavior 
encompasses norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or society in general. Based 
on the literature, we have proposed that unethical behavior is more likely to be driven by Type 
1 processing (i.e. a diverse set of autonomous processes that do not rely on working memory 
and are associated with intuition, intuition and learned, automated processes) and ethical 
behavior is more likely to be driven by Type 2 processing (i.e. a type of processing that relies 
heavily on working memory and is associated with cognitive decoupling, hypothetical thinking 
and with deliberate and controlled cognitive processes). 
In the first study we find that participants needed more time to judge ethical scenarios, even for 
short sentences describing basic, everyday behaviors. These findings show that people are more 
quick to recognize and consequently judge unethical behavior, compared to ethical behavior. 
In the second study we replicate the finding that participants were slower to judge ethical 
scenarios compared to analogous unethical scenarios. Also, participants who were exposed to 
the ethical scenarios were less susceptible to framing effects, which is to be expected from 
people relying on a more analytic processing that is characteristic to Type 2 processing 
(McElroy & Seta, 2003). We also find that participants do not appear to be aware of these 
differences, which lead us to conclude that these differences might be hardwired on a more 
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basal level, out of the reach of conscious reflection and control. The third study teases out the 
differences in Type 1 and Type 2 processing by overtaxing the participants working memory 
during their decision making in four morally laden dilemmas. Cognitive load in the form of a 
digit task hampered decision making in the ethical personal dilemma by significantly slowing 
down reaction times, whereas decision making in the unethical personal dilemma was not 
negatively affected by cognitive load. Moreover, participants reacted even faster compared to 
the no-load condition. The final study tracked participants eye movements and pupil diameters 
while reading and deciding upon the four morally laden dilemmas from Study 3. More, longer 
and more dispersed fixations, faster, longer and more numerous saccades and smaller pupil 
sizes were observed for the unethical dilemmas compared to the ethical dilemmas. Though no 
conclusive process evidence can be deduced from the eye tracking metrics, the results showed 
that ethical and unethical information is processed differently. 
In the third chapter we investigate a contemporary manifestation of unethical consumer 
behavior, i.e. norm-violating behavior that is harmful to others and/or society in general and 
segment the population of digital pirates and find four segments of pirates were distinguished 
based on differing constellations of attitude, moral evaluation of piracy, and experienced guilt 
associated with piracy. The selection of these cluster variates was inspired by the aspiration to 
include only the most fundamental building blocks to achieve a parsimonious model that would 
adequately reflect possible differences between digital pirates. Attitude provides valuable 
information about a person’s general appraisal of the appropriateness of behavior (Ajzen, 1991). 
Some researchers may not consider attitude in their models because they presume that attitude 
is correlated with ethical judgment, i.e. they assume that if people think something is unethical, 
they will have a negative attitude toward it. However, the literature suggests that attitude is not 
necessarily contingent on or related to ethical judgment, especially when it comes to illegal 
downloading (Patwardhan et al., 2012; Vitell & Muncy, 1992; Vitell et al., 2007). Hence, there 
is good reason to include both attitude and ethical evaluation as distinct factors. Finally, 
experienced guilt is included because it works as an inhibitory mechanism that might help to 
further differentiate pirate segments.  
This resulted in four pirate segments: the anti-pirate, conflicted pirate, cavalier pirate and die-
hard pirate. Anti-pirates are characterized by the least favorable attitude toward piracy, consider 
piracy as morally unacceptable and experience the largest amount of guilt compared to the other 
segments. They tend to pirate the least frequent of all segments, report the lowest subjective 
norms and piracy self-efficacy. For them, piracy is by no means a habit and they strongly 
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believe that digital piracy inflicts harm to the industry. Conflicted pirates have a positive 
attitude toward piracy, although they consider piracy as morally unacceptable and feel guilty 
when pirating. This juxtaposition typifies the conflicted pirate, who tends to pirate more than 
the anti-pirate yet less than the other segments do. Compared to the rest, the conflicted pirate 
reports a moderate subjective norm, pirating self-efficacy, habitual behavior and believes that 
digital piracy harms the industry. Cavalier pirates have a positive attitude toward digital piracy 
and recognize piracy as an unethical activity but do not experience guilt over piracy. This 
nonchalant and indifferent mindset typifies the cavalier pirate. This segment pirates more than 
conflicted pirates, reports higher levels of subjective norm, pirating self-efficacy, considers 
their activity more of a habit and perceives it as less harmful compared to the previous two 
segments. Die-hard pirates express the most favorable attitude of all segments and do not 
consider it unethical. They also experience the least amount of guilt, which is consistent with 
their belief that the action is not unethical. Die-hard pirates tend to pirate the most of all pirate 
segments, report the highest subjective norm, pirating self-efficacy and they do not believe that 
piracy causes much harm to the industry. For the die-hard pirate, pirating is just a habit.  
More importantly, by establishing these four different segments of digital pirates, we can 
understand better how current piracy-combatting measures influence them differently and why 
the overall success of such measures has been rather limited. We find that the educational 
strategy is more effective than the legal strategy in terms of lowering pirating intentions. But 
even though the legal strategy was successful in significantly influencing perceptions of 
illegality and impunity, it did not lower the pirating intentions of die-hard pirates. The 
educational strategy displayed the same weakness, as die-hard pirates reported significantly 
heightened perceptions of harm after the manipulation but their general level of perception of 
harm remained significantly lower than that of all other segments and in addition, it did not 
lower their pirating intentions. We have thus determined that both strategies fail to change the 
pirating intentions of the most challenging target segment, i.e., die-hard pirates.  
In the fourth chapter we focus on the consumption of Fair Trade goods, which is a form of 
ethical consumer behavior or ethical consumerism, and reflects behavior aimed at enhancing 
other’s well-being and doing good for others and/or society in general. We investigate whether 
purchasing behavior can be influenced by tapping into the consumers need for interpersonal 
connections. We do this by the use of a particular self-affirmation tool called the Kindness 
Questionnaire which works by prompting people to recall and elaborate on specific situations 
in which they have been kind to others. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to nudge 
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consumers into choosing a Fair Trade alternative by increasing the experience of interpersonal 
feelings through the Kindness Questionnaire. We could find this effect in two different product 
categories, namely chocolate and coffee. In the first study we find that participants choice for a 
Fair Trade milk chocolate brand versus a well-known regular brand was mediated by an 
increase of interpersonal feelings. In the conjoint analysis survey in study 2 the product attribute 
private label brand versus manufacturer brand was included in the model, but no specific brands 
were mentioned hence mitigating the influence of brand names. In the second study we found 
that participants in the Kindness Questionnaire condition attached more importance to the Fair 
Trade attribute than did the participants in the control condition. Our studies have confirmed 
that the Kindness Questionnaire leads to an increase in the experience of interpersonal feelings, 
thus replicating previous research (Armitage et al., 2008; Armitage & Rowe, 2011; Epton & 
Harris, 2008; McQueen & Klein, 2006). This boost in interpersonal feelings in turn could nudge 
respondents towards choosing a Fair Trade product. 
Linking the results of Chapter III and IV back to the findings of Chapter II, it would be expected 
that the evaluation of digital piracy would follow Type 1 processing, whereas purchasing 
decision making of Fair Trade products would follow Type 2 processing. But this could be 
different depending on the circumstances. Anti-pirates and die hard pirates will probably 
engage in Type 1 processing because their behavior follows their evaluation that digital piracy 
is unethical/not unethical. For the conflicted and cavalier pirates (to a lesser extent), chances 
are that Type 2 processing is engaged in order to articulate rationalizations for why they would 
still engage in digital piracy. In the case of Fair Trade, for mainstream consumers who would 
normally purchase regular products, the decision to purchase a Fair Trade product is controlled 
and intentional, thus Type 2 processing. These consumers would have to deviate from their 
regular, default brand and would have to consider why they would purchase a Fair Trade 
product instead. Interventions such as the Kindness Questionnaire could serve as an additional 
argument (i.e., emotion as information) and could help tilt the balance in the advantage of the 
Fair Trade product. Conversely, for consumers who have strong, outspoken ethical principles 
regarding Fair Trade and/or highly idealistic consumers (De Pelsmacker, Janssens, et al., 2005) 
and/or habitually purchase Fair Trade products, purchasing decisions could be more automatic 
and intuitive. 
2. Theoretical and managerial implications 
Chapter II contributes to the literature on moral cognition by applying dual process theory on 
ethical and unethical judgment. In doing so it highlights the need of a general, unifying theory 
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on morality which could set a new stream of comparative research in motion. As the field 
becomes more multidisciplinary and more knowledge is gathered, the need for a framework in 
which to structure and outline this knowledge becomes more important. This paper does not 
advocate that ethical and unethical should always be studied jointly, but it could be interesting 
to study both for contrast. To quote Vitell and Muncy (2005) “[…] items that capture the 
consumers’ desire to do the right thing would offer a distinct and valuable contrast to the 
existing scale items” (p. 268). After the publication of the updated Consumer Ethics Scale, 
which included unethical as well as ethical items, most authors continued using either the 
ethical (Cojuharenco, Cornelissen, & Karelaia, 2016) or unethical items (Albert, Reynolds, & 
Turan, 2015; Egan, Hughes, & Palmer, 2015). But in doing so, valuable information is lost. To 
illustrate, Lu, Chang, and Chang (2015) measured whether the CES items are related to the 
purchase of green (ecological) products. They found that only the dimensions Recycling, Doing 
Good and Questionable behavior was positively related to green purchase intentions, but the 
other dimensions Actively, Passively Benefitting and No Harm, No Foul were not related at all 
to green purchasing behavior. Based on these findings, Lu et al. (2015) utter the possibility that 
ethical behavior is independent of unethical behavior. These findings are in line with the main 
assumption of Chapter II, namely that ethical and unethical behaviors are distinct behaviors.  
Chapters III and IV produce specific implications for their respective fields and related 
businesses. Chapter III offers an encompassing framework through which digital piracy can be 
better understood and acted upon. This paper is not the only one which has attempted to segment 
the pirating population, but it is unique in the sense that the segmentation is more than just a 
theoretical exercise because it also focuses on practical and actionable uses. The segmentation 
includes important insights and elements from the extensive literature on digital piracy and 
offers insights relating to actionable outcomes, such as pirating frequency, perceived harm, 
perceived illegality and perceived impunity. Our findings suggest that anti-pirating campaigns 
are targeting the wrong pirates because they rely on the assumption that piracy is the result of 
a lack of awareness, guilt and fear. Based on our findings, we propose a different approach for 
tackling digital piracy, one focused not on preventing piracy from occurring but on offering 
better service value than digital piracy (for instance, ad-based streaming subscriptions). Such 
an approach could make it unnecessary to awaken pirates’ moral sensitivity, causing even the 
die-hard pirates to become more interested on legal alternatives.  
Chapter IV highlights the importance of addressing the specific needs that are related to the 
ethical product attribute. We found that the Kindness Questionnaire manipulation had an impact 
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on the importance of the Fair Trade product attribute, but not on the organic certification. This 
suggests that the increase in interpersonal feelings exclusively impacts the ethical value that has 
a strong humane, social aspect (i.e. the Fair Trade label) as opposed to the other ethical value 
that has a more global, environmental overtone. By appealing to the consumers kindness, the 
gap between attitude and behavior could be bridged. Our paper contributes in three ways, first, 
to the best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the few that applies the Kindness 
Questionnaire on product choice or prosocial behavior. Second, our studies refrain from the use 
of traditional surveys in order to curb the effects of social desirability. Finally, it offers an 
action-oriented approach for retailers and Fair Trade stakeholders to nudge consumers towards 
Fair Trade products. We propose that texts such as “You are a kind person” or more specific 
statements inspired on the items of the Kindness Questionnaire such as “Your friends can rely 
on you” or “You are generous towards friends and family” could be printed on the product 
packaging or on a poster near the Fair Trade product assortment.  
The common thread that runs through the recommendations for business is paradoxical: in order 
to increase the purchase of ethical products and decrease digital piracy, one must strip the 
behaviors of its moral connotation and the negative affect that accompanies it. By providing 
better service value than piracy (instead of campaigns to make them feel bad or guilty for 
pirating), and by reminding customers of how kind they have been (instead of campaigns that 
make them feel bad or guilty for not helping poor and unfortunate farmers because they are not 
buying Fair Trade products). 
3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The studies in Chapters II to IV in this dissertation are subject to certain limitations, however, 
acknowledgment of limitations can provide inspiration and avenues for future research.  
The notion that ethical and unethical behavior are distinct behaviors and more than simply each 
other’s opposites opens up new opportunities and venues for research. Because the domain of 
moral cognition is becoming increasingly multidisciplinary the need for a general unified theory 
on moral judgment and decision making is becoming more important. Chapter II provides a 
strong impetus for the start of a line of comparative research within the field of morality. This 
Chapter found robust results that were repeatedly replicated over different morally charged 
contexts, but we have only scratched the surface and there is much uncharted territory that is 
yet to be explored. Future research could replicate the application of cognitive load by using 
manipulations that tax different parts of the brain, such as the dot memory task, operation span 
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task or time pressure. This way, the difference cannot be attributed by unwanted processes 
elicited by the cognitive load manipulation. This could entail task-specific processes such as 
encoding, retention, retrieval and abstract processing, but also general processes such as visual 
processing and motor responding. It is also possible that under certain circumstances, Type 1 
processing may occur for ethical judgments, for instance if when people bolster strong, 
outspoken norms and principles regarding ethical behavior or uphold strong values of 
benevolence or universalism (Yoon et al., 2006). Just as it is possible that Type 2 processing 
occurs for unethical judgment, for instance when automatic, proponent responses need to be 
overridden by utilitarian considerations (Greene et al., 2008). Further research into these 
boundary conditions could nuance and advance our understanding of dual processing in moral 
reasoning. Also, the role of emotion has not been addressed in this paper, but it almost certainly 
plays an important role. Future research could attend to how and where emotions takes effect 
or whether there are differences between the nature of the emotions that are involved. For 
instance, judgment of unethical behavior could be driven by more primordial emotions, such as 
anger, disgust and fear. These are ‘activating’ emotions which can set the sympathetic nervous 
system in motion, which is responsible for the ‘fight or flight’ response and for which quick 
responses are crucial. Contrary to this, ethical behavior could elicit more ‘passive’ emotions, 
such as contentment, empathy and affection. These could be linked to the parasympathetic 
nervous system, which is characterized by the ‘rest and digest’ response, a state of mind which 
lends itself for reflection and deliberation. But also, the role of moral emotions such as shame, 
guilt, embarrassment and pride should be investigated. More importantly, the stimuli (scenarios 
and dilemmas) that were used are subject to improvement. The stimuli sometimes differ on 
more than the ethical/unethical aspect. Though careful effort was invested in the design of the 
dilemmas and in keeping the level of severity (life threatening versus financial repercussions) 
and the nature of required action (indirect versus direct physical contact) constant, their contexts 
still differ in terms of the context in which they are situated. The constant context-issue also 
afflicts the other studies in the chapter. Future research should focus on designing and validating 
comparable ethical and unethical dilemmas and scenarios. Finally, there are certainly 
limitations in the use of eye tracking for investigating judgment processing since many 
alternative explanations are possible for the resulting output. Although based on the results of 
our eye tracking study we can conclude with a level of certainty that differences do exist, future 




Chapter III studies piracy, which is a global issue, with a single nation sample. Cross-cultural 
research is needed to determine whether the structure of the segmentation is generalizable 
across cultures. Studies have confirmed that Asian cultures are much more tolerant towards 
digital piracy due to the Confucian values they adhere to. These values propagate social 
harmony, cooperation and sharing with others what one creates, hence these countries are less 
eager to accept claims to intellectual property by corporations (Chen, Shang, & Lin, 2008). 
Cross-cultural research could determine whether there is a much larger proportion of die-hard 
pirates within these nations, or whether the structure of the segmentation is different entirely. 
However, this particular sample has the advantage that it is taken from a nation where piracy is 
not high on the political agenda which eliminates the risk of socially desirable responses 
motivated by a fear of prosecution. Future research could also look into possible antecedents 
that will cause someone to become a particular type of pirate. Also, since this study was cross-
sectional, longitudinal research could shed light on possible transfers across segments. 
Someone could be a die-hard pirates as a student but at later age become a conflicted, or a 
cavalier pirate, or even an anti-pirate. Furthermore, this study does not consider the role of 
financial considerations on piracy. Future research could investigate whether differences in total 
income or discretionary income exist between the pirate segments. Future research could also 
delve deeper into the moral aspects of digital pirates and further investigate moral personality 
traits such as machiavellism, idealism, relativism and the situational antecedents as suggested 
in the Hunt and Vitell (1986) model. Future research could also investigate the neutralization 
techniques and concepts such as moral licensing (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015) 
pirates use.  
Chapter IV also suffers from certain limitations. Contrary to Chapter III, social desirability 
poses a much greater risk in this Chapter, which studies ethical consumer behavior. We have 
attempted to eliminate this issue by concealing the true nature of the study from the participants, 
by making them believe they were participating in a taste test or by adding various other product 
attributes. The use of an adaptive conjoint analysis also hinders social desirability but it is not 
infallible against social desirability, respondents could attribute a higher importance to certain 
attributes they believe they are expected to attach a higher importance to. Another limitation 
were the effect sizes. This could in fact be a reflection of the small role Fair Trade currently 
plays for consumers. Larger sample sizes could improve statistical significance, but would not 
change the size of the effects. Still, it is indeed advisable that future researchers use much larger 
sample sizes when studying the role Fair Trade plays in the consumer’s purchasing behavior. It 
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is also not clear what truly drives the behavior: is it merely the rise in interpersonal feelings, 
attribution/labelling or a combination of both? Future research should focus on disentangling 
these possible mechanisms. This paper has also focused on consumers as a whole, but several 
studies have demonstrated that different segments of consumers exist, some with a larger 
propensity of purchasing Fair Trade (De Pelsmacker, Janssens, et al., 2005; Doran, 2009). There 
could be variety in the effectiveness of the Kindness Questionnaire depending on the type of 
consumer. Also, coffee and chocolate are one of the most typical Fair Trade product categories, 
but in order to generalize to all Fair Trade goods, future research should incorporate other 
product categories such as bananas, sugar, textiles and flowers. Future research could 
investigate the effectiveness of nudging texts on the packaging of the Fair Trade products, as 
suggested in the managerial implications. In this paper, we have only focused on Fair Trade 
products, but future research could investigate how the purchase of other ethical products can 
be influenced by tapping into needs and concerns that are specific to those ethical product 
attributes or by activating related memories, like the Kindness Questionnaire did. For example 
by reminding people of how well they have treated their pets in the past (and present) to make 
the animal-welfare attribute salient. 
Finally, this dissertation also points out the need for a clear definition of the concept of ‘ethical 
behavior’, which to date has not been addressed by the literature. We started out with a very 
broad definition of ethical behavior. But there is a strong need for a clear definition of what 
‘ethical behavior’ entails. Only then can the field of ethical behavior advance. The same goes 
for ‘ethical consumer behavior’. Research in the field is fragmented and not guided by a general 
framework. Also, the definition of ethical consumer behavior that is used by many others is 
limited to purchasing behavior. Researchers should build on a definition that goes much broader 
than this so it also covers other behaviors such as consumption patterns (e.g. consuming less to 
generate less waste), the way consumers reuse regular products such as recycling or upcycling, 
but also other behaviors in the consumption-context, such as returning to a store to pay for a 
product that was accidentally not charged.  
To our opinion, the development of a general framework for ethical consumerism deserves top 
priority. Preliminary steps in that direction have already been undertaken in the literature of 
corporate governance, management and leadership (Morales-Sanchez & Cabello-Medina, 
2013; Shanahan & Hyman, 2003) but to the best of our knowledge no such research has been 
undertaken for ethical consumer behavior. Shanahan and Hyman (2003) have developed a 
‘virtue ethics scale’ which is basically a categorization of traits that people appreciate in the 
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workplace: empathy, protestant work ethic, piety, reliability, respect and incorruptibility. But 
this is not applicable to consumer ethics and even it would be, it would not address the dire 
need of research into the descriptive ethics of ethical behavior. And with descriptive ethics we 
mean: what do people think is right? Undoubtedly, just as there are gradations in how unethical 
people consider certain norm violating behaviors, there will also be gradations in how people 
judge ethical behavior. The Vitell and Muncy’s (2005) Consumer Ethics Scale (CES) captures 
the gradations in unethical behavior based on beliefs that people have on what is more wrong. 
We believe that such a scale should also be developed for ethical consumer behavior. There are 
3 principles of unethical behavior that result in a higher moral condemnation: the action 
principle (harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by inaction), the intention principle 
(harm caused intentionally is worse than harm caused unintentionally) and the contact principle 
(causing physical harm is worse).  
Based on our literature review, we propose 3 principles for higher ethical approval or 
appreciation. People would consider behavior as more ethical if: it was intentional (intention 
principle), at a high cost for the benefactor (sacrifice principle) and the recipient is abstract or 
unrelated to the benefactor (proximity principle). The more distant and abstract the recipient is, 
the smaller the possibility that the benefactor could have self-interests invested in the deed. 
Adaptive conjoint analyses could generate and investigate trade-offs between these principles. 
For the development of the ethical equivalent of the CES, the following steps could be taken. 
Since Vitell and Muncy (2005) are already using the term ‘ethical’ in the name of their unethical 
scale, it could be baptized as the ‘Consumer Virtue Scale’. Focus groups and other qualitative 
techniques are needed to generate a multitude of ethical consumer situations and behaviors. 
Participants would then rate these behaviors on how virtuous (ethical) they consider these 
behaviors a factor analysis could determine categories varying in virtuous (ethical) gradation. 
There is also an urgent need for an ethical (virtuous) decision model, similar to the H-V model. 
If we would better understand what mechanisms could drive people to act against their own 
interests to the benefit of others, more insights can be gained as to how people can be swayed 
into engaging in ethical behavior. Also, only if we have a better understanding and delineation 
of ethical behavior we can venture into comparative studies between ethical and unethical 
behavior. Ethical research could also benefit from a multidisciplinary approach. Unethical 
behavior is a well-researched domain, but much attention and advances are still needed within 
the domain of ethical behavior. In other words, we already have a good idea of what we’re 




Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211 
Albert, L. S., Reynolds, S. J., & Turan, B. (2015). Turning Inward or Focusing Out? Navigating 
Theories of Interpersonal and Ethical Cognitions to Understand Ethical Decision-
Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 130(2), 467-484 
Armitage, C. J., Harris, P. R., Hepton, G., & Napper, L. (2008). Self-affirmation increases 
acceptance of health-risk information among UK adult smokers with low 
socioeconomic status. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 22(1), 88-95 
Armitage, C. J., & Rowe, R. (2011). Testing multiple means of self-affirmation. British Journal 
of Psychology, 102, 535-545 
Blanken, I., van de Ven, N., & Zeelenberg, M. (2015). A Meta-Analytic Review of Moral 
Licensing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(4), 540-558 
Chen, Y.-C., Shang, R.-A., & Lin, A.-K. (2008). The intention to download music files in a P2P 
environment: Consumption value, fashion, and ethical decision perspectives. Electronic 
Commerce Research and Applications, 7(4), 411-422 
Cojuharenco, I., Cornelissen, G., & Karelaia, N. (2016). Yes, I can: Feeling connected to others 
increases perceived effectiveness and socially responsible behavior. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 48, 75-86 
De Pelsmacker, P., Janssens, W., & Mielants, C. (2005). Consumer values and fair-trade beliefs, 
attitudes and buying behaviour. International Review on Public and Non Profit 
Marketing, 2(2), 50-69 
Doran, C. J. (2009). The Role of Personal Values in Fair Trade Consumption. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 84(4), 549-563 
Egan, V., Hughes, N., & Palmer, E. J. (2015). Moral disengagement, the dark triad, and 
unethical consumer attitudes. Personality and Individual Differences, 76, 123-128 
Epton, T., & Harris, P. R. (2008). Self-Affirmation Promotes Health Behavior Change. Health 
Psychology, 27(6), 746-752 
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nvstrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive 
load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107(3), 1144-
1154 
Hunt, S. D., & Vitell, S. J. (1986). A General Theory of Marketing Ethics. Journal of 
Macromarketing 6, 5-15 
180 
 
Lu, L. C., Chang, H. H., & Chang, A. (2015). Consumer Personality and Green Buying 
Intention: The Mediate Role of Consumer Ethical Beliefs. Journal of Business Ethics, 
127(1), 205-219 
McElroy, T., & Seta, J. J. (2003). Framing effects: An analytic-holistic perspective. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39(6), 610-617 
McQueen, A., & Klein, W. M. P. (2006). Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation: A 
systematic review. Self and Identity, 5(4), 289-354 
Morales-Sanchez, R., & Cabello-Medina, C. (2013). The Role of Four Universal Moral 
Competencies in Ethical Decision-Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 116(4), 717-734 
Patwardhan, A. M., Keith, M. E., & Vitell, S. J. (2012). Religiosity, Attitude Toward Business, 
and Ethical Beliefs: Hispanic Consumers in the United States. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 110(1), 61-70 
Shanahan, K. J., & Hyman, M. R. (2003). The development of a virtue ethics scale. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 42(2), 197-208 
Vitell, S. J., & Muncy, J. (1992). Consumer ethics: An empirical investigation of factors 
influencing ethical judgments of the final consumer. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(8), 
585-597 
Vitell, S. J., & Muncy, J. (2005). The Muncy-Vitell consumer ethics scale: A modification and 
application. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 267-275 
Vitell, S. J., Singh, J. J., & Paolillo, J. (2007). Consumers' ethical beliefs: The roles of money, 
religiosity and attitude toward business. Journal of Business Ethics, 73(4), 369-379 
Yoon, Y., Gurhan-Canli, Z., & Schwarz, N. (2006). The effect of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities on companies with bad reputations. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
16(4), 377-390 
  
 
 
 
  
